ライフサイエンスコーパス: biosafety

1 holerae vaccine strains should enhance their biosafety.

2 afety practices and improve their culture of biosafety.

3 ting with high purity, biocompatibility, and biosafety.

4 Biosafety analysis was performed and showed an acceptabl

5 s a select agent, is considered to pose both biosafety and biosecurity threats.

6 including food safety, clinical diagnostics, biosafety and biosecurity.

7 of-care in vitro diagnostics, food analysis, biosafety and environmental monitoring, forensics, and s

8 he high throughput and rapid food detection, biosafety and environmental monitoring.

9 ory elements are likely to improve intrinsic biosafety and may be particularly useful for a number of

10 In light of concerns about biosafety and potential germ line transmission, they hav

11 Biosafety and uptake efficiency of the EMs were evaluate

12 apid blood clearance, low background signal, biosafety, and acceptable radiation dosimetry in humans.

13 ing of biosafety practices, vigilance toward biosafety, and enforcement of biosafety practices throug

14 es; engineering controls (e.g., clean rooms, biosafety cabinets) as needed; and homogeneous matrix-ba

15 n the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture issued biosafety certificates for commercial production of two

16 ountermeasures are restricted by the current biosafety classification of EBOVs.

17 There are biosafety concerns about reintroduction of the disease f

18 reintroduction of the disease, but there are biosafety concerns for both OPV and IPV.

19 of transgene silencing and the toxicity and biosafety concerns of working with viral vectors.

20 of transgene silencing, and the toxicity and biosafety concerns of working with viral vectors.

21 of transgene silencing, and the toxicity and biosafety concerns of working with viral vectors.

22 Such an approach minimizes biosafety concerns that could apply to single, replicati

23 , depend on sample availability, and present biosafety concerns, so reliable methods for sequence-bas

24 nt larger-capacity viral vectors suffer from biosafety concerns, whereas plasmid-based approaches hav

25 is therefore highly desirable for addressing biosafety concerns.

26 dy of aspects of CCHFV biology under relaxed biosafety conditions.

27 (MALDI) mass spectrometry imaging suite in a biosafety containment facility, we show that the key ste

28 screening of small-molecule libraries under biosafety containment level 2 (BSL2) conditions.

29 1, 2, or 3 status did not possess all of the biosafety elements considered minimally standard for the

30 biomacromolecules and their in vitro/in vivo biosafety evaluations.

31 ome to provide lentivirus vectors with novel biosafety features.

32 These biosafety hurdles could be overcome by the use of recomb

33 However, their biosafety is of major concern.

34 challenges and discuss the environmental and biosafety issues involved in the use of this technology

35 aled that subsets of laboratories that claim biosafety level 1, 2, or 3 status did not possess all of

36 Here, we exploit a biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) chimeric Sindbis virus system

37 cycle, but it still can be carried out under biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) conditions.

38 st highly pathogenic influenza viruses under biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) conditions.

39 from the select-agent rule and handled at a biosafety level 2 (BSL2) laboratory.

40 ophila melanogaster, in conjunction with the biosafety level 2 (BSL2) Nine Mile phase II (NMII) clone

41 We modified a biosafety level 2 chimeric virus system to facilitate ev

42 man immunodeficiency virus (HIV) type 1 in a biosafety level 2 containment facility, without any appa

43 ganisms nonviable and safe for handling in a biosafety level 2 laboratory.

44 rus Pichinde virus (PICV) has been used as a biosafety level 2 model for the Lassa virus.

45 riants of the arenavirus Pichinde, used as a biosafety level 2 model of Lassa fever virus as it produ

46 therefore can be handled more facilely using biosafety level 2 practices.

47 Under biosafety level 3 (agricultural) conditions, we have gen

48 ) genes during viral infection in mice under biosafety level 3 (agricultural) conditions.

49 The JHH BCU and The Johns Hopkins biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) clinical microbiology laborato

50 atency, work with B. pseudomallei requires a biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) containment facility.

51 (50%) of these ETC clinical laboratories had biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) containment.

52 and even basic studies must be conducted in biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) facilities.

53 spiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), a biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) pathogen.

54 fection, where virus spread and the need for biosafety level 3 containment complicate the use of wild

55 was evaluated in a field test conducted in a Biosafety Level 3 facility, where the system was challen

56 requirement for conducting experiments in a biosafety level 3 laboratory (BSL-3) limit the ability t

57 removing fixed M. tuberculosis samples from biosafety level 3.

58 ing multiple recombinants under constraining biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) conditions.

59 virus L polymerase protein and the need for biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) containment conditions for wor

60 enaviruses is hampered by the requirement of biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) facilities to work with these

61 Since handling of the virus requires a biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) facility, little is known abou

62 nus of paramyxoviruses, which are designated biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) organisms due to the high mort

63 The results demonstrate that the biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) suit protects workers from aer

64 th infectious Ebola viruses is restricted to biosafety level 4 (BSL4) laboratories, presenting a sign

65 V), the causative agent of Lassa fever, is a biosafety level 4 (BSL4) pathogen that requires handling

66 For biosafety level 4 (BSL4) pathogens such as the deadly Ni

67 For biosafety level 4 (BSL4) pathogens such as the deadly Ni

68 nsport in Marburg virus-infected cells under biosafety level 4 conditions.

69 extraordinary pathogenicity, which requires biosafety level 4 containment.

70 o its high pathogenicity and requirement for biosafety level 4 containment.

71 rus entry, replication, and assembly without biosafety level 4 containment.

72 nction with the development of sophisticated biosafety level 4 laboratories at the US Army Medical Re

73 Frozen samples were shipped to a reference biosafety level 4 laboratory for RNA viral load measurem

74 tainment level 4 (CL4) laboratories studying biosafety level 4 viruses are under strict regulations t

75 EVD) reminds us of how little is known about biosafety level 4 viruses.

76 The work was performed at biosafety level 4 with wild-type virus with specificity

77 single-domain antibodies (sdAbs) selected at biosafety level 4.

78 hly pathogenic paramyxovirus classified as a biosafety level four agent.

79 the virus can be handled only at the highest biosafety level, research is restricted to a few special

80 ential biological weapon, is classified as a biosafety level-4 agent because of its high mortality ra

81 ovides a safe means to handle EBOV outside a biosafety level-4 facility and will stimulate critical s

82 hallenges investigating viruses that require biosafety-level 3 or 4 handling.

83 dy the filovirus replication cycle under low biosafety levels.

84 ous cell culture assay for BASV and at lower biosafety levels.

85 insic biocontainment would provide essential biosafety measures to secure these closed systems and en

86 r of the enhancement of therapy efficacy and biosafety of CO therapy.

87 ere we present an approach to strengthen the biosafety of gain-of-function influenza experiments.

88 es to determine the experimental utility and biosafety of hESCs and (ii) optimization and standardiza

89 Significant progress was achieved in the biosafety of HIV-derived vectors by eliminating all the

90 While the actual biosafety of the vector will ultimately be proven in viv

91 and mandated to unequivocally establish the biosafety of this device and related bioartificial organ

92 system (BLSS), we proceeded to evaluate the biosafety of this device.

93 nged Wisconsin laboratories to examine their biosafety practices and improve their culture of biosafe

94 importance of epidemiologic tracing, proper biosafety practices in the clinical diagnostic laborator

95 rtance of laboratorians strictly adhering to biosafety practices recommended for the handling of infe

96 gilance toward biosafety, and enforcement of biosafety practices throughout the laboratory setting.

97 ontinued microbiology-based understanding of biosafety practices, vigilance toward biosafety, and enf

98 ies should be examined to ensure appropriate biosafety precautions.

99 tural environments, remains a major unsolved biosafety problem.

100 to remain vigilant in the use of appropriate biosafety procedures, particularly when working with unk

101 One constraint is optimisation of national biosafety processes to support rapid and safe uptake of

102 emonstrate that TA2-nHP66 exhibits excellent biosafety profile without apparent systemic toxicities.

103 ic effect in mammalian cells and have a good biosafety profile.

104 clinical use, nanoparticles with established biosafety profiles should be used to decrease long-term

105 tes tumor-specific lymphocytes with improved biosafety profiles.

106 With the caveat that biosafety regulations preclude testing of a complemented

107 Although biosafety regulations precluded our testing the compleme

108 Although biosafety regulations precluded our testing the compleme

109 use of such agents complies with appropriate biosafety requirements.

110 ies in compliance of both animal welfare and biosafety requirements.

111 ent meeting of the International Society for Biosafety Research (ISBR) focused on so-called genetical

112 To circumvent biosafety restrictions associated with the use of live L

113 less contributory to a microbiology-focused biosafety risk assessment than information on the specim

114 a questionnaire-based, microbiology-focused biosafety risk assessment.

115 Our findings have implications for biosafety, vector design, and cell biology research.