ライフサイエンスコーパス: unconscious

1 e various ways in which mental processes are unconscious.

2 ed to be unconscious and superior are indeed unconscious.

3 eliable ways to be certain that a patient is unconscious.

4 nd skills that were previously automatic and unconscious.

5 the VLPO, but only when mice are sedated or unconscious.

6 ents and the former for events that remained unconscious.

7 onal outcomes than those predicted to remain unconscious.

8 ike the perceived objects are, but vague and unconscious.

9 Is this type of learning truly implicit and unconscious?

10 the case fatality rate was highest in those unconscious (44.4%).

11 onths and case fatality was highest in those unconscious (44.4%).

12 hort of 103 comatose adult patients who were unconscious 48 hours after CA and underwent repeated mea

13 es can be forgotten by pushing them into the unconscious, a process called repression.

14 results provide evidence for spontaneous and unconscious access to grammatical gender in participants

15 ce of a word presented in English constrains unconscious access to its Chinese translation.

16 ecision-making to explain both conscious and unconscious accumulation of decisional evidence.

17 which detects whether a subject is awake or unconscious achieving high performance.

18 and a subsequent slow decay of the lingering unconscious activity.

19 degrees C to 34 degrees C) for 12 to 24 h in unconscious adult patients with spontaneous circulation

20 nternational trial, we randomly assigned 950 unconscious adults after out-of-hospital cardiac arrest

21 0, through January 10, 2013, we enrolled 950 unconscious adults with cardiac arrest of presumed cardi

22 al processing specific to consciousness from unconscious afferent sensory signals, the issue has been

23 's hospitals involving children who remained unconscious after out-of-hospital cardiac arrest.

24 pulseless ventricular tachycardia and still unconscious after restoration of spontaneous circulation

25 ol of action because they disrupt the normal unconscious and automatic inhibition of alternative move

26 ses can be thought of as either conscious or unconscious and consequently gives a misleading analysis

27 She was unconscious and had extreme bradycardia (6 beats/min) at

28 that these areas are critically involved in unconscious and involuntary motor control.

29 to believe that conscious goals evolved from unconscious and selfish forms of pursuit.

30 incing evidence that processes assumed to be unconscious and superior are indeed unconscious.

31 tive processes that are fast, automatic, and unconscious and those that are slow, deliberative, and c

32 The distinction between implicit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious) learning is contro

33 light on the brain mechanisms of conscious, unconscious, and metacognitive processing.

34 rting assumption that all decision making is unconscious, and that the onus should be on researchers

35 neurobiological or behavioral effect to be 'unconscious,' and provide a platform for rigorously inve

36 curacy of judgments does not necessitate the unconscious; and the prescriptive claim of UTT is unfoun

37 rons is sufficient to induce arousal from an unconscious, anesthetized state.

38 ious systems (in vitro neuronal cultures) or unconscious animals (e.g. anaesthetized rats).

39 hich unseen disgust-cues induced unexpected, unconscious arousal just before participants discriminat

40 Gender roles contribute to unconscious assumptions that have little to do with actu

41 of the structures and the heuristic nature (unconscious assumptions) of human visual perception.

42 e patients that underwent MRI, one third was unconscious at the time of MRI and half of these patient

43 tion of whether implicit evaluations reflect unconscious attitudes.

44 cortex, whereas experts are expected to use unconscious automation (habitual DM) in which decisions

45 cortex, whereas experts are expected to use unconscious automation (habitual DM) in which decisions

46 responses associated with the conscious and unconscious (backwardly masked) perception of fearful fa

47 consciousness in subjects who are considered unconscious based on behavioral responses.

48 He came to reject the idea of the unconscious because he could not observe unequivocally u

49 s because he could not observe unequivocally unconscious behaviour at the bedside.

50 s article can help us recognize and mitigate unconscious bias and can help create an equitable enviro

51 vignettes assessed the relationship between unconscious bias and clinical decision making.

52 for scientists and institutions to overcome unconscious bias and create environments with better gen

53 Unconscious bias can also affect healthcare professional

54 Tackling unconscious bias is a major challenge for journals and t

55 Studies involving physicians suggest that unconscious bias may be related to clinical decision mak

56 o quickly interpret what we see, and with an unconscious bias toward that which makes the most sense

57 tion of why dopamine agonists may lead to an unconscious bias towards risk in susceptible individuals

58 ignificantly speeds up data analysis, avoids unconscious bias, and represents another step towards th

59 To address unconscious bias, the study was described as examining a

60 mes (D scores) on the IAT as a surrogate for unconscious bias.

61 Better understanding of how unconscious biases affect clinical decision making may h

62 on signs of possible apophenia to help bring unconscious biases to awareness.

63 s, for example, appear to exhibit particular unconscious biases, then dialogue could help them to bec

64 henia could help to indicate and manage such unconscious biases.

65 gut similarity, other than psychological and unconscious biases.

66 ence the effects of unintentional cognitive (unconscious) biases that derive from cultural stereotype

67 I describe an unconscious binding perspective, and how in conjunction

68 one characterizing element of conscious and unconscious bodily communication.

69 We aimed to evaluate unconscious body movement synchrony changes as an index

70 Surprisingly, the unconscious boost in accuracy was not accompanied by cor

71 xplanation for blindsight need not appeal to unconscious brain processes, citing research indicating

72 ns, but its role in organizing conscious and unconscious brain states is poorly understood.

73 e electrophysiological landmarks of distinct unconscious brain states, and could be used to help impr

74 ature differentiating the conscious from the unconscious brain.

75 ork has investigated sound processing by the unconscious brain; such investigations may provide a 'wi

76 terior cortex when subjects initially became unconscious, but later encompassed both frontal and post

77 view the psychological and neural science of unconscious (C0) and conscious computations (C1 and C2)

78 nscious control of behavior, but evidence of unconscious causation and automaticity has sustained the

79 rriers to adherence and reduce the impact of unconscious clinician biases.

80 anding the distinction between conscious and unconscious cognition remains a priority in psychology a

81 s the sub-processes underlying conscious and unconscious cognitive control differently.

82 However, for unconscious cognitive control, excluded participants sho

83 e recent studies have shown the existence of unconscious cognitive control.

84 imination task, and showed clear evidence of unconscious colour processing, consistent with previous

85 rtant neural circuitries and networks during unconscious conditions have been reported.

86 nd specificity between the conscious and the unconscious conditions in the benchmark population.

87 for discriminating between the conscious and unconscious conditions.

88 hat excluded people invest less attention in unconscious conflict detection, but more in unconscious

89 strate that native-language activation is an unconscious correlate of second-language comprehension.

90 k for to fight hidden bias and deliberate or unconscious corruption.

91 nvestigated noninvasive neural signatures of unconscious cortical stimulus processing to understand m

92 nd their choice of words display elements of unconscious (covert) engendered views.

93 equires a mechanism of motor simulation - an unconscious, covert imitation of the observed facial pos

94 t requires a process of motor simulation--an unconscious, covert imitation of the observed movements.

95 f these contextual cues provoke conscious or unconscious craving and enhance susceptibility to relaps

96 well and Shanks provide a useful critique on unconscious decision making.

97 ature and its implications for understanding unconscious decision making.

98 ggesting that we have poor metacognition for unconscious decisional evidence.

99 and static distinction between conscious and unconscious decisions, ignoring a process that dynamical

100 etheless were delayed significantly by these unconscious distractors in a directed saccade but not in

101 Yet, consciousness has advantages that the unconscious does not.

102 isions and actions between the conscious and unconscious domains of the mind: habitual decision makin

103 trous oxide could be used to render patients unconscious during surgical procedures, subsequent devel

104 ressed memories can continue to exert strong unconscious effects that may compromise mental health.

105 associative operations to rapid retrieval of unconscious emotional memories acquired during prior thr

106 findings provide a biological basis for the unconscious emotional vigilance characteristic of anxiet

107 ce emerged in reaction times recorded during unconscious encoding and in the outcome of decisions mad

108 Hippocampal activity increased during the unconscious encoding of overlapping versus nonoverlappin

109 Furthermore, hippocampal activity during unconscious encoding predicted the outcome of decisions

110 uding reduced paramedic call outs, decreased unconscious episodes and improved independence.

111 uppression paradigm to titrate conscious and unconscious evidence, we show that unconscious informati

112 odel of how motivated forgetting affects the unconscious expression of memory that may be generalized

113 ntion, but also neocortical areas underlying unconscious expressions of memory.

114 from three major bodies of research in which unconscious factors have been studied: multiple-cue judg

115 be unconscious; there can be true "zombies"--unconscious feed-forward systems that are functionally e

116 The neurological basis for this unconscious fill-in phenomenon is unknown, despite being

117 ost-hoc subset analysis of patients who were unconscious for more than 1 hour (n = 75) following TBI,

118 that eye movements could reveal an unaware (unconscious) form of memory.

119 survive V1 damage, mediating residual, often unconscious functions known as "blindsight." Because som

120 oretical framework predicts the existence of unconscious goal processes capable of guiding behavior i

121 tructural similarities between conscious and unconscious goal pursuit (the similarity principle), and

122 Second, unconscious goal pursuit occurs through early-stage orie

123 To understand the conflict between unconscious goals and consciousness, we can study the em

124 First, we argue, unconscious goals are rooted in conscious choices relate

125 The language of conscious and unconscious goals is rooted in a folk-taxonomy that is l

126 Third, unconscious goals work selflessly, resulting in their ow

127 isorders of compulsivity and impulsivity, an unconscious habit system may play a key role in explaini

128 the preparatory interventions, were sedated, unconscious, hemodynamically unstable, developmentally d

129 ichotomous view that separates noncognitive, unconscious (implicit) learning from cognitive, consciou

130 Hence, unconscious inference may influence decision-making in n

131 Shape may be the paradigm case of such "unconscious inference": When a coin is rotated in depth,

132 en von Helmholtz characterized perception as unconscious inference.

133 rticle convincingly argues that evidence for unconscious influence is limited by the quality of the m

134 y focuses on the bidirectional links between unconscious influences and decision making.

135 r, it understates the empirical evidence for unconscious influences and overlooks considerations of c

136 with our intuitions have all contributed to unconscious influences being ascribed inflated and erron

137 anks' (N&S's) concerns regarding the role of unconscious influences in theories of decision making.

138 greater evidence of awareness of supposedly unconscious influences is revealed.

139 The hypothesis of unconscious influences on complex behavior is observatio

140 While showing unconscious influences on complex decisions is indeed di

141 ead the unwary to conclude that there are no unconscious influences on decision making - and never co

142 a service for debates regarding the role of unconscious influences on decision making by offering so

143 ainst the idea that any significant role for unconscious influences on decision making has been estab

144 ent and does not circumvent the existence of unconscious influences on decision making.

145 e a welcome examination of many claims about unconscious influences on decision making.

146 prior work using such methods clearly shows unconscious influences on simple decisions.

147 elief that our decisions are often biased by unconscious influences.

148 eories assigning causally effective roles to unconscious influences.

149 ual problem in assigning causes to potential unconscious influences.

150 cious and unconscious evidence, we show that unconscious information can be accumulated over time and

151 The unconscious information could only be used when some con

152 estigated over the past several decades, how unconscious information impacts neural circuitry and beh

153 a sound framework to isolate and understand unconscious information processing.

154 If cases of unconscious inhibition are not instances of integration,

155 unconscious conflict detection, but more in unconscious inhibition of impulsive responses.

156 Unconscious inhibition therefore potentially undermines

157 nd of inhibition can occur unconsciously via unconscious inhibitory mechanisms.

158 esearchers should be aware of the dangers of unconscious investigator bias, all papers should provide

159 l & Shanks' (N&S's) conceptualization of the unconscious is overly restrictive, compared to standard

160 an interface for conscious (early-born) and unconscious (late-born) proprioceptive inputs to the cor

161 FC play complementary roles in the implicit, unconscious learning and exploitation of spatial statist

162 tarting point for future investigations into unconscious learning and functions of metacognition.

163 y are cognitively impenetrable, represent an unconscious learning mechanism.

164 in operative and drive harmful actions in an unconscious manner.

165 ted the fundamental aspects of conscious and unconscious mechanisms of perception.

166 ntury-old assumption that suppression leaves unconscious memories intact should be reconsidered.

167 though the role of attention in formation of unconscious memories is more complex.

168 lts reveal a previously unknown mechanism of unconscious memory due to irreplaceable neuronal commitm

169 Both conscious and unconscious memory mechanisms contribute to the rewardin

170 rical evidence for the role of rapid, likely unconscious memory reactivation during retrieval.

171 of taste memory as a type of non-declarative unconscious memory.

172 eflective consciousness and use of the term "unconscious mind" as a dumpster for all mental processes

173 d make an even stronger case for the role of unconscious motivation in cognition and action.

174 Unconscious motivation in humans is often inferred but r

175 ication of Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) theory of unconscious motivational processes to psychopathology.

176 f it, but also that it is possible to induce unconscious motor adaptations requiring significant chan

177 during limb movement can induce substantial unconscious motor and muscular adjustments is not known.

178 the confrontation of two signals: a fast and unconscious motor code, based on a direct sensory-motor

179 domestication is a protracted process, that unconscious (natural) selection plays a prominent role,

180 The findings question the unconscious nature of deep sleep, and provide an explana

181 Unconscious neural activity has been repeatedly shown to

182 unique opportunity to compare conscious and unconscious neural events in response to the same visual

183 Work on unconscious neural processes provides a complementary ap

184 onal load in a relevant task would determine unconscious neural processing of invisible stimuli.

185 Here, we show unconscious neurofeedback training, which consequently p

186 ndividual presentation, as manifestations of unconscious or psychological distress-mediated behaviour

187 hanges represent state-related (conscious vs unconscious) or drug-related (anesthetic vs no anestheti

188 rved changes are state-related (conscious vs unconscious) or drug-related (drug vs no drug).

189 patients were severely cognitively impaired, unconscious, or unable to express a choice and were auto

190 circulation and inclusion <240 minutes, and unconscious patient after return of spontaneous circulat

191 ne clearance protocols are controversial for unconscious patients after blunt traumatic injury and ne

192 nutrition from terminally ill or permanently unconscious patients is illegal; (3) risk management per

193 Unconscious patients predicted to recover consciousness

194 ees C was initiated on November 18, 2002 for unconscious patients resuscitated from cardiac arrest.

195 ent (TTM) at 33 degrees C to 36 degrees C in unconscious patients with out-of-hospital cardiac arrest

196 Three hundred fifty-five adult, unconscious patients with out-of-hospital cardiac arrest

197 infusion is still considered appropriate for unconscious patients without palpable blood pressure or

198 diagnosis, classification, and prognosis of unconscious patients, and will lead to a greater underst

199 I argue that the scope and strength of unconscious perception have been overestimated in extant

200 vide a platform for rigorously investigating unconscious perception in future studies.

201 ction (confidence), we found no evidence for unconscious perception; participants' behavior matched t

202 tern prior to stimulus onset also influences unconscious perceptual making in unseen trials.

203 he Implicit Association Test (IAT) to assess unconscious preferences, direct questions regarding stud

204 Our results suggest that unconscious preparation of free choices is not restricte

205 decisions to inhibit or delay may depend on unconscious preparatory neural activity.

206 Past research demonstrates that unconscious primes can affect people's decisions.

207 extensions because incentive hope denotes an unconscious process capable of working against many form

208 evidence is lacking for the intervention of unconscious processes in complex decision making.

209 gene theory) and overemphasizes the role of unconscious processes in decision making, it provides a

210 , whether attentional modulation extended to unconscious processes remained largely unknown, particul

211 Conscious processes are partly produced by unconscious processes, and much information processing o

212 ated stimuli are influenced by conscious and unconscious processes, but the neural systems underlying

213 framework that allows the identification of unconscious processes, even with null effects on behavio

214 t set of functional brain imaging studies of unconscious processes.

215 ults from a dynamic mixture of conscious and unconscious processes.

216 ncing tests of the superiority of (presumed) unconscious processes.

217 ize theories on decision making that include unconscious processes.

218 nificant update of our view of conscious and unconscious processes.

219 nd delayed, and it depends on interplay with unconscious processes.

220 r is dynamically influenced by conscious and unconscious processes.

221 des new possibilities for reliably measuring unconscious processes.

222 ostly implementing computations that reflect unconscious processing (C0) in the human brain.

223 However, unconscious processing (implicit memory) of intraoperati

224 st threshold of this quality is required for unconscious processing and a second threshold for consci

225 signatures that differentiate conscious and unconscious processing in the brain?

226 Unconscious processing modulated activity only in the ba

227 determines neural representations related to unconscious processing of continuously suppressed stimul

228 activation of the right amygdala during the unconscious processing of emotionally expressive faces.

229 Unconscious processing of subliminal visual information,

230 of saccadic eye movements, is mediating the unconscious processing of the transcranial magnetic stim

231 However, the dependence of such unconscious processing on stimulus properties remains un

232 Third, extensive unconscious processing takes place for those stimuli on

233 t signal complexity can affect the extent of unconscious processing without altering the subjective a

234 proof on anyone wishing to claim a role for unconscious processing.

235 havior comes from a mixture of conscious and unconscious processing.

236 omponents to parietal function; and residual unconscious processing.

237 red with unilateral right trials, indicating unconscious processing.

238 methodology it can guide the delineation of unconscious processing.

239 nce and stimulus complexity on the extent of unconscious processing.

240 nctions within the nervous system, including unconscious proprioception, audition, and arousal.

241 neurons essential for hearing, balance, and unconscious proprioception.

242 The presence of unconscious race and social class bias and its associati

243 ponses to the vignettes were associated with unconscious race or social class preferences.

244 Specifically, the activity could reflect unconscious reactions to the last word in the command, n

245 It results in an unconscious reduced responsiveness to continuous or repe

246 e that melanopsin's influence extends beyond unconscious reflex functions to encompass cortical visio

247 Effects of unconscious relational inference emerged in reaction tim

248 Do these unconscious representations encompass the motor programm

249 gh conscious suppression and perhaps through unconscious repression, though whether such attempts are

250 with sedatives do not exhibit a stereotypic 'unconscious' response to direct cortical stimulation; in

251 Rather than studying unconscious responses as the real predispositions, align

252 ispositions, alignment between conscious and unconscious responses promises deeper insights into the

253 sus nonoverlapping word pairs and during the unconscious retrieval of episodically related versus unr

254 win's conceptualization of domestication and unconscious selection provides valuable insight into the

255 argh's (H&B's) metaphoric description of the unconscious, selfish goal on three points.

256 igm to demonstrate that attention load gates unconscious semantic processing.

257 ous sensations of touch and hearing, and the unconscious sensation of blood flow.

258 In conclusion, we contend that the unconscious, severely altered state of the brain in NREM

259 Unconscious social class and race biases were not signif

260 We argue that the brain is in an unconscious state in sleep, akin to general anesthesia (

261 induce the transition from an anesthetized, unconscious state to an awake state, suggesting critical

262 stimuli, thus providing a correlate for the unconscious state.

263 e accelerated by ensemble reactivation in an unconscious state.

264 widespread deactivation of the cortex in the unconscious states of NREM sleep or GA would be expected

265 rent patterns of information transfer during unconscious states remains unknown.

266 xit both isoflurane- and sevoflurane-induced unconscious states.

267 sal both against endogenous and drug-induced unconscious states.

268 ted delta activity during both the awake and unconscious states.

269 and vPM) was more frequent in conscious than unconscious states.

270 (suprathreshold), or does it also extend to unconscious stimuli (subthreshold)?

271 airing minimizes non-strategic influences of unconscious stimuli on task selection, insulating endoge

272 most cases, such activation is observed for unconscious stimuli that closely resemble other consciou

273 ety, activity in the basolateral amygdala to unconscious stimuli, and subjects' reaction times, were

274 vents that separate conscious awareness from unconscious stimulus processing.

275 owever, other studies have reported 'direct' unconscious-stimulus influences on task selection in the

276 ing is very narrow in its generalization and unconscious (subliminal) influences, if they occur at al

277 In unconscious survivors from out-of-hospital cardiac arres

278 Unconscious survivors of out-of-hospital cardiac arrest

279 In unconscious survivors of out-of-hospital cardiac arrest

280 ommended to improve neurological outcomes in unconscious survivors of out-of-hospital ventricular fib

281 n self-insight did not emerge to explore the unconscious; the accuracy of judgments does not necessit

282 When subjects become unconscious, there is a characteristic change in the way

283 imally conscious; complicated systems can be unconscious; there can be true "zombies"--unconscious fe

284 mological futility of using concepts such as unconscious thinking in research.

285 We argue that even distracted or unconscious thought is capacity limited and differences

286 Moreover, N&S fail to demonstrate that unconscious thought plays no role at all in decision mak

287 attention to better understand conscious or unconscious thought.

288 cus on the role of attentional mechanisms in unconscious thought.

289 ope of attention influence processing during unconscious thought.

290 The unconscious-thought effect occurs when distraction impro

291 framework, we clarify issues with regard to unconscious-thought theory (UTT) and self-insight studie

292 e in luciferase expression when conscious or unconscious throughout development.

293 dentifiable and which are not, therefore the unconscious use of a nonidentifiable model is a consider

294 well as the neural correlates of unattended, unconscious visual events.

295 ted potential recordings of conscious versus unconscious visual phenomena generated by the very same

296 patients died after successful conversion of unconscious VT/VF (89.5% survival of VT/VF events).

297 First-shock success was 76 of 76 (100%) for unconscious VT/VF and 79 of 80 (99%) for all VT/VF.

298 ies to the idea of an "intelligent cognitive unconscious," we would agree.

299 planatory burden on an intelligent cognitive unconscious, with many theories assigning causally effec

300 Recent evidence of unconscious working memory challenges the notion that on