ライフサイエンスコーパス: consciousness

1 of relevance for understanding mechanisms of consciousness.

2 lex locomotor actions in the absence of full consciousness.

3 ortical mapping of the internal body to self-consciousness.

4 ess is invaluable to the scientific study of consciousness.

5 play an important role in altered states of consciousness.

6 ise to perception, memory, intelligence, and consciousness.

7 sal forebrain underlies decreasing levels of consciousness.

8 and the lung) plays a critical role in self-consciousness.

9 onscious contents) processes associated with consciousness.

10 at science should not focus on high forms of consciousness.

11 that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness.

12 ging scientific knowledge about disorders of consciousness.

13 d cardiac support, associated with a drop in consciousness.

14 legating other information to the shadows of consciousness.

15 ses in the mind are accessible to subjective consciousness.

16 ptors, but to prevent a change from reaching consciousness.

17 th syndromes of fever, headache, and altered consciousness.

18 an interesting theory about the functions of consciousness.

19 different from that observed during loss of consciousness.

20 only prediction errors ("surprises") attract consciousness.

21 sh between unresponsiveness with and without consciousness.

22 ized by frequent and transient impairment of consciousness.

23 nd simulations of BSC and eventually of self-consciousness.

24 s, which is commonly associated with loss of consciousness.

25 gnosis of patients with chronic disorders of consciousness.

26 y according to clinically diagnosed level of consciousness.

27 were clinically stable with no alteration in consciousness.

28 turbational approach to assess the levels of consciousness.

29 vity states to recover those compatible with consciousness.

30 al arousal, attention processing, memory and consciousness.

31 cientific debate on the neural correlates of consciousness.

32 n interactions in patients with disorders of consciousness.

33 Responsiveness was used as a surrogate for consciousness.

34 sts a voluntary behavior with maintenance of consciousness.

35 racterized by motor difficulties and altered consciousness.

36 lded values exceeding those of normal waking consciousness.

37 vior in terms of cognition, rationality, and consciousness.

38 lated to movement disorders and disorders of consciousness.

39 eveal visual mechanisms behind attention and consciousness.

40 what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.

41 ical issues that impact our understanding of consciousness.

42 lar syndrome, memory impairment, and altered consciousness.

43 in cognitive processes, including access to consciousness.

44 s of consciousness for action and action for consciousness?

45 What are the brain mechanisms of self-consciousness?

46 ng necessary (but not sufficient) for visual consciousness?

47 Morsella et al. examined the fundamentals of consciousness?

48 Does the theory accommodate the contents of consciousness?

49 glucose has been proposed as an indicator of consciousness [2, 3].

50 ortive measures (1D), and decreased level of consciousness (2D).

51 sents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness 3.0, which incorporates several advances o

52 action selection is a plausible function for consciousness, a narrow focus on skeletomotor control ne

53 Raising consciousness about clinical significance should be an i

54 are characterized by brief interruptions of consciousness accompanied by abnormal brain oscillations

55 r behaviour, suggesting that the newborn has consciousness according to Morsella et al.'s framework.

56 ess contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroa

57 The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, pa

58 ts and outlines related circuits that inform consciousness across generations.

59 ues requires considering the distribution of consciousness across the animal phylogenetic tree.

60 th a two-level normalization model, in which consciousness affects only the first level and attention

61 in a two-level normalization model in which consciousness affects only the first level, whereas atte

62 d effect, associated with the reemergence of consciousness after brain injury.

63 mechanisms underlie the loss and recovery of consciousness after severe brain injury?

64 a from 32 patients with chronic disorders of consciousness, against normative data from healthy contr

65 Consciousness allows us to handle conflict, a promising

66 ural effusion, diarrhea, hepatosplenomegaly, consciousness alteration, as well as higher rates of pne

67 ts into the characteristic hallucinatory and consciousness-altering properties of psychedelics that i

68 ced an MMTBI (blunt head trauma with loss of consciousness, amnesia, or disorientation and a Glasgow

69 thetics (VAs) produce their effects (loss of consciousness, analgesia, amnesia, and immobility) remai

70 ound that single mTBI causes a brief loss of consciousness and a transient reduction in dendritic spi

71 orks, yet with distinct contributions during consciousness and anesthesia.

72 al mechanisms underlying transitions between consciousness and anesthetic-induced unconsciousness rem

73 thus likely to participate in the control of consciousness and attention.

74 y will be critical to test theories of human consciousness and clinical models of hallucination.

75 Early detection of covert consciousness and cortical responses in the intensive ca

76 ings shed light on the common basis of human consciousness and enable the interpretation of conscious

77 urvivors were more likely to have an altered consciousness and higher cerebrospinal fluid fungal burd

78 Anesthesia blocks consciousness and memory while sparing non-conscious bra

79 The neural underpinnings of impaired consciousness and of the variable severity of behavioura

80 harges (SWDs) in the EEG and interruption of consciousness and ongoing behavior.

81 Together, these data show that access consciousness and perceptual integration can be dissocia

82 isplacement has been associated with loss of consciousness and poor outcome in a range of acute neuro

83 Syncope is a sudden transient loss of consciousness and postural tone with spontaneous recover

84 cond state occurs at the loss or recovery of consciousness and resembles an enhanced slow cortical po

85 pected results challenge several theories of consciousness and suggest that invisible information can

86 ' respectively present one's self-protection consciousness and the ability of gaining information.

87 omputational mechanisms behind attention and consciousness and the perceptual consequences that they

88 er, the brain mechanisms underlying impaired consciousness and the specific network interactions invo

89 implies regarding the exact functionality of consciousness and the timescale at which it operates.

90 ostic accuracy of patients with disorders of consciousness and to provide guidelines regarding the nu

91 aphy (EEG) signatures of transitions between consciousness and unconsciousness under anaesthesia have

92 ased beta connectivity was noted relative to consciousness and unconsciousness, again with increased

93 LSD has profound modulatory effects on consciousness and was used extensively in psychological

94 the cerebral cortex (for amnesia and loss of consciousness) and to the spinal cord (for atonia and an

95 movement disorders, 22 treated disorders of consciousness, and 14 treated other neurologic condition

96 re about showing what is not the function of consciousness, and claiming that it does not integrate,

97 may help reveal brain mechanisms underlying consciousness, and minimize POCD in the choice and devel

98 Longer duration of illness, depressed consciousness, and peripheral blood eosinophilia were as

99 standard behavior-based clinical measures of consciousness, and reframe our current models of DOC by

100 erfect coherence among goals, attention, and consciousness, and supports the alternative view that (a

101 ignals), a notion referred to as bodily self-consciousness, and these studies have shown that the man

102 tates of conscious wakefulness, disconnected consciousness, and unconsciousness.

103 rectionality patterns across states of human consciousness are driven by alterations of brain network

104 Although wheezes, dyspnea or loss of consciousness are known to occur with severe allergic re

105 The neural correlates of consciousness are typically sought by comparing the over

106 t be based on a careful consideration of how consciousness arises in the only physical system that un

107 hat Freud had in mind when he declared that "consciousness arises instead of a memory-trace." The aim

108 Morsella et al. describe consciousness as a director of voluntary action, but the

109 ood pressure, body temperature, and level of consciousness as previously described.

110 sical hand position, but also on bodily self-consciousness as quantified through illusory hand owners

111 enomenology constitutes an elevated level of consciousness - as measured by neural signal diversity.

112 Understanding the role of "consciousness" as a resolution device, with specific foc

113 er, when a contemporary estimate for loss of consciousness associated with an ICD shock of 14% was us

114 The likelihood of loss of consciousness associated with an ICD shock was estimated

115 Transient loss of consciousness associated with focal temporal lobe seizur

116 Recent research has investigated self-consciousness associated with the multisensory processin

117 SpO2 at 28% (213/748), and altered level of consciousness at 23% (170/748) compared with respiratory

118 Loss of consciousness at onset was identified by structured inte

119 Loss of consciousness at symptom onset is an important manifesta

120 Without behavioural evidence of consciousness at the bedside, clinicians may render an i

121 dent and 63.0% (515 of 817) reported loss of consciousness at the time of injury.

122 Can consciousness be understood through an association with

123 te severe traumatic brain injury may recover consciousness before self-expression.

124 of multisensory bodily signals (bodily self-consciousness [BSC]) in fronto-parietal cortex and more

125 Therefore, not only the level of consciousness, but also body posture, might affect CSF-i

126 g acquisitions in patients with disorders of consciousness by means of a systems-level approach.

127 memory in order to determine the content of consciousness by modifying both taste perception and lat

128 ailing view holds that this disorder impairs consciousness by seizure spread to the bilateral tempora

129 y a more widespread role in the "piercing of consciousness" by non-conscious thought processes.

130 These results demonstrate that attention and consciousness can effectively show different gain functi

131 Accurate behavioral assessments of consciousness carry tremendous significance in guiding m

132 (4) How do the contents of consciousness change with the development of automaticit

133 y conscious state), (3) clinical measures of consciousness (Coma Recovery Scale-Revised), and (4) inj

134 Episodes with altered consciousness, coma, or convulsions constituted 36.6% of

135 Furthermore, work on parental consciousness confirms the importance of motor outputs a

136 We suggest that the word "consciousness" conflates two different types of informat

137 e frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how c

138 ion of the brain is to control behavior, and consciousness contributes to the function of the brain.

139 symptoms at baseline (prostration, impaired consciousness, convulsions, coma), and malaria status we

140 ms that could support cognitive function and consciousness despite profound behavioural impairment.

141 head impacts increases, the time to recover consciousness diminishes; however, both the sensorimotor

142 displayed a response-gain function, whereas consciousness displayed a contrast-gain function.

143 s in progressive ophthalmoplegia, ataxia and consciousness disturbances.

144 largest cohort of patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) to date, the link between gold stand

145 urrent taxonomy of postcomatose disorders of consciousness (DoC), and it provides guidelines for how

146 te to the clinical diagnosis of disorders of consciousness (DOCs) [4, 5].

147 Although disorders of consciousness (DOCs) demonstrate widely varying clinical

148 the same index to patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs).

149 Here, we aimed at assessing consciousness during anesthesia with propofol, xenon, an

150 ain measures to track the loss of reportable consciousness during sedation is hampered by significant

151 How, why, and when consciousness evolved remain hotly debated topics.

152 How consciousness (experience) arises from and relates to ma

153 to EEG data from patients with disorders of consciousness exposed to auditory stimuli diverged param

154 addition to previously validated markers of consciousness extracted from electroencephalograms (EEG)

155 43.7% and strongly associated with decreased consciousness, fever, and focal neurological signs.

156 is most suitable as a model system to study consciousness for action also seems questionable.

157 What does it take to explain the roles of consciousness for action and action for consciousness?

158 What is consciousness for?

159 The interpretation of human consciousness from brain activity, without recourse to s

160 ased for those triggered by reduced level of consciousness (from 20% to 17%; difference [95% CI], 3 [

161 Morsella et al. claim that consciousness functions to integrate incompatible skelet

162 Impaired consciousness has been incorporated in prediction models

163 Studies of pain and consciousness have catalyzed reconsiderations of approac

164 The level of consciousness, hemoglobin concentration, blood lactate l

165 h the drug's other characteristic effects on consciousness, however.

166 scale (HR: 1.7; 95% CI: 1.1, 2.6), impaired consciousness (HR: 16.7; 95% CI: 3.1, 90.4), and a capil

167 duration of epilepsy and higher frequency of consciousness-impairing seizures (P < 0.01, linear regre

168 egions was related to increased frequency of consciousness-impairing seizures (p<0.01, Pearson's corr

169 What, then, is consciousness in a dream for?

170 What are the properties of consciousness in a dream?

171 Impaired consciousness in absence seizures is related to the inte

172 uggested as the mechanism underlying loss of consciousness in anesthesia.

173 Validating objective, brain-based indices of consciousness in behaviorally unresponsive patients repr

174 ous collection of data regarding the role of consciousness in decisions.

175 ding of the mechanisms enabling higher-order consciousness in dreams.

176 arousal is a critical mechanism for loss of consciousness in focal temporal lobe seizures.

177 year-old man presented with mildly decreased consciousness in our emergency department after ingestin

178 ring parameters may facilitate assessment of consciousness in patients with subarachnoid hemorrhage.

179 amental function of the neural mechanisms of consciousness in perception.

180 She lost consciousness in shock and sustained life-threatening in

181 be sensitive to the presence of disconnected consciousness in subjects who are considered unconscious

182 Impaired consciousness in temporal lobe seizures has a major nega

183 ud Morsella et al.'s approach to investigate consciousness in terms of behavioral control.

184 ephalography techniques have revealed covert consciousness in the chronic setting, but these techniqu

185 s account, especially concerning the role of consciousness in the development of action.

186 ly available for computation and report (C1, consciousness in the first sense), and the self-monitori

187 ompanion Paper: Are the Neural Correlates of Consciousness in the Front or in the Back of the Cerebra

188 What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system?

189 subjective sense of certainty or error (C2, consciousness in the second sense).

190 Consciousness in this context requires attention to the

191 Parenting consciousness, in line with passive frame theory, may be

192 waking state and (ii) in an altered state of consciousness induced by ingestion of Ayahuasca.

193 te cortex covary with changes in bodily self-consciousness induced by the full-body illusion.

194 signals from humans during altered states of consciousness induced by three psychedelic substances: p

195 elpful in assessing objectively the level of consciousness irrespective of sensory processing and mot

196 ccurately measuring the neural correlates of consciousness is a grand challenge for neuroscience.

197 Prior concussion that results in loss of consciousness is a risk factor for increased hippocampal

198 Consciousness is also fundamental for the highest emotio

199 Blast-related injury and loss of consciousness is common in military TBI.

200 Morsella et al. argue convincingly that consciousness is for adaptive voluntary action.

201 Understanding the neural basis of consciousness is fundamental to neuroscience research.

202 Low-level consciousness is fundamental to our understanding of the

203 not effective, suggesting that higher order consciousness is indeed related to synchronous oscillati

204 An understanding of high forms of consciousness is invaluable to the scientific study of c

205 e about the long-standing proposal that self-consciousness is linked to the cortical processing of in

206 I argue that consciousness is not the adjudicator, but is instead the

207 ever, they provide little evidence as to why consciousness is particularly valuable in resolving conf

208 In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential.

209 A function for consciousness is proposed with no reference to the possi

210 y dualist or Cartesian materialist theory of consciousness is proposed without citing the many well-k

211 research, it is not known whether access to consciousness is required to complete perceptual integra

212 EMENT The relationship between attention and consciousness is still debated.

213 owever, also critical to an understanding of consciousness is the role of internally generated experi

214 Morsella et al. assert that the function of consciousness is to determine which of many competing ac

215 Under this perspective, the function of consciousness is to increase the saliency of conscious c

216 theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, serving the somatic

217 ive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; i

218 d with no reference to the possibility that "consciousness itself" has no function of its own.

219 ortion of respiratory arrest (68%), impaired consciousness level (82%) and mechanical ventilation (93

220 ctor of early mortality after adjustment for consciousness level and fungal burden and was associated

221 e purpose of this study was to determine the consciousness level of the society about MRI.

222 rement, oxygen saturation, respiratory rate, consciousness level, and other evidence of clinical dete

223 rd, we obtained duration of hospitalization, consciousness level, disease severity, medical cost, and

224 Impaired consciousness limited understanding of patients' viewpoi

225 al transition from full alertness to loss of consciousness (LOC) and on through a deeper anesthetic l

226 eported lifetime history of TBI with loss of consciousness (LOC) but no chronic deficits occurring mo

227 nd frontal premotor area) during the loss of consciousness (LOC) induced by propofol in nonhuman prim

228 Loss of consciousness (LOC) is a common presenting symptom of su

229 by TBI severity (no TBI, TBI without loss of consciousness [LOC], and TBI with LOC).

230 Major theories of consciousness make distinct predictions about the role o

231 itself as a response-gain function, whereas consciousness manifests itself as a contrast-gain functi

232 pathy syndrome, seizures, depressed level of consciousness, methotrexate-related stroke-like syndrome

233 d 17 patients revealing signs of fluctuating consciousness (Minimally Conscious State).

234 The domain of emotions corresponds to the consciousness model proposed by Morsella et al.

235 Consciousness never fades during waking.

236 level mechanisms responsible for the loss of consciousness occurring in NREM sleep.

237 When a likelihood of loss of consciousness of 32% associated with an ICD shock was us

238 -seq has popularized, there is an increasing consciousness of the importance of experimental design,

239 What is the level of consciousness of the psychedelic state?

240 of cardiac activity associated with loss of consciousness, of spontaneous breathing, and of circulat

241 Here, the influence of both attention and consciousness on these functions were measured and they

242 Does consciousness operate on, and resolve the conflict it em

243 It is not yet known whether attention and consciousness operate through similar or largely differe

244 y when the patient has no history of loss of consciousness or direct head trauma.

245 of patients treated had convulsions, altered consciousness, or coma.

246 Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional fe

247 nt of the relationship between attention and consciousness, particularly given available models.

248 oposes that the option-selection function of consciousness plays out in cognition as well.

249 First, attention lowered CRFs, whereas consciousness raised them.

250 at excluding memories of visual objects from consciousness reduced their later indirect influence on

251 for the cardiac cycle modulations and other consciousness-related EEG markers were combined, single

252 each network reflecting their involvement in consciousness-related processes.

253 The role of the frontal cortex in consciousness remains a matter of debate.

254 nctional, although correlation with level of consciousness remains controversial.

255 ding objective characterization of states of consciousness, repeated assessments of network metrics c

256 Some patients diagnosed with disorders of consciousness retain sensory and cognitive abilities bey

257 provides an important experimental tool for consciousness science and psychiatry.

258 tegration and top-down processing in minimal consciousness seemingly supported by auditory-visual cro

259 For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and dire

260 onscious thoughts are not connected and that consciousness serves skeletomotor conflict only.

261 ck and Koch (1998) claimed that a science of consciousness should first search for its neural correla

262 has a capacity for the most basic aspect of consciousness: subjective experience.

263 al specialists, brain death and disorders of consciousness such as coma, vegetative state, and minima

264 bodily inputs induces changes in bodily self-consciousness such as self-identification.

265 Altered states of consciousness, such as psychotic or pharmacologically-in

266 reated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception o

267 brain dynamics of patients with disorders of consciousness systematically change between day and nigh

268 ore severe physiological changes and altered consciousness than other absence seizures.

269 ve, brain-based measures of the capacity for consciousness that are independent of sensory processing

270 There is a growing consciousness that exposure studies need to better cover

271 oup of VS patients may retain a capacity for consciousness that is not expressed in behavior.

272 ts produced pronounced alterations in waking consciousness that lasted 12 hours.

273 em by first validating a promising metric of consciousness-the Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI)-

274 Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor

275 who could confirm the presence or absence of consciousness through subjective reports, and then apply

276 While applauding Morsella et al. for linking consciousness to action control, we ask what their theor

277 ving conflict, nor do they limit the role of consciousness to only conflicting experiences.

278 human cognitive neuroscience has linked self-consciousness to the processing of multisensory bodily s

279 EEG signatures for monitoring the levels of consciousness under sedation.

280 n to the modern period in American political consciousness, ushering in new objects of political disc

281 y changes were consistent with the fading of consciousness using its surrogate responsiveness.

282 gate this question, we manipulated access to consciousness using the attentional blink.

283 Although essential to the stream of consciousness, various strategies may minimize the downs

284 indow to evaluate patients with disorders of consciousness via the embodied paradigm, according to wh

285 Loss of consciousness was also associated with more prehospital

286 Loss of consciousness was associated with poor clinical grade, m

287 s leading to error detection is modulated by consciousness, we applied multivariate decoding methods

288 To understand visual consciousness, we must understand how the brain represen

289 ree adult patients with chronic disorders of consciousness were referred to our tertiary center.

290 Morsella et al. present a novel theory of consciousness which is more "low-level, circumscribed, c

291 e a simple and objective metabolic marker of consciousness, which can readily be implemented clinical

292 ons of internal bodily signals underlie self-consciousness, which to date has been based on philosoph

293 d in intensive care units with alteration of consciousness who underwent EEG recordings at 3 separate

294 bs of connectivity discriminated behavioural consciousness with accuracy comparable to that achieved

295 These results reconcile theories of consciousness with observations of long-range correlatio

296 investigated the relationship of bodily self-consciousness with the neural processing of internal bod

297 nal dynamics might constitute a signature of consciousness, with potential clinical implications for

298 ssessments in each patient with disorders of consciousness within a short time interval (eg, 2 weeks)

299 ings suggest that variations in the level of consciousness within the same physiological state are as

300 erved in humans, self-awareness and internal consciousness would be impaired if not abolished.