ライフサイエンスコーパス: payoff

1 eward to one of two alternatives ("potential payoff").

2 r, and influence the environment (i.e., game payoffs).

3 ation would thrive regardless of its average payoff.

4 symmetric payoffs but a slightly lower total payoff.

5 items to cut are those with the longest-term payoff.

6 ve that was most probable or had the largest payoff.

7 ues with gambling outcomes to maximize their payoff.

8 ian interpretation to guarantee considerable payoff.

9 es of key program features would have a high payoff.

10 Individuals reproduce proportional to payoff.

11 o effect on contributions and leads to lower payoff.

12 ted based on the expected time of the larger payoff.

13 ychology, there had better be some important payoff.

14 ers sometimes choose the strategy with lower payoff.

15 or), where each decision offers a stochastic payoff.

16 es choice variability, lowering the expected payoff.

17 ontext value at the cost of slightly reduced payoff.

18 s, while many others receive low or negative payoff.

19 e, disfavors defection but decreases average payoff.

20 ocks, consequently corresponding to a higher payoff.

21 costly punishment applied, increases average payoff.

22 es is optimal if it ensures maximal expected payoff.

23 ions range adaptation maximizes the expected payoff.

24 t because it delays realising a reproductive payoff.

25 by copying the group member with the highest payoff.

26 ed more effort and thereby achieved a higher payoff.

27 e positive correlations between the players' payoffs.

28 dividual decisions interact to determine the payoffs.

29 lay of the strategy leading to the symmetric payoffs.

30 gree of control over both players' long-term payoffs.

31 rate of cooperation typically depends on the payoffs.

32 he agent, who then distributes the coalition payoffs.

33 iduals have complete information about their payoffs.

34 nificantly increased, leading to mutualistic payoffs.

35 se in expected costs also increases expected payoffs.

36 nal and care only about maximizing their own payoffs.

37 and when it does, it enhances group-average payoffs.

38 at entails a conflict between their material payoffs.

39 gh-risk research that could have the largest payoffs.

40 ilibrium of a game with perceived rewards as payoffs.

41 ymmetries and small observable variations in payoffs.

42 smaller immediate payoffs over larger future payoffs.

43 search, model-based strategies led to higher payoffs.

44 require information on others' strategies or payoffs.

45 armers evaluate local conditions to increase payoffs.

46 of one's actions and the value of potential payoffs.

47 odels that assigned utility only to monetary payoffs.

48 equently modifies the commons and associated payoffs.

49 ed choices in decisions that involve delayed payoffs?

50 chnique were subjected to a reduced foraging payoff, 49% of birds switched their behavior to a higher

51 nd crucially, however, on the deviation from payoff additivity that occurs when both interacting indi

52 erous strategy achieves the maximum possible payoff against its own type.

53 the direction of the mutant that has maximum payoff against the resident population.

54 gs from other studies, support the idea that payoff and prior probability manipulations produce flexi

55 with previous studies, support the idea that payoff and prior probability manipulations produce flexi

56 Here, we characterize the economic payoff and regional emission consequences of BTM storage

57 eflect a fixed policy for the integration of payoff and stimulus information.

58 rce a linear relationship between his or her payoff and that of the opponent even when restricting hi

59 fixed linear relationship between one's own payoff and that of the other player.

60 es of not equally distributing the coalition payoff and the long-term concern to keep cooperation goi

61 suggest that a fast guess process, biased by payoff and triggered by stimulus onset, occurred on a su

62 a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment.

63 ibria: two equilibria with highly asymmetric payoffs and another equilibrium with symmetric payoffs b

64 t aspect of animal interactions, namely that payoffs and asymmetries may both be imperfectly observed

65 tivational state and controls to what extent payoffs and costs enter the overall evaluation of action

66 osed plasticity rules is suitable to extract payoffs and costs from a prediction error signal if they

67 s of the positive and negative consequences (payoffs and costs) of individual actions.

68 ere also initially uninformed about opponent payoffs and could not communicate verbally.

69 e, even if this resulted in lower scores and payoffs and even when there was no need to counteract th

70 Stimuli represented payoffs and participants had to predict their occurrence

71 ndings previously obtained with non-negative payoffs and primary rewards, the animal's choice behavio

72 degree to which there is transparency in the payoffs and risks associated with the decisions agents m

73 volving games in which environment-dependent payoffs and strategies coevolve.

74 where agents make mistakes when judging the payoffs and strategies of others, natural selection favo

75 are averse to differences between their own payoffs and those of others, i.e., inequity.

76 alue of resources can lead to a reduction in payoffs (and vice versa), both in the immediate- and lon

77 multiplied by reward level to calculate the payoff, and a binary choice task that involved choosing

78 ontrol that must be invested to achieve that payoff, and the cost in terms of cognitive effort.

79 trust, although that reduces their economic payoff, and they do so nonimpulsively and in a very calc

80 ivalent to a donation game with non-additive payoffs, and has previously been analysed for the single

81 foresight - which takes into account future payoffs, and how groupmates respond to one's own strateg

82 nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information.

83 earn the language of individuals with a high payoff; and (iii) random learning: children learn the la

84 ather than virtual) currency and when higher payoffs are at stake (Study 3).

85 The potential future payoffs are huge in terms of faster approval of more eff

86 Payoffs are larger among the least-developed countries a

87 ble degrees of cooperation are possible, and payoffs are scaled accordingly.

88 to that query is known, in situations where payoffs are unknown and the goal is purely epistemic: Th

89 ale-free graph on cooperation when effective payoffs are used.

90 It also predicts that when one's own payoffs are valued more than others', some generous acts

91 ey are motivated to increase their partners' payoff as well as their own.

92 volutionary game theory by allowing players' payoffs as well as their strategies to evolve in respons

93 PFC) encoded the animal's past decisions and payoffs, as well as the conjunction between the two, pro

94 ly-life environment and measured the fitness payoffs associated with the supply of parental care when

95 ics, rather than the rational examination of payoffs assumed by most social preference models.

96 is assured that she will receive the maximum payoff attainable under the desired payoff relation she

97 ividuals frequently demonstrated the highest-payoff behavior in their repertoire, inadvertently filte

98 by strategic considerations and the relative payoff between maxima.

99 There is a payoff between non-PIP anionic lipids attracting the PH

100 We investigated how differences in payoffs between available alternatives affect neural act

101 Breaking the alignment in payoffs between player A and player B reduced the extent

102 hy (EEG) and behavior to examine the role of payoff bias in a difficult two-alternative perceptual de

103 ial exploration and without any evidence for payoff-biased copying.

104 ious play, reinforcement learning, selective payoff-biased imitation, and foresight.

105 ion of such rules (unbiased social learning, payoff-biased social learning and frequency-dependent bi

106 We find that payoff-biased social learning may evolve under high leve

107 e acquired via two cognitive mechanisms: (1) payoff-biased transmission-a tendency to copy the most s

108 yoffs and another equilibrium with symmetric payoffs but a slightly lower total payoff.

109 theory of ZD strategies and improves his own payoff by adaptively changing his strategy following som

110 While the players would maximize their payoffs by both choosing the largest allowed value, M, t

111 g competitive games, monkeys increased their payoffs by systematically deviating from a simple heuris

112 ifferent strength according to the coalition payoffs can accept a transfer of power to another player

113 ess in the wild suggest that maximal fitness payoffs can be achieved by shifting offspring production

114 accurate-guessing) predictions, and shift as payoffs change, just as equilibrium theory predicts.

115 ion, and more responsive to past history and payoff changes, than two samples of human choices from e

116 of the anger program reflects the ancestral payoffs characteristic of a small-scale social world rat

117 possible moves, and therefore many possible payoffs conditional on those moves.

118 ted mean, variance, and skewness of possible payoffs, consistent with the idea that sequential choice

119 applied to NTDs, where their resource-saving payoffs could be highly beneficial.

120 They do not correspond to direct payments or payoff deductions, but they arise from the repercussions

121 djust their vaccinating strategies and their payoffs depend nonlinearly on whether or not the herd im

122 However, these payoffs depend on the particular way in which actions ar

123 we consider symmetric games, which means the payoff depends only on the number of players using eithe

124 The game payoffs determine which interactions are reinforced, and

125 social environments characterized by a large payoff difference between weak and strong ties, and no g

126 nically on the sensitivity of individuals to payoff difference, but the dependence is non-monotonous

127 Yet aggregated over all rounds, the payoff differences between players are rather small, and

128 al games with weak selection, i.e., when the payoff differences between strategies are small.

129 rted the fast guess account over accounts of payoff effects supported in other studies.

130 fort by incorporating tug-of-war theory into payoff equations from the two main classes of IFD models

131 tive reproductive tactic that yields fitness payoffs equivalent to a non-cooperative route to alpha s

132 n individuals take actions to maximize their payoffs even as their combined payoff is less than the g

133 such, we suggest that rare, high-risk, high-payoff events such as mating and mate competition could

134 ensure that any increase in one player's own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed perce

135 sights and, better yet, when high-risk, high-payoff experiments succeed.

136 n the player's and their opponent's expected payoff (extortionate strategies).

137 andards, or (ii) low variance in group-level payoffs, fails to predict attitudes about redistribution

138 ply our formulation to a system in which the payoffs favor unilateral defection and cooperation, give

139 In the chaotic regime, the total payoffs fluctuate intermittently, showing bursts of rapi

140 ior they try to facilitate leads to the best payoff for all agents on average, and most of the time.

141 pick the larger quantity even when the food payoff for choosing the smaller quantity was increased (

142 We apply our framework to quantify the payoff for Costa Rican birds of changing farm plot and b

143 The payoff for each alternative (which could be biased or un

144 nce, consistent with the hypothesis that the payoff for increasing brain size was greater general cog

145 evidence suggesting that these repeats are a payoff for the advantages of having abundant simple-sequ

146 Exhausting the resource maximizes the payoff for the present generation, but leaves all future

147 attacker, the knowledge level of the victim, payoffs for different outcomes, and the beliefs of each

148 relative value signal that linearly weights payoffs for self and other, captures key patterns of cho

149 Recent clinical findings have provided payoffs for significant preclinical evaluation and refin

150 and thus any direct or indirect reproductive payoffs for staying and working are less likely to be lo

151 of birds switched their behavior to a higher-payoff foraging technique after only 14 days, with young

152 egrates three critical factors: the expected payoff from a controlled process, the amount of control

153 However, the net payoff from energy research and policy directed at RGM m

154 he community of cooperators achieve a higher payoff from interactions within the community than membe

155 ng with a "good" male but a negative fitness payoff from mating with a "bad" male.

156 quences for her: she gets a positive fitness payoff from mating with a "good" male but a negative fit

157 s interact in any one encounter and derive a payoff from that interaction.

158 the case of weak selection, which means the payoff from the game is only a small contribution to ove

159 gy balances the downstream socially-mediated payoffs from a decision.

160 xpect price controls to reduce the potential payoffs from breakthrough drugs.

161 groups of strangers, even if monitoring and payoffs from cooperation were invariant to group size.

162 a strategy to extort an unfair share of the payoffs from the opponent.

163 ntrality algorithm that uses the concept of "payoffs" from economic theory.

164 We derive the payoff function for these families analytically, and stu

165 assignment problem and learned the implicit payoff function.

166 classes share the feature that knowledge of payoff functions is weakly beneficial for the emergence

167 tiplayer game with non-linear, non-monotonic payoff functions that models the benefits of the acidity

168 players are uncertain about their opponents' payoff functions.

169 d that the error rate is at least 5% and the payoff gain (relative to the status quo) is at least 150

170 ze, such that diffusion is fast whenever the payoff gain from the innovation is sufficiently high and

171 agents interact in small local clusters, the payoff gain of the innovation relative to the status quo

172 egies that adapt to play the equivalent mean payoff gamble.

173 r failures to find cooperation in controlled payoff games.

174 increased, but that the successful-defection-payoff has less impact on the weight of individuals and

175 so suggests that punishment can only enforce payoff-improving strategies, contrary to a widely cited

176 guided choice task and to integrate risk and payoff in a dynamic foraging task.

177 f cooperation is so extreme that the average payoff in a population can decline even as the potential

178 The greatest payoff in combating biological terrorism lies in focusin

179 Rejecting low offers increases relative payoff in pairwise competition between two strategies an

180 The importance of the larger payoff in this model suggests that the salience of large

181 ongly bound elite, and defectors earning low payoffs in a weakly connected periphery.

182 mework for the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in arbitrary iterated games.

183 sense of being able to appropriate 'surplus' payoffs in each interaction, which is selected for withi

184 understand the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in iterated interactions.

185 d rather than rational assessments of modern payoffs in large populations.

186 nexpectedly accelerates again when these A-A payoffs increase even further.

187 ow that countergeoengineering generates high payoff inequality as well as heavy welfare losses, resul

188 With more payoff information subjects are less likely to switch to

189 reward rather than integrating stimulus and payoff information.

190 ts that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information.

191 on-signaled strategic information, including payoffs, intentions of the other player, reward outcomes

192 derivative is a financial asset whose future payoff is a function of underlying assets.

193 and choice efficacy, such that the expected payoff is highest for decisions in an intermediate value

194 ls are satisfied if and only if the obtained payoff is larger than a fixed aspiration level.

195 aximize their payoffs even as their combined payoff is less than the global maximum had the players c

196 mulation cannot deal with games in which the payoff is not differentiable.

197 he long run, access to information about own payoffs leads to less cooperative behaviour.

198 ces that were less influenced by anticipated payoff magnitudes and were more driven by recent negativ

199 ategies: fair strategies ensure that the own payoff matches the average payoff of the group; extortio

200 For some payoff matrices the distribution of fixation times can b

201 These equilibrium solutions assume that the payoff matrices under each behavioural context are ident

202 r model can be mapped to particular forms of payoff matrices.

203 tween the two strategies is given by the 2x2 payoff matrix (acbd).

204 Classifying all two by two games with payoff matrix [(a,b),(c,d)], we show that mutation from

205 on population size and the parameter of the payoff matrix and noise factor.

206 hich the positive and negative values of its payoff matrix were realized by the delivery and removal

207 en two strategies, A and B, described by the payoff matrix(abcd).

208 space is equivalent to making changes in the payoff matrix, and once this is done, the behavior of th

209 whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix.

210 population of competing individuals using a payoff matrix.

211 t not on the number of strategies, n, or the payoff matrix.

212 s whose interactions are described by an nxn payoff matrix.

213 he two graphs induce a transformation of the payoff matrix.

214 cs introduces a simple transformation of the payoff matrix.

215 ccording to the normalised parameters in the payoff matrix.

216 ion and selfishness, quantifiable in a 2 x 2 payoff matrix.

217 make their decisions either based purely on payoff maximization or by imitating the vaccination beha

218 that individuals for whom trustworthiness is payoff-maximizing will find TPP to be less net costly (f

219 First, cooperation is a rational (expected payoff-maximizing) response to incorrect beliefs about t

220 s to behaviours in the present and how these payoffs may be realised in different currencies.

221 ssing no information about others' traits or payoffs, mobility (via self-propulsion or environmental

222 Here, we develop a payoff model of eco-evolutionary control based on strate

223 at are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner'

224 s cooperate, by doing which he maximizes the payoff of the extortioner as well.

225 The payoff of the game is interpreted as fitness.

226 he amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group.

227 sure that the own payoff matches the average payoff of the group; extortionate strategies allow a pla

228 r obtains an advantageous share of the total payoff of the players, and the other players best respon

229 t, our results indicate that the equilibrium payoff of the population can be increased if players som

230 ulation size, evolution acts to maximize the payoff of the whole population.

231 Therefore, the payoff of two individuals using the same strategy can be

232 nce of conspecifics influenced the potential payoffs of a foraging opportunity.

233 Here we show that payoffs of cooperation depend on asymmetric costs of ora

234 ows that simply understanding the behavioral payoffs of existing games is insufficient to make predic

235 kind, when combined with inequalities in the payoffs of fighting, can lead to the evolution of severe

236 y punishment may actually reduce the average payoffs of group members in comparison with groups in wh

237 However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strat

238 her with social ties determine the resulting payoffs of interactants.

239 ring the alternating condition increased the payoffs of mutual prosociality, and prosocial choice inc

240 hich individuals directly value the material payoffs of others, i.e., generosity, and (2) the extent

241 hich individuals directly value the material payoffs of others.

242 Clarifying the condition-dependent payoffs of the dance language provides new insight into

243 ing the successful strategy according to the payoffs of the last round of the game, and then analyse

244 erally enforce a linear relation between the payoffs of the two players.

245 clines translated into sexually antagonistic payoffs: old males fertilized more eggs when they were d

246 proposed stochastic evolutionary model where payoff only weakly drives evolution and individuals can

247 are more likely to choose smaller immediate payoffs over larger future payoffs.

248 s model suggests that the salience of larger payoffs played a critical role in determining the value

249 are rather small, and the equal division of payoffs predicts about 80% of all groups best.

250 h a novel strategy that would increase their payoffs provided that it is also adopted by their neighb

251 maximum payoff attainable under the desired payoff relation she imposes, without knowing how the oth

252 he capacity for strategic thinking about the payoff-relevant actions of conspecifics is not well unde

253 We consider decision makers who know that payoff-relevant observations are generated by a process

254 cated issues must be resolved, the potential payoff remains large.

255 ifically, velocity initially falls as rising payoffs reward the interactions among the more stationar

256 by combining conformist social learning with payoff-sensitive individual reinforcement (updating of e

257 nd populations that experience heterogeneous payoff shocks.

258 played the strategies leading to asymmetric payoffs significantly more frequently than study partici

259 The resulting "payoff stochasticity" reduces the intensity of selection

260 ived that captures the average effect of the payoff stochasticity.

261 We show how the payoff structure in this scenario and other closely rela

262 metimes conflated with the actual underlying payoff structure of those decisions.

263 rock-paper-scissors games, the nontransitive payoff structure of which means that unilateral control

264 en have conscious knowledge about the task's payoff structure.

265 rtainty, and impacts culture via group-level payoff structures that define individualism and collecti

266 Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't

267 human opponents, extortion resulted in lower payoffs than generosity.

268 ce of punishers, cooperators can gain higher payoffs than non-cooperators.

269 right temporoparietal junction and expected payoff that was absent in the other groups.

270 ooperative behaviors may reveal the greatest payoff to social science research of all agent-based mod

271 The total payoff to the plant, the benefit obtained from water and

272 wnplays the importance of differences in the payoffs to behaviours in the present and how these payof

273 s to predators), which 'equivalates' fitness payoffs to both risk-takers (red non-droppers) and risk-

274 s have no intrinsic meaning or effect on the payoffs to individuals, yet beliefs/superstitions regard

275 Payoffs to interactions depend on whether or not individ

276 l mating rates for males are higher, fitness payoffs to monogamy and the maintenance of a single part

277 reased the level of cooperation, the average payoffs to players, and the assortativity between cooper

278 unctional perspective straight from expected payoffs to predicted frequencies of behaviors.

279 Finally, by modifying the payoffs to satisfy two novel conditions, we found that c

280 f economic games that measured concern about payoffs to themselves and to others: dictator, ultimatum

281 pulation level with a sub-optimal per capita payoff towards which irrigation systems tend to gravitat

282 diness potential (LRP) on a subset of biased payoff trials contralateral to the higher-paying alterna

283 clude that rats are able maintain a constant payoff under changing sensory conditions by flexibly adj

284 nterest, information use, and contingency of payoff under environmental variation that may be applied

285 ributes of the three isoforms might engender payoffs under specific conditions.

286 cients in a linear inequality containing the payoff values.

287 ility condition, particularly when the value payoff was highest (i.e., $6 and $7).

288 Knowing that the payoff was proportional to the time spent above a target

289 To explain this large payoff, we use percolation theory and prove that wheneve

290 For standard prisoner's dilemma payoffs, we also found that assortativity resulted predo

291 Offering more than you demand increases payoff when many strategies are present simultaneously a

292 plies that humans do not consider neighbors' payoffs when making their decisions in this dilemma but

293 e frequently and earned significantly higher payoffs when matched with other study participants from

294 reward leads to increased contributions and payoff, whereas punishment has no effect on contribution

295 ires that decision makers (i) believe future payoffs will occur and (ii) are not forced to take the i

296 ls may be both less likely to believe future payoffs will occur and less able to forego immediate rew

297 Uncertainty (i.e., variable payoffs with unknown probabilities) brings together a nu

298 rporates terms for the disutility of unequal payoffs, with parameters that index behaviors normally e

299 imization to the distortion of the perceived payoffs, with some followers being more receptive than o

300 o exert a physical effort knowing that their payoff would be proportional to their effort duration.