ライフサイエンスコーパス: payment

1 formed the implantation received the largest payment.

2 ices is increasing in the era of value-based payment.

3 postoperative visits used to help determine payment.

4 tients and outpatients as a prerequisite for payment.

5 ecially in light of the shift to value-based payment.

6 ted but not exceed 18% to 44% of current tPA payment.

7 led the nationwide shift toward value-based payment.

8 hospital charges rather than actual monetary payments.

9 ic attendance monitoring to automated mobile payments.

10 ar model to estimate overall PrEP medication payments.

11 s of care, length of stay, and total charges/payments.

12 fied into quartiles based on average episode payments.

13 ngs that over time began to exceed incentive payments.

14 level variation exists in 90-day PCI episode payments.

15 lers of identical packages received the same payments.

16 rdered laboratory test among Medicare Part B payments.

17 tended negative consequences on workflow and payments.

18 : -$228 to +$84] or individual components of payments.

19 d 9.2% (95% CI, 8.3%-10.4%) by out-of-pocket payments.

20 postacute care and hospital Medicare-allowed payments.

21 nd 9.4% (95% CI, 9.4%-9.4%) by out-of-pocket payments.

22 hat had provided physicians with the largest payments.

23 2.6% (95% CI, 2.6%-2.6%); and out-of-pocket payments, 1.1% (95% CI, 1.0%-1.1%).

24 rgeons, and vascular surgeons received lower payments ($130 million, $60 million, and $30 million les

25 d higher inpatient evaluation and management payments ($1405 versus $752, P<0.001) and higher utiliza

26 ization (-16.7%, P = 0.002) and readmissions payments (-27.0%, P = 0.003).

27 s $5947, P=0.031), and index hospitalization payments ($33 474 versus $30 800, P<0.001).

28 rgery contributed the most to total surgical payments (69.4% in 2014), it declined over the study per

29 y accumulated $1488 less in total healthcare payments (95% CI -2 688.56--266.58).

30 erred an additional $2019 in predicted total payments (95%CI:$2002-$2036) and $324 in OOP expenses (9

31 cost an additional $2649 in predicted total payments (95%CI:$2632-$2667) and $302 in predicted OOP e

32 d receipt of disproportionate share hospital payments (a marker of safety-net status) were also asses

33 ating in these models will receive capitated payments according to changes in patients' PAM scores, i

34 payments per 30 TDF-FTC tablets in 2018, OOP payments accounted for $94 (5.7%) and third-party paymen

35 erminants of variation in 90-day PCI episode payments across a diverse array of patients and hospital

36 respectively, for those receiving a positive payment adjustment (absolute difference, 14.5% [95% CI,

37 d 73.9% vs 55.1% for those receiving a bonus payment adjustment (absolute difference, 18.9% [95% CI,

38 he percentage receiving a negative (penalty) payment adjustment was 2.8% for system-affiliated clinic

39 ative (penalty) payment adjustment, positive payment adjustment, and bonus payment adjustment.

40 The secondary outcome was MIPS payment adjustment, including negative (penalty) payment

41 ent adjustment, including negative (penalty) payment adjustment, positive payment adjustment, and bon

42 ment, positive payment adjustment, and bonus payment adjustment.

43 The largest source of savings was simplified payment administration (median 8.8%), and the best predi

44 re utilization and savings due to simplified payment administration, lower drug costs, and other fact

45 ng burden of quality reporting, the Medicare Payment Advisory (MedPAC) has recommended using claims d

46 vements in patient outcomes or lower episode payments among Medicare beneficiaries undergoing inpatie

47 usting fee schedules, and reforming provider payment and governance structures; and (2) overhaul of i

48 tween the manufacturer that made the highest payment and the proportion of devices from the same manu

49 to assess the potential changes in Medicare payments and clinical outcomes of referring high-risk su

50 rovement) and cost (which includes incentive payments and cost offsets from quality improvements) out

51 Furthermore, the association between payments and healthcare costs varies markedly across sta

52 We investigated 374,766 providers' industry payments and healthcare costs.

53 known about the association between industry payments and medical device selection.

54 ivariable linear regression to predict total payments and OOP expenses, with costs adjusted to the 20

55 Its effect on payments and outcomes for percutaneous coronary interven

56 comes assessed were receipt of financial COI payments and overall conclusion reported between robotic

57 The association between industry payments and physician prescribing was consistent across

58 0) identified a positive association between payments and prescribing in all analyses; the remainder

59 ated as the difference between reimbursement payments and the total cost to provide care to the patie

60 ch factors as social norms regarding whether payments are considered fair.

61 Complication rates and Medicare payments are significantly lower for high-risk patients

62 se organizations, 168 (61%) provided only co-payment assistance, and the most common therapeutic area

63 stintervention primary patency and aggregate payments associated with maintenance interventions were

64 For CABG, payments at both BPCI and control hospitals decreased du

65 Our analysis indicates that national REDD+ payments attenuated the effect of increases in gold pric

66 Despite growth in value-based payment, attributes of nephrology care associated with p

67 Payments based on the amount of CO(2) removed from the a

68 Thus, differences in episode payments between TAVR and SAVR were greatest for the sic

69 injectable medications into an expanded ESKD payment bundle prompted concerns that dialysis facilitie

70 Expansion of the ESKD payment bundle was not associated with increased closure

71 Patients with TAVR had higher preprocedural payments, but lower payments during and after the index

72 2012, increased to represent 57.9% of total payment by 2017.

73 -hour window) incentivized by increasing tPA payment by as much as 18% to 44% depending on willingnes

74 es, the average risk-adjusted 90-day episode payment by hospital ranged between $22 154 and $27 205 w

75 ationship exists between receipt of industry payments by speakers of the Open Public Hearing (OPH) po

76 totaled all inpatient and outpatient episode payments by surgical specialty.

77 international expenditures through corporate payment cards to map the network of global business trav

78 tcoin blockchain to provide "off-chain" fast payment channels between users, which means that not all

79 ts of Ontario physicians have greater yearly payments compared to older cohorts at the same age despi

80 received an average of $17 942 in incentive payments compared with $11 105 for optometrists, $16 617

81 ts of Ontario physicians have greater yearly payments compared with older cohorts at the same age des

82 The Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data from 2012-2015 were combined with the 2015

83 Annual Meeting were obtained and matched to payment data in OP.

84 Missing payment data were imputed using a generalized linear mod

85 was linked with the Open Payments Program's payment data.

86 IQVIA Institute for Human Data Science, Open Payments Data [Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services]

87 In this study, we linked Open Payments data on providers' industry payments with Medic

88 This study uses Medicare Open Payments data to characterize trends in the prevalence a

89 Company-reported payments from the Open Payments database (OP) have been compared with self-disc

90 thors (per study) were determined using open payments database.

91 sidering proven added benefit in pricing and payment decisions.

92 include targeted social safety net programs, payment deferrals, or tax breaks as well as suitable cas

93 The ACP calls for reform of U.S. payment, delivery, and information technology systems to

94 care recently concluded a national voluntary payment demonstration, Bundled Payments for Care Improve

95 associated with reductions in total Medicare payments [difference-in-differences estimate=-$72, confi

96 had higher preprocedural payments, but lower payments during and after the index hospitalization for

97 grouping surgeons by adjusted total episode payments, each component of the total episode was more e

98 und that tree cover loss increased after the payments ended, and therefore, our results suggest that

99 t inequality was perceived as less fair than payment equality.

100 Compared with current payment, equivalent population-level net monetary benefi

101 rticipants who were disadvantaged by unequal payments exerted significantly less conservation effort

102 rvices (PES) programs have long worried that payments flow to landholders who would have conserved fo

103 Over that period, the average total payment for 30 TDF-FTC tablets increased from $1350 to $

104 traception (IPP-LARC) separately from global payment for all services in a delivery hospitalization w

105 dicare and Medicaid Services to only provide payment for allogeneic bone marrow transplantation for p

106 t-of-pocket maximum and a relatively high co-payment for hospitalizations.

107 Price reductions or payment for initial response would improve cost effectiv

108 Payment for most surgical procedures bundles postoperati

109 eir willingness to donate a portion of their payment for participation as a charitable donation.

110 Participation in episode-based payment for PCI and CABG was not associated with changes

111 Payment for research participation is ethically contenti

112 sults support the need for a reassessment of payment for surgical procedures.

113 Increasing payment for the iStent represents the majority of the in

114 Total Medicare part B payment for the selected glaucoma procedures increased f

115 nts accounted for $94 (5.7%) and third-party payments for $1544 (94.3%).

116 We compared total Medicare payments for 30-day surgical episodes, payments for indi

117 score were independent predictors of higher payments for both inpatient and outpatient resource use,

118 nal voluntary payment demonstration, Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) model 3, in which s

119 Under the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) program, bundled pa

120 nd remaining vs leaving the 2018 CMS Bundled Payments for Care Improvement-Advanced Program (BPCI-A),

121 Medicare's bundled payments for care improvement-advanced program includes

122 and Medicaid Innovation launched the Bundled Payments for Care Initiative (BPCI) in 2013.

123 Unadjusted mean Medicare payments for each incremental year of patency were as fo

124 Medicare payments for each surgical episode were calculated.

125 cobenefits under FLR and other carbon-based payments for ecosystem service schemes (e.g. carbon enha

126 nvironmental laws, the widescale roll-out of payments for ecosystem service schemes, and sustainable

127 Designers and funders of payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs have long

128 of a market for ecosystem services [e.g., a payments for ecosystem services (PES) scheme] can close

129 Conclusion Patency-adjusted payments for hemodialysis access maintenance differed by

130 icare payments for 30-day surgical episodes, payments for individual components of care (index hospit

131 Episode payments for laparoscopic cholecystectomy vary widely ac

132 rovision of vouchers to offset medication co-payments for P2Y12 inhibitors, compared with no vouchers

133 There was a discrepancy in Medicare payments for patients who achieved a TO versus patients

134 edicare beneficiaries, we calculated episode payments for patients who underwent aortic valve replace

135 For example, payments for physician services were higher for the most

136 Payments for PrEP medication in the IQVIA database in 20

137 hield of Hawaii, introduced Population-based Payments for Primary Care (3PC), a new capitation-based

138 After summing payments for services rendered during each episode, we t

139 There is concern that payments for some procedures are excessive because the n

140 nd - passed legislation to cap out-of-pocket payments for specialty drugs at $150 per prescription.

141 Total Medicare payments for surgical care are substantial, representing

142 Total payments for surgical encounters paid by the insurer/emp

143 However, episode payments for TAVR are less influenced by patient comorbi

144 We calculated price-standardized payments for the entire surgical episode of care and str

145 We calculated price-standardized Medicare payments for the surgical episode from the index admissi

146 , our results suggest that without continued payments, forest protection is not guaranteed.

147 Among these physicians, 4152 (94%) received payments from device manufacturers ranging from $2 to $3

148 ns were performed by physicians who received payments from device manufacturers.

149 Financial payments from the drug industry to U.S. physicians are c

150 Company-reported payments from the Open Payments database (OP) have been

151 Population-based global payment gives health care providers a spending target fo

152 Studies with financial COI payment greater than this amount were more likely to rep

153 OOP expenses are rising faster than total payments, highlighting the transition of costs to patien

154 ver half the variation between high- and low-payment hospitals was related to care after the index pr

155 For settlements alone, the median indemnity payment in glaucoma was $955 988, compared with $827 051

156 The $2.08 billion in PrEP medication payments in 2018 is an underestimation of national costs

157 For tPA payments in acute ischemic stroke, our model-based resul

158 concordance between disclosures to ASCO and payments in OP was 16% for company and category matching

159 Further research is needed to assess bundled payments in other clinical contexts.

160 7, encompassing the first 2 years of bundled payments in the CJR program.

161 ound annual growth rate) and the average OOP payment increased from $54 to $94 (14.9% compound annual

162 For PCI, payments increased at both BPCI and control hospitals du

163 Total payments increased by 29%, with a 53% increase in facili

164 Median payments increased over time in all groups and were less

165 Episode payments increased with increasing comorbidity score for

166 The experiment introduced unjustified payment inequality based on luck, in contradiction of lo

167 Payment inequality was perceived as less fair than payme

168 eem to be well-aligned in Medicare's bundled payment initiative for bariatric surgery.

169 lly, we find that a 10% increase in industry payments is associated with 1.3% higher medical and 1.8%

170 hysicians' claims history, total malpractice payments, jury awards, the presence of an immunity from

171 While the payment landscape is changing, with an increasing propor

172 ssociated with changes in patient selection, payments, length of stay, or clinical outcomes.

173 Payments may influence physicians' clinical decision mak

174 While these payments may pose conflicts of interest, their relations

175 Bundled payments may prompt hospitals to implement broad care re

176 patients, prescribers, relative uptake, and payment methods in the US.

177 Compared to the types of payment methods that people living with diagnosed HIV (P

178 ry participation in the CJR program (bundled-payment metropolitan statistical areas, hereafter referr

179 ipant birth based on income, health services payment mode, maternal education, height, and skin color

180 < .001) and reporting through an alternative payment model (mean score, 79.5 for alternative payment

181 lacement (CJR), a national mandatory bundled-payment model for hip or knee replacement in randomly se

182 ment model (mean score, 79.5 for alternative payment model vs 59.9 for reporting as individual; diffe

183 its introduction, the BCBS population-based payment model was associated with slower growth in medic

184 e developed a framework for a HF value-based payment model with a longitudinal focus on disease manag

185 dence on outcomes associated with this novel payment model.

186 this goal has been to implement alternative payment models (APMs) that encourage high-value care by

187 is designed to be compatible with prevalent payment models and reforms being implemented today.

188 Conclusion: Value-based payment models for cirrhosis have the potential to benef

189 Episode-based payment models for HF hospitalization have yielded limit

190 uggests that primary care-based longitudinal payment models have indirectly improved HF care quality

191 fined patient populations, and episode-based payment models that emphasize accountability for quality

192 pport to guide practices' implementation and payment models that improve the business case for practi

193 ages of both fee-for-service and alternative payment models, and few reported positive financial retu

194 althcare dollars flowing through value-based payment models, no longitudinal models currently focus o

195 vice delays, caused by lags between the time payments must be made and the time services stemming fro

196 ccrued under current Medicare policy (stroke payment not adjusted for performance) compared with vari

197 rs ranging from $2 to $323 559 with a median payment of $1211 (interquartile range, $390-$3702).

198 nd the highest quartiles had average episode payments of $23 744 and $26 504, respectively (differenc

199 al and ED admissions and of total healthcare payments over the first 30 days after discharge.

200 s in the slope of glaucoma surgical Medicare payment (P < 0.00001) and iStent payment (P < 0.0001) tr

201 al Medicare payment (P < 0.00001) and iStent payment (P < 0.0001) trajectories in 2012.

202 Out-of-pocket payments per 30 tablets were lower among Medicaid recipi

203 Of the $1638 in total payments per 30 TDF-FTC tablets in 2018, OOP payments ac

204 Third-party and OOP payments per 30 TDF-FTC tablets increased annually.

205 the change in standardized Medicare-allowed payments per 90-day episode.

206 Outpatient total yearly charges and payments per beneficiary with PBC increased from $3,065

207 Baseline Medicare payments per episode for PCI were $20 164 at BPCI hospit

208 Unadjusted payments per year of access patency gain were compared a

209 ct patients seen, patient visits, government payments, physician age, sex, specialty, and year of bir

210 ct patients seen, patient visits, government payments, physician age, sex, specialty, and year of bir

211 rms, frequency of paid claims, average claim payment, physicians' claims history, total malpractice p

212 for Joint Replacement (CJR) model, a bundled payment plan for hip and knee replacements intended to i

213 eatment-related costs, such as discussion of payment plans or linkage to financial resources.

214 sures is the best insurance that alternative payment plans will truly reward and promote higher quali

215 Fundamental restructuring of payment policies and delivery systems is required to ach

216 This article proposes changes to Medicare payment policy, which currently does not adequately reim

217 ystem (MIPS) is a major Medicare value-based payment program aimed at improving quality and reducing

218 gistry ICD Registry was linked with the Open Payments Program's payment data.

219 Bundled payment programs are pressuring hospitals to reduce spen

220 have been a significant focus of value-based payment programs for outpatient practices.

221 or socioeconomic disadvantage in value-based payment programs initiatives that target outpatient prac

222 owever, have voiced concern that value-based payment programs may penalize practices that serve vulne

223 ts' annualized Medicare costs in value-based payment programs.

224 equently could fare poorly under value-based payment programs.

225 s for systems to maximize savings in bundled payment programs.

226 Payment rates were adjusted -4% to 4% based on scores.

227 ia testing using published Medicare national payment rates.

228 al [95% CI], 0.59 to 0.67) immediately after payment reform and declined by an additional 6% (OR, 0.9

229 are Improvement-Advanced Program (BPCI-A), a payment reform model that reimburses for a 90-day episod

230 the context of a nationwide Medicare bundled payment reform that was implemented in some areas of the

231 In an era of value-based payment reform, our objective was to better understand t

232 enced slight increases in closures following payment reform, whereas Hispanic and Medicare/Medicaid d

233 We estimate that the payment reform-which targeted traditional Medicare patie

234 characteristics) and closures changed after payment reform.

235 eing affected by facility closures following payment reform.

236 ility of closure in 2015 in association with payment reform.

237 at dialysis facilities before and after 2011 payment reforms and 2014 Affordable Care Act changes tha

238 gs for estimates of the impact of healthcare payment reforms and more generally for the design of hea

239 care has been largely untargeted by Medicare payment reforms because episode costs associated with it

240 st growth, which could be targeted by future payment reforms.

241 Here, we review 3 functions of research payment-reimbursement, compensation, and incentive-and i

242 inpatient episodes, we determined component payments related to the index hospitalization, readmissi

243 r of visits and patients, sex differences in payments remained significant for all physicians and oph

244 fidence interval: 43%, 72%; P < .001) higher payments, respectively, for the same patency gain compar

245 ialty and accounted for 407% and 132% higher payments, respectively.

246 st pandemic background conditions, incentive payment should be avoided unless essential to recruitmen

247 rvation effort than men, and that increasing payment size unexpectedly reduced effort.

248 cost of damaging local environments if cash payments stimulate food production that conflicts with n

249 , concerted changes in coordination of care, payment structures, and policy are needed.

250 The US Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is a major Medicare value-based pa

251 re & Medicaid Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) relative to their peers.

252 year, the 3PC population-based primary care payment system in Hawaii was associated with small impro

253 health-care practitioners, a fee-for-service payment system that incentivises testing and treatments

254 Before Canada's single-payer reform, its payment system, health costs, and number of health admin

255 e (3PC), a new capitation-based primary care payment system, in 2016.

256 nge underpinning these issues is the current payment system, which is largely based on fee-for-servic

257 andated health insurance employing a unified payment system.

258 the work environment, such as organization, payment systems, user training, and roles) on EHR implem

259 oviders receiving higher amounts of industry payments tend to bill higher drug and medical costs.

260 TAVR is associated with lower episode payments than SAVR.

261 edic surgeons and urologists received higher payments than they would have if benchmark times had bee

262 gements, in exchange for monetary or in-kind payments that exceed costs.

263 Individuals who incurred out-of-pocket payments that were more than 10% of their annual househo

264 How should we think about offering payment to participants in these trials?

265 manufacturer that provided the highest total payment to the physician who performed an ICD or CRT-D i

266 y the manufacturer that provided the largest payment to the physician who performed implantation than

267 m the manufacturer that provided the largest payment to the physician who performed implantation was

268 ation policy in which rich countries provide payments to developing countries for protecting their fo

269 (1) incentivized experiments, using monetary payments to elicit norms; (2) self-report scales.

270 In FY2015, Medicare began reducing payments to hospitals with high adverse event rates.

271 or knee-replacement episode (i.e., Medicare payments to institutions, primarily to hospitals and pos

272 Healthcare industry players make payments to medical providers for non-research expenses.

273 Manufacturers' payments to physicians who performed an ICD or CRT-D imp

274 erty programs around the globe provides cash payments to poor and vulnerable households.

275 nited States are increasingly tying provider payments to quality and value using pay-for-performance

276 018 after implementation of the federal Open Payments transparency program in 2013.

277 t than other participants receiving the same payment under an equal distribution.

278 Average episode payments varied nearly as much within hospital systems (

279 1 [6436 patients]) provided patients with co-payment vouchers for clopidogrel or ticagrelor for 1 yea

280 The sex gap of payments was mostly explained by differences in the numb

281 The sex gap of payments was mostly explained by differences in the numb

282 Average 90-day episode payments were $14,124, ranging from $12,220 at the lowes

283 Mean total episode payments were $51 509 at low-compared with $45 526 at hi

284 ll below the poverty line once out-of-pocket payments were accounted for.

285 ays, patient safety indicators, and Medicare payments were also below 1 percentage point; the noninfe

286 Patient-level factors associated with payments were analyzed by multivariable linear regressio

287 Hospital variation in TO and Medicare payments were analyzed.

288 Payments were associated with increased prescribing of t

289 No payments were categorized as ownership in OP, but 35 aut

290 Medicare payments were compared among patients who achieved TO ve

291 Third-party, OOP, and total payments were compared by third-party payer, classified

292 Increases in outpatient surgery total payments were driven primarily by facility fees and OOP

293 Payments were price standardized and risk adjusted using

294 Average baseline payments were similar at ACO versus non-ACO hospitals.

295 Average Medicare payments were substantially higher among patients who di

296 ay risk-adjusted, price-standardized episode payments were used to categorize hospitals by value by d

297 ts, the savings on claims exceeded incentive payments, which included quality bonuses and providers'

298 gned using medicare fee for service national payments, while medicare advantage, hospital, and patien

299 ed Open Payments data on providers' industry payments with Medicare data on healthcare costs.

300 udies had authors who received financial COI payments, with a median of $3364.46 per study (range $9