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1 A select agent and thus a potential agent of bioterrorism.
2 enic and classified as a category A agent of bioterrorism.
3 th the potential for subversion as agents of bioterrorism.
4 threat to humans and is a potential agent of bioterrorism.
5 t is presently feared as a possible agent of bioterrorism.
6 spread of infectious diseases and potential bioterrorism.
7 orly immunogenic vaccines, and the threat of bioterrorism.
8 fever and is considered a potential agent of bioterrorism.
9 l in humans and could be used as an agent of bioterrorism.
10 infectiousness make it a potential agent of bioterrorism.
11 because of its potential use as an agent of bioterrorism.
12 for public safety amid the growing threat of bioterrorism.
13 s of an epidemic model, focusing on smallpox bioterrorism.
14 ay not be applicable to some threats such as bioterrorism.
15 ty, has increased exponentially in an age of bioterrorism.
16 reating infections caused by these agents of bioterrorism.
17 odel may be needed to address the threats of bioterrorism.
18 f the AIDS pandemic and the threat of global bioterrorism.
19 a) poses a significant threat as an agent of bioterrorism.
20 disease, and they pose a threat as agents of bioterrorism.
21 ion in indoor environments and the threat of bioterrorism.
22 cal diagnosis, and the current fight against bioterrorism.
23 ns that it might be exploited as a weapon of bioterrorism.
24 ularensis bacteria, a Tier 1 Select Agent of bioterrorism.
25 ermeasures to combat this potential agent of bioterrorism.
26 adequate plans for dealing with agricultural bioterrorism.
27 ghly infectious agents that may be agents of bioterrorism.
28 of protecting against such future threats of bioterrorism.
29 re one of the highest-risk threat agents for bioterrorism.
30 also well recognized as a potential agent of bioterrorism.
31 event the potentially devastating effects of bioterrorism.
32 and is considered an agent of biowarfare or bioterrorism.
33 spiratory symptoms, infectious diseases, and bioterrorism.
34 ue to its high infectivity and potential for bioterrorism.
35 e agent of anthrax and a potential weapon of bioterrorism.
36 d and be useful tools in our arsenal against bioterrorism.
37 otential for international spread and use in bioterrorism.
38 icity, superantigens are potential agents of bioterrorism.
39 e deadliest agents of biological warfare and bioterrorism.
40 to world security, and increases the risk of bioterrorism.
41 nited States experienced a deliberate act of bioterrorism.
42 sepsis and is a major concern as a weapon of bioterrorism.
43 e case of malignancy, pandemic infection, or bioterrorism.
44 category (category A) of potential agents of bioterrorism.
45 there is concern that MPXV could be used for bioterrorism.
46 nt of anthrax disease, is a proven weapon of bioterrorism.
47 lity, ricin is considered a likely agent for bioterrorism.
48 erotoxin B (SEB), a potential incapacitating bioterrorism agent and a major cause of food poisoning,
49 attention because of its potential use as a bioterrorism agent and inadvertent introduction into Nor
52 MARV has been identified as a category A bioterrorism agent by the Centers for Disease Control an
53 idae and has been classified as a Category A bioterrorism agent by the United States Centers for Dise
55 ons in ultrasensitive molecular diagnostics, bioterrorism agent detection, and real-time imaging and
57 or Disease Control and Prevention Category A bioterrorism agent Francisella tularensis and prototype
58 isms to cause disease, making this potential bioterrorism agent one of the most infectious bacterial
62 c threat of VEEV, and its potential use as a bioterrorism agent, there are no FDA-approved antivirals
63 ly virulent zoonotic pathogen and category B bioterrorism agent, was sequenced by the random shotgun
64 to wide availability and potential use as a bioterrorism agent, with particular concern for food sup
87 de an attractive technology platform against bioterrorism agents due to their safety record in humans
90 ct pathogenic bacteria, especially potential bioterrorism agents like Yersinia pestis and Bacillus an
91 er, multidrug-resistant strains of bacterial bioterrorism agents occur naturally or have been bio-eng
93 umber of protein toxins, including potential bioterrorism agents such as ricin and botulinum neurotox
94 l pyrogenic exotoxins] and anthrax toxin are bioterrorism agents that cause diseases by immunostimula
95 has been developed for specific detection of bioterrorism agents, as exemplified by ricin, cholera to
96 ) Sterne, surrogates for potential bacterial bioterrorism agents, as well as selective measurements o
106 s Review, we discuss the potential threat of bioterrorism, agents that could be exploited, and recent
107 e common infectious processes from agents of bioterrorism also could improve management strategies.
109 continues to generate concern as an agent of bioterrorism and as a natural cause of sporadic disease
113 ations of surveillance systems for detecting bioterrorism and emerging infections are insufficient to
114 e in vaccinating against potential agents of bioterrorism and emerging infections because of their pr
119 Thus, rapid methods to distinguish between bioterrorism and naturally occurring plague infections a
122 use of the potential for use of the toxin in bioterrorism and the increasingly widespread application
123 alth threats both through the possibility of bioterrorism and the intentional release of smallpox and
127 number of mechanisms, which include disease, bioterrorism, and destruction of both plant and animal f
130 , whether naturally occurring or a result of bioterrorism, and thus can be an integral component of a
134 of intense study as a result of its use in a bioterrorism attack in the United States in September an
137 arth and represent a serious problem for (i) bioterrorism attack, (ii) horizontal transmission of mic
145 thods to the analysis of evidence related to bioterrorism, biocrimes, hoaxes, or the accidental relea
146 (from 1966 to 2004) for articles relating to bioterrorism, biological agents, biological warfare, hos
148 e-threatening infections during outbreaks or bioterrorism (BT) events and, in some cases, can experie
149 its classification as a category A agent of bioterrorism, but little is known about the molecular me
150 ularemia and a category A potential agent of bioterrorism, but the pathogenic mechanisms of F. tulare
151 y can become much better prepared to counter bioterrorism by developing a list of likely anti-crop th
152 ion in humans and animals and has been a top bioterrorism concern since the 2001 anthrax attacks in t
156 iruses are under intense research because of bioterrorism concerns, zoonotic infections, and the side
157 importance of dermatologist preparedness for bioterrorism, dermatologist knowledge regarding smallpox
159 surveillance systems, 20 systems collecting bioterrorism detector data, 13 systems collecting influe
161 rriers to surge capacity in the setting of a bioterrorism event and to identify solutions to these pr
164 role of pathology in investigating potential bioterrorism events and in guiding epidemiological studi
165 national capacities to detect and respond to bioterrorism events and naturally occurring outbreaks of
169 rensic science, embryonic disease diagnosis, bioterrorism genome detection, "immortalization" of clin
170 e agent of anthrax and a potential weapon of bioterrorism, grows rapidly in mammalian hosts, which su
173 20 years ago, its potential release through bioterrorism has generated renewed interest in vaccinati
174 naturally occurring smallpox, the threat of bioterrorism has led to renewed vaccination programs.
179 ng clinicians and laboratorians to potential bioterrorism-initiated outbreaks as well as look-alike d
180 in part to recently heightened concern over bioterrorism, interest in the mechanism of action of bot
184 trategies would provide a better response to bioterrorism, mass vaccination, or vaccination of social
185 o get ready, and in the process be ready for bioterrorism, natural disasters, and epidemics of other
186 h the powers they need to detect and contain bioterrorism or a naturally occurring disease outbreak.
188 bioaerosol is of the greatest concern from a bioterrorism or warfare perspective, potentially capable
190 (SEB) may occur accidentally, as a result of bioterrorism, or during colonization or infection of the
191 gnized as potential agents of biowarfare and bioterrorism owing to their morbidity and mortality in h
192 s, and their potential use as instruments of bioterrorism, pose a significant threat to the developed
195 ct Terrorism" (USA PATRIOT) Act and the 2002 Bioterrorism Preparedness Act on US select agent researc
202 cult to differentiate from illness caused by bioterrorism, rapidly spreading infection, or toxic subs
205 d 47 historical cases (including 11 cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax) with 376 controls with com
207 cell responses were studied in patients with bioterrorism-related cutaneous or inhalation anthrax and
208 ical and IHC studies of patients who died of bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax confirmed the
212 plague worldwide and is considered a tier 1 bioterrorism select agent due to its potential for inten
213 ed in 1951 to be a defense against potential bioterrorism, serve the immediate needs for field invest
215 rns about the use of smallpox as a weapon of bioterrorism since the world events in recent years.
216 se research expands to counter the threat of bioterrorism, so does suspicion and the need for guidanc
218 to-person transmission, and potential use in bioterrorism, the development of a vaccine against ebola
219 eat of the reemergence of smallpox following bioterrorism, the diversification and availability of po
220 ry syndrome (SARS), the continuing threat of bioterrorism, the proliferation of West Nile virus, and
221 in and other fast-acting toxins as agents of bioterrorism, there is an urgent need for the developmen
223 usative agent for anthrax, poses a potential bioterrorism threat and is capable of causing mass morbi
225 ing clinical specimens, field samples during bioterrorism threat assessment, and samples from outbrea
226 ation of Yersinia pestis, represents a major bioterrorism threat for which no vaccine is available.
236 , DNA vaccines against emerging pathogens or bioterrorism threats can be quickly constructed based so
238 d activity, combined with today's climate of bioterrorism threats, has heightened the need for high-t