ライフサイエンスコーパス: belief

1 rical role an apple plays in Judeo-Christian belief).

2 vs. incompetent, words (reflecting specific beliefs).

3 tudies have begun to question this long-held belief.

4 plications for human psychology and cultural belief.

5 ier than the stage 5, a previously long-held belief.

6 global presence and variability of religious belief.

7 ntrolling for explicit learning and parental belief.

8 nformation participants require to form that belief.

9 riate body area and MTG disappears with that belief.

10 ood as depending on prior representations of belief.

11 hese processes may help explain variation in belief.

12 the subject's dynamically evolving internal beliefs.

13 uncertainty with potential rewards and prior beliefs.

14 ocating for a cause can alter the advocate's beliefs.

15 ontradicted or bolstered current predominant beliefs.

16 ation and updating of social preferences and beliefs.

17 futing long held assumptions and unqualified beliefs.

18 gnals a discrepancy between past and current beliefs.

19 eaction times reliably reflected the agent's beliefs.

20 n that is incongruent with their preexisting beliefs.

21 on, and that this can be combined with prior beliefs.

22 ividuals but are unable to represent others' beliefs.

23 ind strong evidence for differences in prior beliefs.

24 mately, failure to update overfamiliar prior beliefs.

25 e precision of the environment when updating beliefs.

26 y avoid information or resist revising their beliefs.

27 eek new information and eagerly update their beliefs.

28 sive and anxiety symptoms and fear-avoidance beliefs.

29 how they emerge from random accumulations of beliefs.

30 ial information processing can improve group beliefs.

31 models to recover information about investor beliefs.

32 alongside changes in consumer attitudes and beliefs.

33 he future are rationally combined with prior beliefs.

34 icular, whether they enable tracking others' beliefs.

35 ut, how does the Bayesian brain obtain prior beliefs?

36 mation in a manner that confirms their prior beliefs, a cognitive bias that contributes to rising pol

37 ghting the role of the PFC in representing a belief about the current state of the world.

38 not impact the ability to accurately develop beliefs about agents' harm preferences and predict their

39 ef precision-the precision afforded to prior beliefs about changing states in the world-particularly

40 vizing people to advocate altered a range of beliefs about character, guilt and punishment.

41 was highest for items related to the domain "Beliefs about Consequences" (e.g., mortality reduction)

42 rs to widely held, but factually inaccurate, beliefs about disease, immunity, pregnancy, and other me

43 lthough both groups reported strong positive beliefs about donation, these did not predict registrati

44 This study identified a wide range of beliefs about early rehabilitation that may influence pr

45 mpact of Internet access on the formation of beliefs about global warming.

46 ng but also help explain why polarization in beliefs about human-caused climate change can threaten g

47 e movements could be used to infer subjects' beliefs about latent variables using a naturalistic navi

48 ollaborative partners and groups, children's beliefs about obligation also arise from a process of in

49 pportunity in 2 hospitals, and the role that beliefs about organ donation play in registration behavi

50 eg, teacher and chef) completed a measure of beliefs about organ donation, were encouraged to discuss

51 ia may be explained by stronger higher-order beliefs about others and increased sensitivity to enviro

52 People's beliefs about others are often impervious to new evidenc

53 f inequality aversion and in the updating of beliefs about others.

54 h both genders and less gender-stereotypical beliefs about own personality characteristics, as indica

55 ses underpinning susceptibility to polarized beliefs about political and societal issues.

56 ated by a third transitional period in which beliefs about predictors' accuracy predominated.

57 e observers may have adopted to update their beliefs about probabilities.

58 m suboptimal neural heuristics over rational beliefs about reward contingencies.

59 cking and complicated by unhelpful views and beliefs about SHC.

60 the gender pay gap may arise due to cultural beliefs about the appropriateness of women and men for S

61 ), leading to a failure to accurately update beliefs about the body.

62 es of the environment, but rather subjective beliefs about the hidden state of the environment.

63 Moreover, businesses had widely varying beliefs about the likely duration of COVID-related disru

64 Beliefs about the negative consequences of donation and

65 hich to forego, requires developing accurate beliefs about the overall distribution of prospects.

66 ng links between this phenomenon and general beliefs about the relationship between effort and earnin

67 ort) measures are used, attitudes toward and beliefs about the same social group are often related to

68 Targeting negative beliefs about the self and others using compassionate im

69 erates more adaptive decisions by making our beliefs about the world less accurate.

70 Humans create metacognitive beliefs about their performance across many levels of ab

71 predict future outcomes and to update their beliefs about value in the world.

72 ctions, we often need to maintain and update beliefs about variables that cannot be directly observed

73 ormation; after inducing expectations (prior beliefs) about stimuli probabilities, we found that esti

74 decision, leading to a reduction in overall belief accuracy despite similar initial decision perform

75 found that information exchange can increase belief accuracy on noncontroversial factual matters, the

76 eriving from optimal computations over false beliefs, actually stems from suboptimal neural heuristic

77 Here we compared people's beliefs against their actual creative performance.

78 (also known as atomristors) has refuted this belief and added a new materials dimension owing to the

79 reasoned action and science to a reliance on belief and document the efforts to separate regulation f

80 Although rationalization about one's own beliefs and actions can improve an individual's future d

81 e were financially incentivized to form true beliefs and among professional lawyers, who are trained

82 ich systems thinking predicts global warming beliefs and attitudes (e.g., believing that global warmi

83 king is positively related to global warming beliefs and attitudes, the relationships are almost full

84 n an ecological worldview and global warming beliefs and attitudes.

85 subtle features of language shape children's beliefs and behaviors as they unfold in real world envir

86 study gender differences in COVID-19-related beliefs and behaviors.

87 We documented the normative beliefs and cooperative dispositions of 759 individuals

88 ationalize their actions, entire networks of beliefs and desires can be created and maintained in the

89 texts, the proximal and ultimate function of beliefs and desires is social inclusion.

90 on has performed an action and then concocts beliefs and desires that would have made it rational.

91 in two crucial respects: (1) the reality of beliefs and desires, that is, the fictional status of fo

92 und 3 of the Delphi, suggesting stability of beliefs and existing consensus.

93 ial norms, therefore, has to link individual beliefs and expectations to population-level dynamics, w

94 We tracked participants' beliefs and found no difference in the speed prior, but

95 Positive oral health beliefs and higher self-esteem predicted higher frequenc

96 Traditional beliefs and ideas, collectivism, family and kinship ties

97 mothers' optimal breastfeeding knowledge and beliefs and in reported exclusive breastfeeding practice

98 To evaluate the potential roles of prior beliefs and interoceptive precision in this context, we

99 what information we receive and how we form beliefs and make decisions.

100 with the ability to form internal-models or beliefs and make predictions about the future to survive

101 Oral health beliefs and self-esteem indirectly predicted gingival bl

102 ink was found between individuals' religious beliefs and uptake, findings indicated that minority rel

103 he brain motivates itself to form particular beliefs and why it does so.

104 ave hypothesized that abnormalities in prior beliefs and/or the precision-weighting of afferent inter

105 ic, they are factive, they are not just true belief, and they allow for representations of egocentric

106 r more information, antivaccine attitudes or beliefs, and a lack of trust.

107 change as a result of individual behaviors, beliefs, and expectations.

108 ousehold crowding), self-esteem, oral health beliefs, and frequency of toothbrushing were collected t

109 ery may be one way of reducing such negative beliefs, and hence paranoia.

110 nt undergoes a surprising change or existing beliefs are highly uncertain.

111 l become more extreme-and less accurate-when beliefs are motivated by partisan political bias.

112 , strong but nonmoral attitudes or religious beliefs), are perceived as universally and objectively t

113 the results suggest that addressing cultural beliefs as manifested in self-beliefs-that is, the confi

114 to choose models that conform to their prior beliefs as opposed to anchoring on the model forecast.

115 oo much precision afforded to negative prior beliefs as the main candidate of pathology, accompanied

116 utions are made more quickly than equivalent belief attributions.

117 tation is disrupted, that knowledge (but not belief) attributions are likely automatic, and that expl

118 that bistable perception is due to our prior beliefs being reverberated in the cortical hierarchy and

119 es are associated not only with more extreme beliefs, but also with a diminished response to social i

120 ' behaviour, demonstrate how such inaccurate beliefs can exacerbate intergroup conflict and provide a

121 an improve an individual's future decisions, beliefs can provide other benefits unrelated to their ep

122 cians' prognosis versus holding more hopeful beliefs compared with the physician.

123 ifesting an ability to track another's false belief critically depends on representing the agent's po

124 On expected targets, prior belief decreased the connection strength from AIC to IPL

125 ely to seek additional information to update beliefs derived from weak or uncertain initial evidence.

126 umed by Cushman, particularly the "boxology" belief-desire model depicting the rational planner, and

127 However, people's beliefs did not match this reality.

128 gest evidence to date that system-justifying beliefs diminish aversion to inequality in economic cont

129 ational expectations and entertain potential belief distortions bounded by a statistical measure of d

130 ss-as measured by the width of the posterior belief-drops below a level that they find tolerable.

131 PFC computations related to updating current beliefs during stochastic reversal learning.

132 updates, we need tools to uncover subjects' belief dynamics from natural behavior.

133 n, including social preferences, cooperative beliefs, (emotion) signaling, and, in particular, reputa

134 of the outside world is altered by our prior beliefs even at initial points of the processing hierarc

135 Beliefs expressed about improved mortality and improveme

136 s the importance of understanding creativity beliefs for predicting creative performance.

137 nderlying this fundamental characteristic of belief formation.

138 g/ordering god, and 2) increased strength-of-belief from childhood to adulthood, controlling for expl

139 se it allows humans to extract more accurate beliefs from our non-rational motivations for behavior.

140 the tendency of individuals to form aberrant beliefs from their bistable perception behavior.

141 Differences in belief have profound societal impacts.

142 rintuitive discovery contradicts the general belief held by scientists, clinicians, and even individu

143 Paranoia may build on negative beliefs held both about the self and others.

144 diets, diseases, local living styles, health beliefs, human development, and community participation.

145 on and is also able to update and refine our beliefs (i.e., background prior knowledge) by incorporat

146 ve conditioning produced parallel changes in belief IATs, demonstrating that implicit attitudes can c

147 ongly bottom-up paradigm predict 1) stronger belief in an intervening/ordering god, and 2) increased

148 For decades, there was limited belief in immune-based anti-MM therapy as a result of th

149 Widespread and unexamined belief in inherent physiological inferiority of Black Am

150 Widespread belief in misinformation circulating online is a critica

151 a solution to both puzzles by proposing that belief in morally concerned supernatural agents cultural

152 intuitions of order which, in turn, lead to belief in ordering gods.

153 uch indifference is partly attributable to a belief in the fairness of the capitalist system.

154 in the extraordinary cultural persistence of beliefs in mind processes having physical manifestation.

155 dogmatism, a phenomenon linked to entrenched beliefs in political, scientific, and religious discours

156 The ability to update beliefs in response to positive and negative information

157 We found that reduced tendency to update beliefs in response to positive relative to negative inf

158 nforcement learning or 2) hyperprecise prior beliefs in the context of active inference play an impor

159 ponse curve, hormesis is challenging central beliefs in the evaluation of chemicals or drugs and has

160 ng rates, with people slower to update their beliefs in the face of new information.

161 TEM professions that shape individuals' self-beliefs in the form of self-efficacy.

162 h opportunities for young members, and 96.4% believes in a more intensive cooperation between the A/I

163 We find that, contrary to previous belief, infectious spread persists during chronic infect

164 surprising sensory events is shaped by prior belief inferred from past experience.

165 whether and how the desire to hold a certain belief influences the amount of information participants

166 e changes in knowledge, attitudes, normative beliefs, intention and behavioural skills for all partic

167 e" in the network); therefore, their initial belief is disproportionately weighted in the collective

168 The general belief is that a carbon market needs a high price in ord

169 A common belief is that African Americans are hyposensitive to pa

170 A widespread belief is that large groups engaged in joint actions tha

171 ut mostly in linear regimes, but the current belief is that nonlinearity introduces more striking fea

172 The current belief is that the contacts can only limit the FET perfo

173 A commonly held belief is that the detection of metabolites of drugs of

174 prominent source of polarised and entrenched beliefs is confirmation bias, where evidence against one

175 As a whole, and contrary to previous beliefs, it is demonstrated that Breslow intermediates,

176 prior information influences perception and belief, leading to the production of suboptimal models o

177 ent work in Bayesian inference suggests that belief maintenance can be compatible with procedural rat

178 We propose a mentalizing account of belief maintenance, which holds that protecting strong p

179 Within our framework, market-implied beliefs may differ from those implied by rational expect

180 understanding how a formation of global self-beliefs may go awry in conditions characterized by disto

181 is of intuition, and intuition as a basis of belief, mediation models support a hypothesized effect p

182 How this prior belief modulates effective brain connectivity for updati

183 sures, and find that generics influence kind beliefs more than essentialism.

184 ain environments, people should update their beliefs most strongly when new evidence is most informat

185 nce, study 8 found that declining creativity beliefs negatively influenced task persistence and creat

186 l groups is, to a large degree, their shared beliefs, norms, and memories.

187 we show that contrary to the generally held belief, not only strong correlations or history-dependen

188 Our results show that during the belief of agency primary motor cortex (M1) shows stronge

189 In Experiment 1, they rated their belief of future success.

190 NT In a probabilistic environment, the prior belief of sensory events can be inferred from past exper

191 ants to characterize the effect of the prior belief of tactile events on connections mediating the ou

192 fer and predict the intentions, thoughts and beliefs of others, involves cognitive perspective taking

193 o show hints of implicitly understanding the beliefs of others.

194 plementation; the attributes, knowledge, and beliefs of providers; complex service user needs; adapta

195 otably, classifiers trained with prospective beliefs of success in Experiment 1 predicted decisions t

196 Prospective beliefs of success were associated with no performance c

197 his project was to examine the attitudes and beliefs of UK ophthalmologists towards ISBCS, explore th

198 ferences in the modulatory strength of prior belief on insular projections correlated with the precis

199 sults suggest complementary effects of prior belief on insular-frontoparietal projections mediating t

200 ecades, would affect significantly our prior belief on the frequency of life in the universe, even st

201 arietal lobule (IPL) were modulated by prior belief on unexpected targets compared with expected targ

202 Demonstrating the impact of creativity beliefs on downstream performance, study 8 found that de

203 eaction times reliably reflected the agent's beliefs only when the agent was free to act on the ball

204 ods across cognitive science, we ask whether belief or knowledge is the more basic kind of representa

205 ocessing mechanisms either over-weight prior beliefs or under-weight signals from the viscera (or bot

206 To our belief, PIK3CA mutations have also not been previously d

207 We present two phenomena - belief polarization and the size-weight illusion - that

208 emingly irrational thought patterns, such as belief polarization.

209 e to integrate social context to adapt one's belief precision-the precision afforded to prior beliefs

210 21), psychological features (Fear-Avoidance Beliefs Questionnaire), lifestyle characteristics (BMI,

211 Contrary to common belief, reactive oxygen species (ROS) accumulation did n

212 These lay beliefs reduce support for policies that make court info

213 rmed participants of the inaccuracy of their beliefs reduced negative out-group attributions, and was

214 A commonly held belief regarding team success is the superstar effect; t

215 le's level of compliance may depend on their beliefs regarding the pandemic.

216 influence might further depend on individual beliefs regarding the relationship between hard work and

217 ral identity, imparting knowledge, revealing beliefs, reinforcing social bonds and providing entertai

218 We argue that new reports of belief representation in non-human primates using AL sho

219 main intact in patient populations even when belief representation is disrupted, that knowledge (but

220 epresent others' beliefs without an explicit belief representation system that guides fitness-relevan

221 ions arise earlier in human development than belief representations, that the capacity to represent k

222 acrofinance using asset market data to infer belief restrictions for macroeconomic growth rates.

223 Normatively, these beliefs should correspond to Bayesian probabilities.

224 nd shifts in neocortical patterns underlying belief states.

225 ing and allows tracking of subjects' dynamic belief states.

226 erican and South Asian populations, cultural beliefs such as fatalism, collectivism and traditional g

227 up perceptual processes in shaping religious belief, suggesting that individual differences in these

228 Some authorities adhere to a traditional belief that all medals have been cast from the bronze of

229 del shows that, instead of the commonly held belief that AML results from a complete block of differe

230 nerative medicine (TERM), established on the belief that biocompatible scaffolds, cells, and growth f

231 metastasis prediction, reflecting the common belief that cancer is a systems biology disease.

232 alytic findings and challenge the widespread belief that caregiving is a substantial risk factor for

233 eral remaining explanations for the effect-a belief that consent is required to impose a policy on ha

234 copic MCT, thus challenging the conventional belief that existing first-principles theories cannot ac

235 Paranoia is the belief that harm is intended by others.

236 There is a long-held belief that interactions between progenitors of the coll

237 In contrast to the general belief that modern culture evolves very quickly, we show

238 This study reinforces the belief that modifiable risk factors for myopia could be

239 There is growing belief that natural organic matter (OM) binds U(IV) and

240 ishing feats, yet there remains a prevailing belief that olfactory language is deficient.

241 or forty years, there has been a widely held belief that over 2,000 years ago the Chinese Qin develop

242 on disease modification, based on the strong belief that PD is caused by irreversible dopaminergic ne

243 ion to offer surgery was influenced by their belief that pursuing surgery gives the patient or family

244 Recent literature reports indicate a belief that SOA yields measured in CF chambers are not a

245 ter inaccuracy was associated with increased belief that the out-group is motivated by purposeful obs

246 he dynamics of the objectivity illusion, the belief that the views of "my side" are objective while t

247 A new study upturns the long-held belief that the yellow gene determines sex-specific beha

248 the pathogenesis of the disorder and also a belief that therapies may only work if given very early

249 ebral vasculature of patients has led to the belief that these brain-sequestered cells solely cause p

250 d antiferromagnetic QCPs(1-4) has led to the belief that they are highly entangled quantum states(5).

251 ver, patients take probiotic products in the belief that they will help to treat their intestinal or

252 The belief that this behaviour confers protection against il

253 This bias appeared even in beliefs that are highly stable, when people were financi

254 ions, a core symptom of psychosis, are false beliefs that are rigidly held with strong conviction des

255 tner violence (0.45, 0.34-0.61; p<0.0001) or beliefs that intimate partner violence is a private matt

256 We discuss four erroneous beliefs that may prevent the biomedical research communi

257 regularities in the environment create prior beliefs that we rely on to optimize our behavior when se

258 o inform our decisions and forming desirable beliefs that we value for their own sake.

259 happens, we are quite good at adopting quasi-beliefs that, if true, would make the action rational.

260 The MDWG believes that a pathogenesis and pathway based molecular

261 The Academy's Board of Trustees believes that myopia is a high-priority cause of visual

262 n-human primates attribute knowledge but not belief, that knowledge representations arise earlier in

263 isk theme demonstrated engendered leadership beliefs, that is, when clinical judgment proved incorrec

264 ssing cultural beliefs as manifested in self-beliefs-that is, the confidence gap-commands attention t

265 this study is that, contrary to the general belief, the understory-instead of the overstory-was the

266 Thus, contrary to current beliefs, the speed-accuracy tradeoff could be a conseque

267 sfully reading other people's intentions and beliefs (theory of mind).

268 The ACP believes these changes will have a meaningful effect on

269 Here, we put this belief to a test, by empirically investigating coordinat

270 is possible for at least some of children's beliefs to emerge in the absence of specific experiences

271 ometimes conflicting goals: forming accurate beliefs to inform our decisions and forming desirable be

272 We construct our beliefs to meet two sometimes conflicting goals: forming

273 de in the absence of machine models as prior beliefs to quantify the weights placed on the models.

274 Selectively attributing beliefs to specific agents is core to reasoning about ot

275 n of dental visits, self-esteem, oral health beliefs, toothbrushing frequency, oral hygiene effective

276 ncluding (1) Cultural and societal views and beliefs toward sexual health; (2) Stigma, embarrassment

277 representations may underpin automatic false-belief tracking.

278 most participants in a network update their beliefs unbiasedly based on new information, while a min

279 of both inference processes aimed to reduce belief uncertainty and more traditional notions of menta

280 mpanied by changes in the representations of belief uncertainty in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vm

281 To understand the principles underlying such belief updates, we need tools to uncover subjects' belie

282 avior and computational modeling to estimate belief updating across individuals with and without ment

283 capitulates this impaired uncertainty-driven belief updating and rigid anticipation of a volatile env

284 lts suggest that measuring valence-dependent belief updating could facilitate risk prediction in bipo

285 ated to the generic perceptual inference and belief updating mechanisms, this approach can be used to

286 However, no evidence for excessive belief updating was found.

287 tility on pupil size, consistent with slower belief updating.

288 y-related increase explaining the attenuated belief updating.

289 reases the influence of prediction errors on belief updating.

290 ent of the interplay between uncertainty and belief-updating across individuals and species.

291 rmally, we represent evidence about investor beliefs using a nonlinear expectation function deduced u

292 This belief was recently challenged by the observation [2] th

293 Also, contrary to popular belief, we could detect no significant genomic contribut

294 plicit attitudes can causally drive implicit beliefs when information about the specific semantic tra

295 ds has tended to focus on representations of beliefs, which are widely taken to be among the most cen

296 ositive information may generate pessimistic beliefs, which in turn can lead to more severe prodromal

297 ce, are taught that they can retain unbiased beliefs while advocating for their clients and that they

298 resented that the American Heart Association believes will lead to better implementation, tracking, a

299 Resistance to updating beliefs with new information has historically been inter

300 -human primates implicitly represent others' beliefs without an explicit belief representation system