ライフサイエンスコーパス: altruism

1 and within-group cooperation (e.g. parochial altruism).

2 at a cost to themselves, a phenomenon termed altruism.

3 sufficient for the evolution of one form of altruism.

4 onsumption of a common resource is a form of altruism.

5 r selfishness help to "pay" for second-order altruism.

6 than others, a situation called competitive altruism.

7 e punisher, making it a form of second-order altruism.

8 us action performance predicts self-reported altruism.

9 e punisher, making it a form of second-order altruism.

10 wo alleles which code for different kinds of altruism.

11 n alternative route towards the evolution of altruism.

12 m interspersed with phases of transient true altruism.

13 mpetition could account for the evolution of altruism.

14 are highly unstable, leading to the loss of altruism.

15 encouraging the origin and stability of true altruism.

16 the system towards the point of 50% marginal altruism.

17 y different perspectives on the evolution of altruism.

18 relationship between sexual reproduction and altruism.

19 relationship between sexual reproduction and altruism.

20 s and cultural context in the development of altruism.

21 are motivated more by self-interest than by altruism.

22 l infinite models) plays in the evolution of altruism.

23 lassic "haystack" models of the evolution of altruism.

24 ups contribute to research solely because of altruism.

25 n relatives can counteract kin selection for altruism.

26 d in terms of extended kinship or reciprocal altruism.

27 upport the selection of both weak and strong altruism.

28 ffects can cancel, limiting the viability of altruism.

29 tly responding quantitatively to a partner's altruism.

30 on need to be interpreted solely in terms of altruism.

31 table component of the immune system and kin altruism.

32 relatedness), group selection and reciprocal altruism.

33 es several novel insights into the nature of altruism.

34 s been described in terms of cooperation and altruism.

35 le of the neuropeptide oxytocin in promoting altruism.

36 sibility of a neural basis for extraordinary altruism.

37 eciprocal activity yielded little subsequent altruism.

38 is applied to model the real motivations of altruism.

39 ew that competition puts any such demands on altruism.

40 close kin but share a "greenbeard" gene for altruism?

41 The evolution of altruism, a behaviour that benefits others at one's own

42 withstanding that examples of pathologies of altruism abound.

43 nces in the social preferences that motivate altruism across the primate order, and there is currentl

44 ection can favor reproductive altruism if an altruism allele aids copies of itself by helping relativ

45 Concepts of pathological altruism, altruism bias, and guardian systems may help o

46 or kinship per se to achieve cooperation and altruism among group members.

47 Competition hinders the evolution of altruism amongst kin when beneficiaries gain at the expe

48 With this type of altruism, an offspring will perform any act for which th

49 is unlikely that a single gene can code for altruism and a recognizable tag.

50 ing a common prosocial motivation underlying altruism and cooperation.

51 re, scientifically informed understanding of altruism and cooperative behavior.

52 istic scenarios, competition influences both altruism and defection.

53 Heritable variation in selfishness, altruism and discrimination is predicted to be particula

54 us social preferences in terms of both their altruism and equality-efficiency tradeoffs.

55 els of the gene-culture coevolution of human altruism and further sharpen what any theory of human co

56 Our study suggests that parochial altruism and in-group/out-group biases emerge early duri

57 Second, we ask why reproductive altruism and individuality arise only in the larger memb

58 e of cooperative agreements, from reciprocal altruism and insurance arrangements to the social norms

59 ormation, allowing the ethical principles of altruism and justice to guide organ allocation.

60 were thought to potentially benefit through altruism and maintenance of hope.

61 sness was inversely predictive of children's altruism and positively correlated with their punitive t

62 We show in a simulation model that altruism and punishment paradoxically become negatively

63 nstitutions of integration can unleash human altruism and restore cooperation in the presence of dive

64 Altruism and selfishness are 30-50% heritable in man in

65 This genetically based variation in altruism and selfishness requires explanation.

66 ions initially in stable equilibrium between altruism and selfishness.

67 eories on the explanation of both biological altruism and sex-ratio conflicts, and defend that the en

68 veral fundamental issues in the evolution of altruism and spite have remained contentious.

69 Humans are a cooperative species, capable of altruism and the creation of shared norms that ensure fa

70 Here, we assessed altruism and third-party evaluation of scenarios depicti

71 Both pure altruism and warm-glow motives appear to determine the h

72 cussion of the connection between other-only altruism and whole-group altruism, in which the donor ga

73 relatedness predisposes individuals towards altruism, and as haploid germ cells of an ejaculate will

74 dual-level ones, need not produce behavioral altruism, and do not require competition between groups

75 as political mobilization, health practices, altruism, and emotional states exhibit similar dynamics

76 entered their children for medical benefit, altruism, and hope of cure.

77 cision on a choice between self-interest and altruism, and if improving this sensitivity through trai

78 ad private insurance, showed lower levels of altruism, and less understanding of study design.

79 enefit from medical improvement, feelings of altruism, and maintenance of hope, the chance of cure or

80 structure for the maintenance of mutualism, altruism, and niche construction or ecosystem engineerin

81 n ambivalent about their values (protection, altruism, and respect) and the deceased's wishes, not wa

82 m benefits the group, selfishness undermines altruism, and the purpose of the model is to identify me

83 METHODS/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: In our AlAn's (altruism-antisocial) game a computer program presents su

84 eard effect and find that if recognition and altruism are always inherited together, the dynamics are

85 despite the fact that virtually all forms of altruism are associated with tradeoffs--some of enormous

86 ve been proposed to explain the evolution of altruism are direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity

87 related individuals so that the benefits of altruism are reaped by copies of the altruistic gene in

88 cial interactions, including cooperation and altruism, are characteristic of numerous species, but ma

89 ong evolutionary trajectories, and find that altruism arises before directly beneficial behavior, des

90 Participants acknowledged hope and altruism as reasons for entering the trial more than exp

91 enomena, chiefly the evolution of biological altruism as that found in sterile castes of eusocial ins

92 netically based variation in selfishness and altruism, as in man, altruists with an innate ability to

93 t to the system's evolved functions: sibling altruism, aversion to personally engaging in sibling inc

94 And, can altruism be favored between individuals who are not clos

95 of competition, selection will often favour altruism because its alternatives provide lower fitness.

96 In the typical evolutionary formulation, altruism benefits the group, selfishness undermines altr

97 ed oxytocin system activity induces a social altruism bias at the cost of ecological responsibility.

98 eptual approach toward the quantification of altruism bias is presented.

99 Concepts of pathological altruism, altruism bias, and guardian systems may help open many n

100 despite fear), and adaptive social behavior (altruism, bonding, and teamwork) were found to be releva

101 ial insect colonies are pinnacles of evolved altruism but also exhibit dramatic conflict among relati

102 sity of the population slows up selection of altruism, but does not affect its direction, and this ho

103 mportant mechanism favoring the evolution of altruism, but punishment can be costly to the punisher,

104 uently relied on kin selection or reciprocal altruism, but recent models suggest that guarding may be

105 e hypothalamic peptide oxytocin in promoting altruism, but whether the influence of oxytocin benefits

106 This effect both supports the evolution of altruism by focusing the altruists' gifts on relatives o

107 provide a new perspective on strong vs. weak altruism by identifying their different underlying game

108 conditions associated with outgroup-directed altruism by showing that charitable social cues co-occur

109 In a brood from a single egg, reproductive altruism by soldiers reflects clone-level allocation to

110 uestions about the proximate source of human altruism by suggesting that prosocial behavior results,

111 on amongst defectors nevertheless undermines altruism, by facilitating invasion of unrelated benefici

112 en helped by the beneficiary, discriminating altruism can be resistant against invasion by defectors.

113 Reciprocal altruism can become established among selfish, unrelated

114 m, the model shows that both strong and weak altruism can evolve in periodically formed random groups

115 The fact that strong altruism can increase when groups are periodically and r

116 We show how kin selection and reciprocal altruism can promote cooperation in diverse 2x2 matrix g

117 losses suffered in the first and in this way altruism can ratchet up to high levels.

118 Together, a little bit of reciprocal altruism can, however, greatly reduce the threshold at w

119 olving an absolute cost to altruists (strong altruism) cannot evolve when populations are structured

120 ow religion negatively influences children's altruism, challenging the view that religiosity facilita

121 Much of what we know about the evolution of altruism comes from animals.

122 The study of prosocial behavior--altruism, cooperation, trust, and the related moral emot

123 Empathy-induced altruism derives its strength from the emotional stake i

124 A species altruism directed toward repair of human problems is cou

125 s the essential factors for the evolution of altruism directly in its parameters and integrates impor

126 Moreover, when altruism does occur among other primates, it is typicall

127 Whereas altruism drives the evolution of human cooperation, ethn

128 This species exhibits altruism during both asexual and sexual cycles of its li

129 In some cases however, kin-altruism effects appear to be modest.

130 Reciprocal altruism emerges from iterated games where players have

131 This nepotistic altruism evolves under natural selection only if the rat

132 The study of human and primate altruism faces an evolutionary anomaly: There is ample e

133 support decisions about trust, reciprocity, altruism, fairness, revenge, social punishment, social n

134 rlapping generations hinder the evolution of altruism, fecundity effects are more conducive to altrui

135 iprocal interactions are a potent trigger of altruism for young children, and that these interactions

136 ibly accounting for the distinctive forms of altruism found in our species.

137 of such functions when observing refusal of altruism from a genetic sister.

138 xperience fostered children's expectation of altruism from others.

139 l design allows us to rigorously distinguish altruism from preferences regarding equality-efficiency

140 Cooperation based on reciprocal altruism has evolved in only a small number of species,

141 Efforts to solve the evolutionary puzzle of altruism have a lengthy history, and recent years have s

142 However, the potential hurtful aspects of altruism have gone largely unrecognized in scientific in

143 as been used extensively to study reciprocal altruism, here we show that the n-player prisoner's dile

144 owever, in conditions that do not select for altruism, host bacteria promoting transfer are outcompet

145 ate mechanism to underlie so-called directed altruism, i.e., altruism in response to anothers's pain,

146 Selection can favor reproductive altruism if an altruism allele aids copies of itself by

147 indirect fitness options and helping is only altruism if it reduces the helper's direct fitness.

148 reciprocal activity elicited high degrees of altruism in 1- and 2-y-old children, whereas friendly bu

149 vity to inequality is strongly predictive of altruism in an independent task domain.

150 o far, and I apply the theory of competitive altruism in arguing how strategic investment in behaviou

151 further our understanding of the origins of altruism in humans by highlighting the importance of emo

152 eted theoretical results on the selection of altruism in inelastic viscous homogeneous populations, n

153 is may explain reported genetic variation in altruism in man.

154 The profound benefits of altruism in modern society are self-evident.

155 selection theory predicts that the degree of altruism in queenless colonies should be reduced because

156 underlie so-called directed altruism, i.e., altruism in response to anothers's pain, need, or distre

157 tions meet the most stringent definitions of altruism in that they represent an intentional behavior

158 st defectors presents relative advantages to altruism in the simplest games between altruists and def

159 fications of pathological altruism, that is, altruism in which attempts to promote the welfare of oth

160 of Hamilton's rule in the case of other-only altruism in which the benefits are shared by other membe

161 d, providing field evidence for 'competitive altruism' in which helpful acts are used as a display to

162 Here we demonstrate the evolution of altruism, in the form of conditional reproductive restra

163 between other-only altruism and whole-group altruism, in which the donor gains some benefit from its

164 other prominent theories of the evolution of altruism: inclusive fitness and multilevel selection.

165 s us to combine kin selection and reciprocal altruism into a general matrix game model.

166 Altruism is consequently deemed to require stronger kin

167 The evolution of sociality and altruism is enigmatic because cooperators are constantly

168 is caused by loosely coupled separate genes, altruism is facilitated through beard chromodynamics in

169 In non-human animals, altruism is generally directed towards relatives, and sa

170 This is true even if altruism is initially rare, migration between groups all

171 enome sequencing reveals that this bacterial altruism is made possible by drug-resistance mutations u

172 In humans, altruism is motivated at least in part by empathy and co

173 Our findings show how altruism is preserved from the disruptive effects of suc

174 If reciprocal altruism is to provide an explanation for altruistic beh

175 e for charitable contributions, called "pure altruism," is satisfied by increases in the public good

176 In the absence of kin selection, reciprocal altruism may be an evolutionarily stable strategy but is

177 Altruism may be learned (behavioral evolution) in a way

178 ltruist, and also limits the extent to which altruism may emerge by exposing clusters of altruists to

179 riodically and randomly formed suggests that altruism may evolve more readily and in simpler organism

180 support prior suggestions that self-reported altruism may not reliably predict altruistic behaviour.

181 However, a self-reported altruism measure previously linked to peer evaluations b

182 riments, interoceptive sensitivity predicted altruism measured through monetary generosity.

183 l of remittances can be explained by our kin-altruism model.

184 ndividuals favour kin to the extent that kin-altruism models predict?

185 that if punishing inequity is predictive of altruism more broadly, extraordinary altruists should pu

186 aggregate of scores from Ego-Resiliency, NEO Altruism, NEO Straightforwardness (positive predictors)

187 itness of the actor and also either benefit (altruism) or harm (spite) other individuals.

188 Altruism (over social space) corresponds to self-control

189 parents, who had higher levels of trust and altruism, perceived the potential for enhanced care, ref

190 ons suggest that enforcement of reproductive altruism (policing) in hymenopteran insect societies is

191 Altruism presents a challenge to evolutionary theory bec

192 ions, and hence, perhaps surprisingly, serve altruism rather than selfishness.

193 explanations and models for cooperation and altruism--reciprocity, kin and group selection, and puni

194 Although the neural mechanisms underlying altruism remain unknown, empathy and its component abili

195 teria to humans: Is the evolution of extreme altruism, represented by the sterile workers of social i

196 In order to be able to enforce altruism, reproductive cheaters need to be reliably iden

197 Greenbeard altruism resolves this paradox by allowing cooperators t

198 h as cooperation, giving, and other forms of altruism--result from covert attempts to avoid social in

199 Altruism should be the guiding motivation for all donati

200 used to model Herbert Simon's explanation of altruism, showing that altruistic norms can "hitchhike"

201 origin of the genetic basis for reproductive altruism (somatic cells specialized at vegetative functi

202 social conformity in general and competitive altruism specifically.

203 selective pressures leading to reproductive altruism stem from the increasing cost of reproduction w

204 for altruistic sterility is favored when the altruism sufficiently benefits relatives carrying the ge

205 al responsibility emphasize the relevance of altruism, suggesting that more altruistic individuals ar

206 ism, fecundity effects are more conducive to altruism than survival effects, and one demographic regi

207 and potential ramifications of pathological altruism, that is, altruism in which attempts to promote

208 ndependently inherited loci, one controlling altruism the other discrimination, or a one locus model

209 range of puzzling behaviors, such as extreme altruism, the use of ethical principles, and romantic lo

210 redictions from kin selection and reciprocal altruism theory.

211 ral network positively reinforces reciprocal altruism, thereby motivating subjects to resist the temp

212 After a brief exploration on the basis of altruism, this review will discuss the assessment, evalu

213 gn, physician involvement, personal benefit, altruism, time, and incentives.

214 the positive assortment necessary for strong altruism to evolve does not require these additional mec

215 it defectors against each other allow strong altruism to evolve even in populations with negligible k

216 such as kinship or reciprocity, that enable altruism to evolve.

217 that spermatozoa may display cooperation and altruism to gain an advantage when inter-male sperm comp

218 This allows altruism to persist even in weakly structured population

219 should consider kin selection and reciprocal altruism together rather than as alternatives, and they

220 The cowbird's unexpected altruism toward host offspring simply promotes its selfi

221 totally negate, the kin-selected benefits of altruism toward relatives.

222 ophobia generally failed to exhibit enhanced altruism toward the outgroup.

223 not affect its direction, and this holds for altruism towards any individual, not just immediate neig

224 By directing altruism towards kin, D. purpureum should generally avoi

225 dividuals will show less aggression and more altruism towards relatives.

226 iduals should show less aggression, and more altruism, towards closer kin.

227 Additional questions assessed altruism, trust, value for research, and perceptions of

228 The idea of reciprocal altruism usually involves direct reciprocity: repeated e

229 Consistent with pure altruism, we find that even mandatory, tax-like transfer

230 aphic regime (so-called death-birth) permits altruism whereas another (so-called birth-death) does no

231 e reciprocal cues remain potent elicitors of altruism, whereas a fourth study with preschoolers showe

232 n and obtain conditions for the stability of altruism which differ from Hamilton's rule by simply rep

233 neural bases of this unique aspect of human altruism, which extends beyond interpersonal interaction

234 y phenomena of human interactions: authentic altruism, why people cooperate intuitively, one-shot coo

235 udy is best described as egoistically biased altruism, with important implications for our understand

236 group formation, the origin of reproductive altruism within the group, and the further specializatio

237 ves, while defectors receive the benefits of altruism without providing any help in return.