ライフサイエンスコーパス: conscious

1 n high-level areas) equally likely to become conscious?

2 control population of SAH patients from the CONSCIOUS-1 study (n = 413).

3 Conscious access appears characterized by the entry of t

4 However, despite conscious access being impaired, the ability to decode t

5 We used two masking techniques and show that conscious access for visual stimuli synchronous to parti

6 Conscious access has been robustly associated with activ

7 uring late processing stages associated with conscious access mechanisms.

8 ach restricted in time, while the failure of conscious access results in the breaking of this chain a

9 oth tasks required sustained attention, thus conscious access to the rules of tonality was manipulate

10 ) and tidal volume (VT ) were recorded in 28 conscious adult male Sprague-Dawley rats.

11 cit safety vs. threat) that is distinct from conscious affective experience and more closely tracks t

12 GROUND DATA: Novices are hypothesized to use conscious analysis (effortful DM) leading to activation

13 Novices are hypothesized to use conscious analysis (effortful DM) leading to activation

14 encephalography collected from humans in the conscious and anesthetized states.

15 and then later (15-20 min) recognizing a non-conscious and complex (second-order) visuospatial sequen

16 100% sensitivity and specificity between the conscious and the unconscious conditions in the benchmar

17 of conscious decision-making to explain both conscious and unconscious accumulation of decisional evi

18 They represent one characterizing element of conscious and unconscious bodily communication.

19 clusion affects the sub-processes underlying conscious and unconscious cognitive control differently.

20 ptimal cutoff for discriminating between the conscious and unconscious conditions.

21 el dichoptic suppression paradigm to titrate conscious and unconscious evidence, we show that unconsc

22 has demonstrated the fundamental aspects of conscious and unconscious mechanisms of perception.

23 These results reveal, in conscious animals, a novel mechanism of neuromodulation

24 This parallel conscious association is unique to the brain.

25 ence for the power of emotional stimuli over conscious attention.

26 ion of emotional stimuli at the threshold of conscious awareness and alter judgments of emotionality

27 ole in perception, associative learning, and conscious awareness and have been shown to be disrupted

28 had made a decision, supports the idea that conscious awareness occurs when evidence has accumulated

29 Thus, conscious awareness of having reached a decision appears

30 Conscious awareness of negative cues is thought to enhan

31 Results demonstrate that conscious awareness of the CS is not required during eit

32 parent future influences "earlier" events in conscious awareness, might affect people's most fundamen

33 duals are physically connected without their conscious awareness, we investigated how the interaction

34 e rather than continuous, and unavailable to conscious awareness.

35 al energetic requirement for the presence of conscious awareness.

36 highly automatic and largely occurs outside conscious awareness.

37 subcortical speech encoding operating below conscious awareness.

38 th other brain networks may be important for conscious awareness.

39 jects, and interacts with pursuit outside of conscious awareness.

40 system modulates pursuit behavior outside of conscious awareness.

41 We applied conscious bioimaging to the assessment of NFkappaB and S

42 Conscious bioimaging was applied to a neonatal mouse mod

43 The CMRglc of the conscious brain (e.g., right parietal region, 99.6 +/- 1

44 s consciousness and memory while sparing non-conscious brain activities.

45 by the central nervous system, muscles, and conscious brain is of interest since body sway carries i

46 signal complexity were revealed in minimally conscious but not unaware patients.

47 ious care, and a culture of high-value, cost-conscious care reinforce the desired training goals (27

48 ating physicians to deliver high-value, cost-conscious care suggests that learning by practicing phys

49 f role models of delivering high-value, cost-conscious care, and a culture of high-value, cost-consci

50 systems that incentivize high-quality, cost-conscious care.

51 ould be prepared to deliver high-value, cost-conscious care.

52 ote education in delivering high-value, cost-conscious care.

53 d in order to ensure that consumers can make conscious choices.

54 was similar in 1PP and 3PP, suggesting that conscious coding of errors is similar for self and other

55 For conscious cognitive control, excluded participants showe

56 focused primarily on exclusion's effects on conscious cognitive control, while recent studies have s

57 l and neural science of unconscious (C0) and conscious computations (C1 and C2) and outline how they

58 pping with the distribution of the benchmark conscious condition.

59 hat excluded people invest more attention in conscious conflict detection, but less in conscious inhi

60 mand for lean meat from progressively health conscious consumers, are considered drivers for change i

61 However, I question whether conscious content is available only to the skeletal musc

62 versus the back of the cortex in specifying conscious contents and discuss promising research avenue

63 consciousness is to increase the saliency of conscious contents by facilitating the deployment of foc

64 ive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousn

65 Conscious contributions to motor activity come after our

66 e LFN is real-time measure that is not under conscious control and which reflects conceptually-mediat

67 urther complex behaviors to occur outside of conscious control remain poorly understood [1].

68 of these misdiagnosed patients as minimally conscious, corroborating their behavioural diagnoses.

69 in vivo electrophysiology, and a guinea pig conscious cough model to investigate a role for TRPV4 in

70 Telemetric analysis from conscious Cx36 KO mice revealed higher variance in heart

71 delivered intravesically to SCI rats during conscious cystometry significantly decreased the frequen

72 Here, we extend a simple model of conscious decision-making to explain both conscious and

73 n invoking them is thought to be guided by a conscious decision.

74 behaviorally, the attentional blink impairs conscious decisions about the presence of integrated sur

75 er-level brain systems interactions modulate conscious detection of prediction error through top-down

76 In the conscious dog, insulin was infused into the hepatic Po v

77 From 0-240 min, 2 groups of conscious dogs (n = 9 dogs/group) received a duodenal in

78 he subjects and asking them if they had been conscious (dreaming) or not.

79 be accumulated over time and integrated with conscious elements presented either before or after to b

80 res on insomnia severity, hyperarousal, self-conscious emotional distress, and thought-like nocturnal

81 ensory feedback has been proposed to trigger conscious emotional experiences.

82 neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences.

83 theory: the role of negative evaluations of conscious emotions, and the role of emotions without phy

84 othesis that it is a correlate of high-level conscious error detection.

85 lations) or if it has an effect only through conscious evaluation of the separation between targets.

86 are characterized by brief interruptions of conscious experience accompanied by oscillations of acti

87 Crucially, participants reported no conscious experience after emergence from propofol and x

88 somatosensory stimuli from getting access to conscious experience and which (2) can explain the assoc

89 advances that are important for dissociating conscious experience from related enabling and executive

90 Conscious experience is fluid; it rarely remains on one

91 is approach provided strong evidence for the conscious experience of a brain-injured patient, who had

92 ce that the amygdala is not required for the conscious experience of fear induced via interoceptive s

93 e the temporal and spatial dimensions of our conscious experience separable?

94 As shown here, when subjects reported no conscious experience upon awakening, TMS evoked a larger

95 Common neural correlates of conscious experience were quantified and related to meas

96 e, features of volition, namely, its link to conscious experience, and reviews stimulation and patien

97 f the temporal and spatial dimensions of our conscious experience, their neuroanatomical implementati

98 welcome reminder of the multimodal nature of conscious experience.

99 performance is above chance, there is likely conscious experience.

100 erve as a gating mechanism for the access to conscious experience.

101 essing terminates in SI preventing access to conscious experience.

102 art of a subcortical network that influences conscious experience.

103 from anesthesia, we collected reports about conscious experiences during unresponsiveness.

104 g that it may constitute a core correlate of conscious experiences in sleep.

105 ur understanding of the neural correlates of conscious experiences in sleep.

106 cted from the environment while still having conscious experiences, as demonstrated by sleep states a

107 We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, aris

108 etwork of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences.

109 NCC, the neural substrates supporting entire conscious experiences.

110 timuli--but only if you have received prior, conscious exposure to the paired stimuli.

111 hese results inform contemporary theories of conscious face perception in particular and visual atten

112 ticular emphasis on the neural substrates of conscious fear processing.

113 logical changes in the brain and body and 2) conscious feeling states reflected in self-reports of fe

114 distinct from the circuits that give rise to conscious feelings of fear and anxiety.

115 For example, tip-of-the-tongue states are conscious feelings that arise when recall fails.

116 al circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs tha

117 Within the conscious field, the constantly changing external visual

118 Taking place out of the conscious field, these adjustments would have critical i

119 s a whole do not influence each other in the conscious field; however, research shows that some of th

120 In a dream, how do contents get into the conscious field?

121 terest in the development of environmentally conscious formulations.

122 Electroacupuncture in conscious freely moving mice offers an effective approac

123 inase inhibitors on regional hemodynamics in conscious, freely moving rats.

124 l infusion and blood pressure measurement in conscious, freely moving state.

125 ed a method to perform electroacupuncture in conscious, freely moving, unrestrained mice.

126 show that implementation of PBM with a more conscious handling of transfusion practice can be achiev

127 with a concomitant decrease in heart rate in conscious humans.

128 in conscious conflict detection, but less in conscious inhibition of impulsive responses.

129 s instead the forum that brings conflicting (conscious) inputs into a form that allows them to be (un

130 ing consist of strategic plans, leading to a conscious integration of goal-directed actions.

131 pseudo-imitative behavior can occur without conscious intent or other higher-order cognitive process

132 ependently correlated with the modulation of conscious intention by brain stimulation.

133 a direct sensory-motor pathway; and a slower conscious intention code that computes the required resp

134 Conscious intention is a fundamental aspect of the human

135 from sensory features, because it requires a conscious, intentional attitude toward the object.

136 inent pursuit trial but rather was immune to conscious intervention.

137 Furthermore, our results suggest that conscious late detection of deviant stimuli is elicited

138 for wakeful rest than for states with lower conscious level like propofol-induced anesthesia.

139 The mental representations are not crisp and conscious like the perceived objects are, but vague and

140 erged from minimally conscious, to the fully conscious locked-in syndrome.

141 AF reversion in conscious long-term tachypaced pigs: Pigs were subjected

142 Thus, in conscious mammals, breathing is subject to a dual and in

143 In conscious mammals, hypoxia or hypercapnia stimulates bre

144 monstrably silenced by hypocapnic hypoxia in conscious mammals.

145 loride alleviated breathing abnormalities of conscious Mecp2-null mice.

146 anatomical circuits traditionally related to conscious memory.

147 of ischemia in a specific cortical region of conscious mice of any postnatal age, including perinatal

148 mains a technical challenge, particularly in conscious mice.

149 ities for NFkappaB and STAT3 in the brain of conscious mice.

150 nitive domains to reach the capacity-limited conscious mind.

151 temporally extended brain process underlying conscious movement intention that spans seconds around m

152 ary motor cortex caused the reported time of conscious movement intention to be approximately 60-70 m

153 ial question of whether machines may ever be conscious must be based on a careful consideration of ho

154 Morsella et al. focus on the conscious nature of sensation.

155 tomaticity features (e.g., un/controlled, un/conscious, non/efficient, fast/slow) and their interrela

156 Smog Study-2 (AHSMOG-2), a cohort of health conscious nonsmokers where 81% have never smoked.

157 visuomotor encoding occurs independently of conscious object perception.

158 Furthermore, 74.7% of respondents were conscious of its negative impact on pregnancy outcomes.

159 the quality of patient care while remaining conscious of the cost of care delivered.

160 ant difference in luciferase expression when conscious or unconscious throughout development.

161 he transformation of nociceptive activity to conscious pain.

162 andomized and placebo-controlled study in 11 conscious patients (nine men, two women) undergoing comm

163 ification between unresponsive and minimally conscious patients.

164 e cortical visual pathway and with an evoked conscious percept.

165 d that cortical activity trajectories during conscious perception are fast evolving and robust to sma

166 eloped method for manipulating attention and conscious perception during EEG recording (modified inat

167 ed preattentively and unconsciously, whereas conscious perception emerges with late-stage (>300 ms) n

168 (2) can explain the associated impediment of conscious perception for additional stimuli.

169 ctor networks, and its possible relevance to conscious perception has been suggested by theorists.

170 We find that conscious perception is influenced and signaled by ventr

171 While conscious perception is robustly associated with sustain

172 Conscious perception may involve the transient stabiliza

173 asic effects have led to the hypothesis that conscious perception occurs in discrete temporal windows

174 iatal responses to a first target determined conscious perception of a second target.

175 visual working memory is known to affect our conscious perception of concurrent visual input.

176 ble known electrophysiological correlates of conscious perception of near-threshold visual stimuli.

177 Moreover, conscious perception of the second target was signaled b

178 g its presence or absence and the associated conscious perception remain elusive.

179 ain objective was to implicitly (i.e., below conscious perception) associate disgust with high-calori

180 Despite escaping conscious perception, manipulable objects activated an o

181 ventral striatum activity may contribute to conscious perception, presumably by gating cortical info

182 te cortical information flow, contributes to conscious perception.

183 orption of nutrients normally occurs without conscious perception.

184 spatial extent of brain changes that support conscious perception.

185 cortical information flow, may contribute to conscious perception.

186 for both changes due to attentional task and conscious perception.

187 visual space that is an essential aspect of conscious perception.

188 ing neural activity as a robust correlate of conscious perception.

189 rtunity to examine the mechanisms underlying conscious perception.

190 vity in prefrontal cortex (PFC) critical for conscious perception?

191 Null Findings Falsify Prefrontal Theories of Conscious Perception?, by Brian Odegaard, Robert T.Knigh

192 equally likely to become conscious; rather, conscious percepts emerge preferentially at a global lev

193 ormation in higher-order visual areas, where conscious percepts emerge.

194 before or after a target stimulus can hinder conscious perceptual processing of the target via an emo

195 stification - that decision making must be a conscious process unless proved otherwise, and they plac

196 n, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes.

197 he DMN in global information integration for conscious processing, can potentially provide an explana

198 scious processing and a second threshold for conscious processing.

199 nctions contribute to a holistic approach to conscious processing.

200 al hierarchy is not equally likely to become conscious; rather, conscious percepts emerge preferentia

201 ic ketamine (1-30 mg/kg, i.v.) or vehicle to conscious rats (n=12) and testing their EEG entrainment

202 Studies in conscious rats demonstrate that these antagonists are or

203 ry consequences of Arch activation (10 s) in conscious rats during normoxia, hypoxia, or hyperoxia.

204 transduced C1 neurons were photoactivated in conscious rats while EEG, neck muscle EMG, blood pressur

205 and normalizes carotid body hyperreflexia in conscious rats with hypertension; no effect was observed

206 ctivation via electrical CSN stimulation, in conscious rats, controls the innate immune response to l

207 In conscious rats, renal cortical PO2 was dose-dependently

208 e the contribution of these neurons to BP in conscious rats.

209 luated their regional hemodynamic effects in conscious rats.

210 rotrapezoid nucleus (RTN) by optogenetics in conscious rats.

211 ing and recognition separately predicted non-conscious recognition memory, and functional coupling be

212 suospatial information and support later non-conscious recognition memory-guided behavior (cf.[5]) an

213 aisal - first, if appraisal is restricted to conscious reflection on one's circumstances, and second,

214 transcription programming during subsequent conscious relearning.

215 ensory reactivation is causally relevant for conscious remembering.

216 ort a close relationship between IPS and the conscious representation of the body external appearance

217 not imputable to mechanisms associated with conscious retrieval.

218 Further studies in conscious, rhesus monkeys revealed an emergent bradycard

219 techniques are excitingly friendly to budget conscious scientific research organizations where probab

220 o investigate whether the sedation mode (ie, conscious sedation [CS] vs general anesthesia [GA]) affe

221 n raw analyses, intraprocedural success with conscious sedation and general anesthesia was similar (9

222 nesthesia was noted in 102 of 1737 (5.9%) of conscious sedation cases.

223 , -3.2 points [95% CI, -5.6 to -0.8]) vs the conscious sedation group (mean NIHSS score, 17.2 at admi

224 anesthesia group (n = 73) or a nonintubated conscious sedation group (n = 77) during stroke thrombec

225 the general anesthesia group vs 18.2% in the conscious sedation group P = .01]).

226 The conscious sedation group was less likely to experience i

227 In the general anesthesia vs the conscious sedation group, substantial patient movement w

228 erformed in one session with US guidance and conscious sedation in 20 euthyroid patients (mean age, 4

229 These results suggest the safety of conscious sedation in this population, although comparat

230 In US practice, conscious sedation is associated with briefer length of

231 Objective: To assess whether conscious sedation is superior to general anesthesia for

232 Conscious sedation is used during transcatheter aortic v

233 nesthesia with patients undergoing TAVR with conscious sedation on an intention-to-treat basis for th

234 Conversion from conscious sedation to general anesthesia was noted in 10

235 nterior circulation undergoing thrombectomy, conscious sedation vs general anesthesia did not result

236 tment-weighted adjustment for 51 covariates, conscious sedation was associated with lower procedural

237 Conscious sedation was associated with reductions in pro

238 Conscious sedation was used in 1737/10 997 (15.8%) cases

239 Conscious sedation was used in 59.9% of transfemoral pro

240 s do not support an advantage for the use of conscious sedation.

241 ls are not consciously selected and that the conscious self is involved just in post hoc rationalizat

242 signals covary with changes in participants' conscious self-identification with a body that were mani

243 omotor control neglects the contributions to conscious selfhood and subjectivity that rest on interoc

244 muli and innocuous stimuli that do not reach conscious sensations from visceral organs to the central

245 various physiological processes such as the conscious sensations of touch and hearing, and the uncon

246 mediate this effect and is it restricted to conscious sensory events (suprathreshold), or does it al

247 angiotensin II during hypotensive sepsis in conscious sheep.

248 teroceptive signals and in the processing of conscious signals beyond self-awareness.

249 Their primary cases of conscious skeletomotor integration involve action suppre

250 ive wakefulness state (VS/UWS), 36 minimally-conscious state (MCS) and 11 severe disability.

251 Differentiation of the minimally conscious state (MCS) and the unresponsive wakefulness s

252 ness syndrome (VS/UWS; n = 70) and minimally conscious state (MCS; n = 57) were presented with the lo

253 ommunicative DOC patients (38 in a minimally conscious state [MCS] and 43 in a vegetative state [VS])

254 panencephalitis that evolves to a minimally conscious state and diffuse cortical atrophy.

255 >80%) for separating patients in a minimally conscious state and vegetative state/unresponsive wakefu

256 o discriminate between patients in minimally conscious state and vegetative state/unresponsive wakefu

257 uch as coma, vegetative state, and minimally conscious state are clearly distinct and unambiguously d

258 ctionally connected in patients in minimally conscious state compared to vegetative state/unresponsiv

259 tterns between the FPN and DMN could predict conscious state more effectively than connectivity withi

260 us state without language (n = 3), minimally conscious state with language (n = 4) or post-traumatic

261 (n = 2), vegetative state (n = 3), minimally conscious state without language (n = 3), minimally cons

262 fulness syndrome, one emerged from minimally conscious state) were used to validate the classificatio

263 al entities (eg, vegetative state, minimally conscious state), (3) clinical measures of consciousness

264 igns of fluctuating consciousness (Minimally Conscious State).

265 (Liege) including 51 patients (26 minimally conscious state, 19 vegetative state/unresponsive wakefu

266 in two other centres (Salzburg: 10 minimally conscious state, five vegetative state/unresponsive wake

267 akefulness syndrome, VS/UWS, and 7 minimally conscious state, MCS) and compared these properties with

268 kefulness syndrome; New York: five minimally conscious state, one vegetative state/unresponsive wakef

269 collected data from 73 patients in minimally conscious state, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulne

270 esuscitated, and monitored for 48 hours in a conscious state.

271 s between the FPN and DMN, which may mediate conscious state.

272 ain activation in dementia and the minimally conscious state.

273 ionecrosis resulting in an ongoing minimally conscious state.

274 " level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines.

275 unresponsive wakeful syndrome and minimally conscious states.

276 range between actions that are almost always conscious, such as finger movements, and those that are

277 s finger movements, and those that are never conscious, such as the smooth-muscle actions of the dige

278 ervention of automatic goals by higher-order conscious systems with examples from social cognitive af

279 We found that conscious T2 perception was influenced and signaled by v

280 e to the attentional blink by revealing that conscious target perception may be determined by T1 proc

281 METHODS AND In conscious telemetered mice, acute intraperitoneal and or

282 le in the "piercing of consciousness" by non-conscious thought processes.

283 Specifically, it challenges the notions that conscious thoughts are not connected and that consciousn

284 hrough those who have emerged from minimally conscious, to the fully conscious locked-in syndrome.

285 GFR was assessed in conscious TRPC6 wild type and knockout mice, and in anes

286 Here, we show that in conscious, unrestrained male Sprague Dawley rats the inf

287 We have evaluated luciferase bioimaging in conscious, unrestrained mice after neonatal intracranial

288 This review is intended as a guide to conscious use of these data sets.

289 Does such prediction require conscious vigilance, or does it continue to unfold autom

290 ubsystems, image-forming circuits that drive conscious vision and non-image-forming circuits for beha

291 sults suggest that melanopsin contributes to conscious vision in humans.

292 igh levels can account for two properties of conscious vision, namely, the dominance of global percep

293 strong, but so far untested, predictions on conscious vision.

294 sults suggest that brain dynamics underlying conscious visual perception belongs to the class of init

295 What contribution melanopsin makes to conscious visual perception is less studied.

296 Conscious visual perception is proposed to arise from th

297 The literature on the neural correlates of conscious visual perception remains inconclusive regardi

298 and patient studies of the cortical basis of conscious volition down to the single-neuron level.

299 brain-injured subjects in various states of conscious wakefulness, disconnected consciousness, and u

300 onsensus, but later rediagnosed as minimally conscious with the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised.