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1 er without viral suppression (1.3 vs 4.0 for contact tracing).
2 ifying transmission events than conventional contact tracing.
3 s, and in the optimization of quarantine and contact tracing.
4 plied in "real time," influencing choices in contact tracing.
5 mmatic adaptations within provider-initiated contact tracing.
6 cumented household member or coworker during contact tracing.
7 rtner therapy has shown promise in improving contact tracing.
8 y on presentation of symptomatic children or contact tracing.
9 pread are face masks, social distancing, and contact tracing.
10 ion clusters, all of which were confirmed by contact tracing.
11 ound 20% of all cases) failed to have timely contact tracing.
12 rtially overlapped with outbreaks defined by contact tracing.
13 ousehold transmission traditionally requires contact tracing.
14 break epidemiology, individual screening and contact tracing.
15 dels, cannot accurately represent effects of contact tracing.
16 as emerged as a barrier to real-time genomic contact tracing.
17 s (27%) could not be linked by either WGS or contact tracing.
18 gies informed by hospitalization history and contact tracing.
19 ifications: 4.2 per index case consenting to contact tracing.
20 osed contacts placed in quarantine by manual contact tracing.
21 r the trust building necessary for effective contact tracing.
22 ntributing to the public adoption of digital contact tracing.
23 coordinates were collected during home-based contact tracing.
24         Public health case investigation and contact tracing.
25 urces of transmission, as determined through contact tracing.
26 ial contribution of DCT compared with manual contact tracing.
27 cation of infected individuals and extensive contact tracing.
28  through random testing campaigns/surveys or contact tracing.
29 losis cases, identified through conventional contact tracing.
30 miological links were missed by conventional contact tracing.
31 ccinated individuals were identified through contact tracing, 3 of which were confirmed by phylogenet
32 f data for statistical purposes (42 states), contact tracing (39 states), epidemiologic investigation
33                                              Contact tracing achieves the early detection and isolati
34 ing, our system can increase the accuracy of contact tracing actions and may help reduce epidemic spr
35                 Following the institution of contact tracing, active case surveillance, care of patie
36 d their contacts, we estimated the impact of contact tracing activities on separation behaviors from
37 ed during mass vaccination campaigns (MVCs), contact tracing activities, and from 9 Diphtheria Treatm
38 tinely performed as part of surveillance and contact tracing activities.
39 surveillance in select settings, rather than contact tracing alone.
40 ocused on voluntary collective isolation and contact-tracing among Tsimane forager-horticulturalists
41 e evidence on the feasibility of integrating contact tracing and administration of single-dose rifamp
42                             Future work with contact tracing and advanced molecular diagnostics may a
43          In most scenarios, highly effective contact tracing and case isolation is enough to control
44                                              Contact tracing and comparison with MRU databases indica
45 nt outbreak with low R(0), provided adequate contact tracing and distribution capacities exist.
46 opulation surveillance, case identification, contact tracing and evaluation of interventions on the b
47 egarding new smartphone apps that facilitate contact tracing and exposure notification.
48                                              Contact tracing and household studies, in particular, pr
49 testing in the community reduces the time of contact tracing and increases the ability to identify th
50 ing of large population groups combined with contact tracing and isolation measures will be crucial f
51 tion and treatment efforts, cooperation with contact tracing and isolation measures, and the effectiv
52 l to quantify the potential effectiveness of contact tracing and isolation of cases at controlling a
53  2.5 or 3.5, if there were 40 initial cases, contact tracing and isolation were only potentially feas
54                                              Contact tracing and monitoring approaches for Ebola were
55                                              Contact tracing and monitoring exposed patients and assi
56           Here, we implement a comprehensive contact tracing and network analysis to find an optimize
57                                              Contact tracing and phylogenetic analysis were used to i
58 ecifically, we study how rapid bulk testing, contact tracing and preventative measures such as mask w
59        Routine screening at age 2 years with contact tracing and preventive treatment averted 11 900
60 erculosis among young children combined with contact tracing and preventive treatment would have a la
61  increases in outbreak size, suggesting that contact tracing and quarantine might be most effective a
62 ative to smartphone-based solutions used for contact tracing and quarantine monitoring.
63 asses, and quickly reopened after 14 days of contact tracing and quarantine of possible contacts.
64 hat include containment (access control with contact tracing and quarantine) and mitigation (hygiene,
65                             Implications for contact tracing and quarantining are considered, and app
66 terization of the operational performance of contact tracing and reconstruct exposure and transmissio
67 benefiting the good of the community through contact tracing and restricting individual liberty.
68 ded concerning such testing when undertaking contact tracing and routine surveillance.
69                        An intensification of contact tracing and screening activities among HIV-infec
70 ommend rolling out SDR in all settings where contact tracing and screening have been established.
71 facilitate reporting on identified carriage, contact tracing and screening, and outbreak investigatio
72 , several COVID-19 response measures such as contact tracing and self-isolation could also be exploit
73 d presymptomatic infections is achievable by contact tracing and should be a priority during an outbr
74  extensive outbreak investigation, including contact tracing and stringent surveillance.
75 ased isolation must be supplemented by rapid contact tracing and testing that identifies asymptomatic
76 ness raises additional issues of quarantine, contact tracing and treatment that are yet to be address
77                                     Although contact tracing and virus culture remained inconclusive,
78 ncing followed by a robust level of testing, contact-tracing and household quarantine could keep the
79   In our estimated analysis, case detection, contact tracing, and 14-day quarantine of close contacts
80 s are important to inform infection control, contact tracing, and community mitigation strategies.
81 health response included isolation of cases, contact tracing, and enforcement of hospital infection c
82 s paper we quantify the impact of isolation, contact tracing, and exclusion in reducing transmission
83 reatment centres, case ascertainment through contact tracing, and household protective kit allocation
84 elational database, facilitating data-driven contact tracing, and improving outbreak data consistency
85 set to isolation, fewer cases ascertained by contact tracing, and increasing transmission before symp
86                                     Testing, contact tracing, and isolating/quarantining is a key str
87                                     Testing, contact tracing, and isolation (TTI) is an epidemic mana
88 he low awareness, poor attention, failure of contact tracing, and low rates of proper treatment provi
89 of controlling outbreaks using isolation and contact tracing, and quantified the weekly maximum numbe
90 tomatic and asymptomatic testing, isolation, contact tracing, and quarantine.
91 estigation that included patient interviews, contact tracing, and serum testing, as well as environme
92 r evaluated expansions of provider-initiated contact tracing, and seven compared programmatic adaptat
93 ction of active tuberculosis (case finding), contact tracing, and treatment completion.
94 rventions, including both manual and digital contact tracing, and vaccination programmes.
95                           Serologic testing, contact-tracing, and next-generation sequencing were use
96                       Results suggest that a contact tracing app can contribute substantially to redu
97 d our three messaging strategies to motivate contact-tracing app signups (n = 152,556 newsletter subs
98                                            A contact-tracing app that builds a memory of proximity co
99 e interplay of various adoption rates of the contact-tracing app, different levels of testing capacit
100                            Intentions to use contact tracing apps-hypothetical ones or the Corona-War
101                                              Contact-tracing apps(1,2) recorded measurements of proxi
102 athematical model to assess if isolation and contact tracing are able to control onwards transmission
103 or which presumptive chlamydia treatment and contact tracing are initially provided, and their sexual
104 rus outbreaks, such as patient isolation and contact tracing, are well established, our observations
105 facility-based arm compared to that from the contact-tracing arm was 1.04 (95% confidence interval [C
106                                       In the contact-tracing arm, 1,677 contacts of 788 new TB index
107                                       In the contact-tracing arm, contacts of patients with active TB
108                                              Contact tracing around TB cases and heightened surveilla
109 le-step contact tracing as well as iterative contact tracing as compared to random intervention.
110 evention is efficient under both single-step contact tracing as well as iterative contact tracing as
111                                              Contact tracing based on symptom screening and Xpert MTB
112  efficient community screening, testing, and contact tracing; behavioral change interventions; adequa
113 More quarantined among those who completed a contact tracing call than among those who did not comple
114 antined for >=14 days, and 13.5% completed a contact tracing call.
115                           Provider-initiated contact tracing can be an effective public health tool.
116                           Case isolation and contact tracing can contribute to the control of COVID-1
117 esponse system based on enhanced testing and contact tracing can have a major role in relaxing social
118 ce evaluations in priority use cases such as contact tracing can highlight trade-offs in test selecti
119                                              Contact tracing can play a key role in controlling human
120                        Increased testing and contact-tracing capacity is paramount for mitigating the
121 al data to better interpret viral spread and contact tracing chains.
122 sease 2019 (COVID-19) case investigation and contact tracing (CI/CT) activities.
123                       Case investigation and contact tracing (CICT) are public health measures that a
124 he impact of COVID-19 case investigation and contact tracing (CICT) programs is lacking, but policy m
125  on a large urban US university campus using contact tracing, class attendance, and whole genome sequ
126 ure to M tuberculosis, who attended an urban contact-tracing clinic.
127                     Investigations including contact tracing, clinical assessments, sequencing and se
128 ne treated sexual partner at 2-4 weeks after contact tracing consultation (adjusted OR 1.27 [95% CI 0
129 ested for C trachomatis at 12-24 weeks after contact tracing consultation; 31 (4.7%) in the intervent
130 f quarantining susceptible households as the contact tracing cost, we have observed an interesting ph
131 ated that combining physical distancing with contact tracing could enable epidemic control while redu
132 smission and show that intensive testing and contact tracing could have prevented SARS-CoV-2 outbreak
133                                  Testing and contact tracing (CT) can interrupt transmission chains o
134 ides the capability to analyze the wealth of contact tracing data available for previous epidemics an
135 -outbreak probability requires comprehensive contact tracing data describing who infected whom to be
136                                  We collated contact tracing data from COVID-19 clusters in Singapore
137                                        Using contact tracing data from eight directly transmitted dis
138 n, c) integration of public health authority contact tracing data, and d) a user-friendly dashboard a
139 ity in susceptibility given contact by using contact tracing data, which are typically collected earl
140  the analysis of epidemiological clusters or contact tracing data, whose collection often proves diff
141  [Formula: see text]) has typically required contact tracing data.
142 nds the previous method and does not require contact tracing data.
143         On the basis of detailed patient and contact-tracing data in Hunan, China, we find that 80% o
144                                      Digital contact tracing (DCT) apps have been released in several
145 contacts of cases diagnosed in Shenzhen with contact tracing details, and of these, 880 (74.9%) had s
146                                              Contact tracing detects TB in 8% of child contacts withi
147                                              Contact tracing efficacy decreased sharply with increasi
148 realistic limitations on the coverage of the contact tracing effort and the amount of non-infectious
149 led to a lag in turnaround time and hindered contact tracing efforts, resulting in a further spread o
150 n the early diagnosis of measles and improve contact tracing efforts.
151 ers of spatiotemporal spread, and to support contact tracing efforts.
152 ys makes this difficult, and epidemiological contact tracing either uncertain, logistically prohibiti
153 these two outbreaks (including education and contact tracing followed by quarantine) reduce the final
154                                              Contact tracing for children in high-burden settings is
155 apidly after the onset of clinical symptoms, contact tracing for confirmed and suspected cases, and q
156      Better understanding of the outcomes of contact tracing for COVID-19 as well as the operational
157                           Core challenges of contact tracing for high-consequence communicable diseas
158        Since molecular typing can complement contact tracing for reconstructing gonorrhea sexual netw
159 d control efforts may be more effective than contact tracing for the early identification of cases.
160                                    Household contact tracing for tuberculosis (TB) may facilitate dia
161 al important applied implications, including contact tracing (for communicable diseases).
162 es in September 2020, with a Bluetooth-based contact tracing functionality designed to reduce transmi
163  to identifying infected individuals through contact tracing, given the substantial proportion of asy
164                                              Contact tracing had limited impact on epidemic suppressi
165       However, this assessment suggests that contact tracing had suboptimal impact on SARS-CoV-2 tran
166                                              Contact tracing has been a commonly used strategy, and v
167 grammes with minimal additional efforts once contact tracing has been established; and is generally w
168                                        Child contact tracing has been widely recommended but poorly i
169                                              Contact tracing has for decades been a cornerstone of th
170              Emerging evidence suggests that contact tracing has had limited success in the UK in red
171  in COVID-19-related testing, treatment, and contact tracing have been largely unexplored.
172 drome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) testing and contact tracing have been proposed as critical component
173  that countries that implement comprehensive contact tracing have significantly lower case fatality r
174                                    Household contact tracing (HHCT), for which households of newly di
175                                              Contact tracing identified 142 students (46%) clustering
176                                              Contact tracing identified 550 and 467 child contacts in
177                                              Contact tracing identified transmission vectors between
178 amples include:(1)systematic underfunding of contact tracing in health departments serving regions wh
179 ples include: (1) systematic underfunding of contact tracing in health departments serving regions wh
180 dividuals presenting to health-care centres; contact tracing in households of cases; isolation centre
181                                              Contact tracing in procedural areas was done if a patien
182                                              Contact tracing in procedural areas was done if a patien
183   In order to achieve efficient and scalable contact tracing in real time, digital devices can play a
184 ght be limited by heterogenous approaches to contact tracing in studies, a scarcity of quantitative e
185 ing strategies (facility-based screening and contact tracing) in 56 public primary care clinics in tw
186 tine and symptom monitoring, implemented via contact tracing, in controlling epidemics using an agent
187  evaluating the effect of provider-initiated contact tracing, including four (66.7%) of six COVID-19
188  Shanghai before and during the outbreak and contact-tracing information from Hunan province.
189  four (66.7%) of six COVID-19 studies, found contact tracing interventions were associated with impro
190 rast, we found that the effects of community contact tracing interventions were sensitive to communit
191                                              Contact tracing investigations led to the identification
192                                              Contact tracing is a core strategy for preventing the sp
193                                              Contact tracing is a multistep process to limit SARS-CoV
194                                              Contact tracing is a pillar of COVID-19 response, but la
195                              However, manual contact tracing is a time-consuming process and as case
196                                              Contact tracing is an essential tool to mitigate the imp
197                                              Contact tracing is critical to controlling COVID-19, but
198       Our results suggest that comprehensive contact tracing is instrumental not only to curtailing t
199 er, the population-level effect of household contact tracing is predicated on the assumption that mos
200                                    Household contact tracing is unlikely to transform TB epidemiology
201                                              Contact tracing is used for multiple infectious diseases
202                       Isolation of cases and contact tracing is used to control outbreaks of infectio
203 ction to the SARS outbreak: surveillance and contact tracing, isolation and quarantine, and travel re
204 introduced including twice-weekly screening, contact tracing, isolation precautions, and environmenta
205 , BU used a coordinated strategy of testing, contact tracing, isolation, and quarantine, with robust
206  protocols, founded on surveillance testing, contact tracing, isolation, and quarantine.
207 South Africa, strategies involving household contact tracing, isolation, mass symptom screening, and
208 spreading too fast to be contained by manual contact tracing, it could be controlled if this process
209 vily relied on the use of genomics to inform contact tracing, linking cases to the border and to clus
210                       We argue that COVID-19 contact tracing may provide a unique opportunity to also
211 d in the United States on 28 September 2014, contact tracing methods for Ebola were implemented.
212                      Compared to traditional contact tracing methods, our approach significantly redu
213            Providing preventive therapy with contact tracing nearly doubled this impact (17-27% decli
214 etermine requirements for case isolation and contact tracing needed to stop the epidemic.
215 es caused by complex transmission behaviors, contact-tracing networks, time-varying parameters, human
216                                              Contact tracing of a teenager with smear-positive pulmon
217 mily disease, and because of this, household contact tracing of children after identification of an a
218 amydia, the authors conducted community-wide contact tracing of chlamydia cases in Colorado Springs,
219              Rapid detection, isolation, and contact tracing of community COVID-19 cases are essentia
220 ole-genome-sequencing-based tool for genomic contact tracing of N gonorrhoeae and demonstrate local,
221                              Epidemiological contact tracing of patients and Bayesian phylogenetic an
222  prevention interventions include screening, contact tracing of sexual partners, and promoting effect
223  fully suppressed through fast isolation and contact tracing of tested cases.
224 ce-limited setting, we assessed the yield of contact tracing on childhood tuberculosis and indicators
225 the impact of social distancing, testing and contact tracing on the COVID-19 epidemic in each state.
226 ted and traced can also reduce the impact of contact tracing on transmission.
227 th confirmed COVID-19 cases as identified by contact tracing operations.
228 d partner therapy can be safely offered as a contact tracing option and is also likely to be cost sav
229 ith adults (20 years and older) derived from contact tracing or population screening were included.
230 l information and interoperating with manual contact tracing, our system can increase the accuracy of
231 ly evaluate the association between national contact tracing policies and case fatality rates of COVI
232 VID-19 control (case identification, digital contact tracing, policy setting, and enforcement of quar
233                                              Contact tracing prevented about half of the potential ca
234 ptom onset could be controlled even with low contact tracing probability; however, the probability of
235 nts were more supportive of the Apple-Google contact tracing program (coefficient, 0.20; 95% CI, 0.07
236       Despite the complexity of developing a contact tracing program in a diverse city with a populat
237 llect data, such as the Apple-Google digital contact tracing program, offer opportunities to reduce C
238 erved in support of the Apple-Google digital contact tracing program, with less support from conserva
239 ere successfully followed up by the national contact tracing program.
240  it using data from a healthcare database or contact tracing program.
241 ctive public health system and comprehensive contact tracing program.
242 olecular typing of Neisseria gonorrhoeae and contact tracing provide a combined approach for analysis
243                              Case detection, contact tracing, public health measures, and affordable
244 d Prevention, launched a case investigation, contact tracing, quarantine of exposed persons, isolatio
245 s; adherence monitoring and feedback; robust contact tracing, quarantine, and isolation in on-campus
246 ve cooperation with Ebola testing as well as contact tracing, quarantining, and treatment.
247                       Epidemiologic data and contact tracing readily recognize most healthcare-associ
248                                  Here, using contact tracing records for 644,029 cases and their cont
249                                              Contact tracing records were reviewed for all exposures
250 e National Viral Hemorrhagic Fever Database, contact tracing records, Kenema Government Hospital (KGH
251  to reduce infection load, such as efficient contact tracing, reduced delay between testing and resul
252 ultaneous social distancing, quarantine, and contact tracing, represents the most likely fighting opp
253                      Both manual and digital contact tracing require public trust, engagement of mino
254  analyzing simulated outbreaks under various contact tracing scenarios, we demonstrate that contact d
255 se many positive contacts were asymptomatic, contact tracing should be paired with testing, regardles
256  the technology-based strategies proposed, a contact-tracing smartphone app.
257                       These findings support contact tracing, social distancing, and travel restricti
258       These data inform on public health and contact tracing strategies.
259                                            A contact-tracing strategy has been deemed necessary to co
260 rus (HIV) transmission except in small-scale contact tracing studies.
261  adults met inclusion criteria, including 18 contact-tracing studies and 14 population screening stud
262                           More comprehensive contact-tracing studies combined with serosurveys are ne
263 le evidence from large-scale, well-conducted contact-tracing studies from across the world and argue
264                    Secondary infection rate (contact-tracing studies) or prevalence or seroprevalence
265 ct and enrolled their households in a TB-HIV contact-tracing study.
266 SARS-CoV-2 testing: routine surveillance and contact tracing ("surge testing") events.
267 e to cases that were initially missed by the contact tracing system, cases subject to proper contact
268 sic reproduction numbers for chlamydia using contact tracing techniques is feasible and can produce u
269                                      Digital contact-tracing technologies can help control epidemics
270 implications for control strategies, such as contact tracing, testing, and rapid isolation of cases.
271            The extensive data collection and contact tracing that occurred during the 2003 outbreak o
272 quences is ushering in a new era of 'genomic contact tracing'-that is, using viral genomes to trace l
273                                              Contact tracing, the evaluation of persons who have been
274 ingly-intrinsic trade-off between the use of contact tracing to either identify infected nodes or det
275 9 pandemic has seen the emergence of digital contact tracing to help to prevent the spread of the dis
276 one of the first large-scale uses of digital contact tracing to track a chain of infection and contai
277  targeted case-based mitigation tactics (eg, contact tracing) to combat coronavirus disease 2019 (COV
278 nce and control protocols that include rapid contact tracing, universal RT-PCR testing, and mandatory
279 onset highlights the importance of continued contact tracing until effective vaccines have been distr
280 sible, a combination of health-care testing, contact tracing, use of isolation centres, and mass symp
281      When R(e) was 1.2, health-care testing, contact tracing, use of isolation centres, and use of qu
282 lyses, a combination of health-care testing, contact tracing, use of isolation centres, mass symptom
283 alone, a combination of health-care testing, contact tracing, use of isolation centres, mass symptom
284          Increasing the feasibility of child-contact tracing using these approaches should be encoura
285                     Implementation of prompt contact tracing was associated with a 10% decrease in th
286                                     Outbreak contact tracing was conducted using exposure histories a
287                                              Contact tracing was crucial in containing outbreaks duri
288 with TB symptoms to 28 study clinics, and no contact tracing was performed.
289                                Engagement in contact tracing was positively correlated with isolation
290                                              Contact tracing was used to investigate transmission.
291 to the individual nature of controls such as contact tracing, we demonstrate the utility of a network
292 tact tracing system, cases subject to proper contact tracing were associated with a reduction in subs
293 uberculosis cases identified by conventional contact tracing were mostly contacts of patients with MD
294 tifies up to a factor 2 more infections than contact tracing when both harness the same contact data
295   It then presents a framework for assessing contact tracing, whether manual or digital: the effectiv
296 n the highly demanding environment of actual contact tracing with high volumes of cases in Santa Clar
297                                    Household contact tracing with intensive screening and referral di
298       40 studies compared provider-initiated contact tracing with other interventions or evaluated ex
299  that a combined approach of case isolation, contact-tracing with quarantine, and sanitary funeral pr
300 llowing isolation guidance and engaging with contact tracing without other measures is an effective t

 
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