ライフサイエンスコーパス: officials

1 d roles, and work closely with public health officials.

2 ging problem to clinicians and public health officials.

3 s disclose financial interests to university officials.

4 ical examiner and interviews with local fire officials.

5 ng providers, researchers, and public health officials.

6 ongressional health staff and administration officials.

7 directors, and state and territorial health officials.

8 ublishers, as well as scientists and funding officials.

9 ly 400,000 by the United Nations and Kurdish officials.

10 ps actively engage with the local government officials.

11 al care and use committees and institutional officials.

12 ell as external collaborators and regulatory officials.

13 at can promote the use of research by public officials.

14 nd use autonomy typically exercised by local officials?

15 erests of the officials: 55 (71%) for senior officials, 55 (69%) for midlevel officials, 62 (81%) for

16 applicable to the financial interests of the officials: 55 (71%) for senior officials, 55 (69%) for m

17 for senior officials, 55 (69%) for midlevel officials, 62 (81%) for IRB members, and 51 (66%) for go

18 This has led health officials across the United States to take steps toward

19 tbreaks, PFGE would have given public health officials additional support in declaring an outbreak an

20 n has alarmed scholars, pundits, and elected officials alike, research across the social sciences rep

21 ors were set in consultation with government officials (alpha and beta <0.10).

22 d by federal, state, and local public health officials and by staff at clinical facilities that admin

23 o get involved by communicating with elected officials and engaging in the local community.

24 nd patients discovered through public health officials and family members.

25 n addition to the flight crew, public health officials and health care professionals have an importan

26 iminal judicial investigations of government officials and industry leaders accused of delaying imple

27 l as difficulty reporting concerns to public officials and influencing decisions about how the practi

28 members, to make contact with their elected officials and neighbors and explain to them why Federal

29 Public health officials and organizations have disseminated health mes

30 arrants renewed attention from public health officials and policy makers.

31 arrants renewed attention from public health officials and policy makers.

32 ty data that could be examined by healthcare officials and program managers on a real-time basis to a

33 d-course correction of the plans and to make officials and providers accountable.

34 Registry officials and the government agencies that provide their

35 Public health officials and urban planners may use our findings to pro

36 Interviews with international health officials and vaccine-makers provided data for a detaile

37 ral government methodologists, health agency officials, and academic methodologists.

38 ral government methodologists, health agency officials, and academic methodologists.

39 Emergency responders, health officials, and city planners could focus on short- and l

40 on, improved coordination with public health officials, and clarification of RPEP guidelines could op

41 tructured interviews with donors, government officials, and expert observers involved in CHW programs

42 Experts, government officials, and industry leaders concerned about the sust

43 s with clinicians, hospital managers, health officials, and other health-care professionals were done

44 hat policy makers, regulators, public health officials, and other stakeholders can better ameliorate

45 tion necessary for clinicians, public health officials, and policymakers to optimize public health em

46 interviewed AMC executives and staff, state officials, and representatives of MCOs serving TennCare

47 s include dialogue among interested parties, officials, and scientists; complex, redundant, and layer

48 alth care providers, researchers, government officials, and the general public is developing and impl

49 ts by mental health professionals, community officials, and the media to work together to identify an

50 Yet, city officials are largely either unaware of their upstream e

51 ational public health programmes, and prison officials are often unwilling to implement effective pre

52 US officials are playing a greater role in prompting physic

53 to engage scientific experts with regulatory officials around the emerging public health problem of v

54 er 2001 through January 2002, we interviewed officials at U.S. medical schools about provisions in th

55 Officials attributed this to consumption of contaminated

56 More accurate forecasting can help officials better respond to and plan for current and fut

57 ertain kinds of information, or grant health officials broad discretion to disseminate personal infor

58 nterest to epidemiologists and public health officials, but estimation of the distribution is complic

59 models can provide guidance to public health officials by projecting the course of an epidemic and ev

60 hnologies can be more formalised, and health officials can better establish which point-of-care techn

61 ow-dose exposure to it so that public health officials can develop appropriate mitigation measures wh

62 cial feature address how scholars and public officials can increase the prospects for future sustaina

63 but are potentially useful for public health officials, clinicians, and researchers seeking to improv

64 ntists, manufacturers, policy and regulatory officials, community leaders, and advocates who held ext

65 hich citizens, physicians, and public health officials denied a diagnosis of plague on economic, poli

66 n the fall of 2009 helped Los Angeles County officials develop a measured and appropriate response to

67 aboration between modelers and public health officials during pandemic H1N1 spread in the fall of 200

68 African public health officials emphasized that a vaccine price of less than U

69 Nazi officials established lecturer positions for the new sub

70 The IMB meets with senior program officials every 3-6 months.

71 s, along with state public health laboratory officials from Colorado, Missouri, Tennessee, and Utah,

72 erts from laboratory and clinical practices, officials from ministries of health, and representatives

73 nity dissuaded military officers and federal officials from taking action against the participation o

74 f a one-day meeting held on May 4, 2016 with officials from the National Cancer Institute, the FDA, m

75 ividuals (13 investigators and 14 compliance officials) from 13 institutions to describe the anticipa

76 ctious diseases physicians and public health officials have advocated for preservation of these life-

77 Since September 18, 2012, public health officials have been investigating a large outbreak of fu

78 Local, state, and federal health department officials have been investigating the source of the cont

79 ich confirmatory trials were incomplete, FDA officials have encouraged sponsors to design AA applicat

80 ed trauma and human rights abuses by Taliban officials have had a profound effect on Afghan women's h

81 ers, government policy makers, public health officials, health care administrators, payers, businesse

82 d students at the University of Iowa, health officials implemented a widespread MMR vaccine campaign.

83 se finding may assist military public health officials in developing strategies to prevent varicella

84 OPD is crucial to assist local public-health officials in developing the best possible primary and se

85 ders; and district, provincial, and national officials in each district were interviewed to elicit pe

86 e biological weapons incident to responsible officials in order to help address microbiological and s

87 This outbreak was detected by public health officials in Tennessee and New York who observed signifi

88 On 7 and 11 July 2007, health officials in Texas and Indiana, respectively, reported 4

89 This paper examines how public officials in three states-Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Te

90 In early 1997, health officials in Yakima County, Washington, noted a 5-fold i

91 vance of your work to the public and elected officials, including the crafting of a two-minute pitch

92 SRP, the knowledge broker brought regulatory officials into the research process, to help scientific

93 Public health officials investigated a protracted GAS outbreak in a sk

94 Federal, state, and local public health officials investigated the cause of the outbreak and ins

95 ihu water quality managers and public health officials is proposed.

96 cademics, policy makers, scientists, elected officials, journalists, and others responsible for defin

97 Do government officials learn reciprocity while holding office, or do

98 ms of influenza outbreaks help public health officials make informed decisions that may help save liv

99 g of influenza outbreaks helps public health officials make timely and meaningful decisions that coul

100 ulled birds leads to nonreporting, and local officials may be complicit if they suspect that reportin

101 Public health officials must urgently consider alternative use strateg

102 ce the number of contacts that public health officials need to investigate while still maintaining ex

103 t agencies, policy organizations, or elected officials, no matter how well intended.

104 rs are encouraged to work with public health officials on appropriate local antimicrobial stewardship

105 ls have the potential to guide public health officials on the nature and scale of the interventions r

106 At a gathering of agency officials, patient advocacy organizations, industry/prof

107 vestigational and control measures by health officials, physicians should report suspected outbreaks

108 Public health officials, physicians, and disease advocacy groups have

109 arch response to ZIKV may help public health officials plan for the next emerging infectious disease

110 duals, scientists, physicians, public health officials, politicians, unions of asbestos workers, lawy

111 cords, and interviews with police and school officials provided detailed information about each case.

112 ditionally targeted managers or higher-level officials, rather than local health care workers (HCWs).

113 titudes of cancer researchers and compliance officials regarding compliance with the US Privacy Rule

114 satisfied with the responsiveness of public officials regarding sludge, many reported a lack of publ

115 r researchers and clinicians; federal health officials; regulatory agency representatives; pharmaceut

116 Chinese and other public health officials responded quickly, characterizing the virus an

117 State officials responsible for the regulation of hydraulic fr

118 Conversely, many local officials seek to preserve land use autonomy to provide

119 led that although researchers and compliance officials share the view that patients' cancer diagnoses

120 This suggests that policy-makers and health officials should account for patient sharing with and am

121 Clinicians, laboratorians, and public health officials should be aware of the potential for misidenti

122 d mild illness, clinicians and public health officials should be aware of the risk of further expansi

123 review boards, advocacy groups, and federal officials should collaborate to improve evaluation of ri

124 1N1), with an estimated R of 1.4-1.6, health officials should consider strategies for vaccinating chi

125 e health of their children and public health officials strive to maintain high immunization rates to

126 guidelines recommended by NYC public health officials than schools that did not have a FRT.

127 dy will alert food scientists and regulatory officials to a potential new source for 2-ACBs.

128 ents an unprecedented opportunity for health officials to ameliorate the current worldwide increase i

129 ne to specific diseases, should allow public officials to apply resources most effectively in develop

130 Health Service, academics, and public health officials to conduct responsible and ethical research.

131 ally work with IT administrators and signing officials to ensure all levels of security are implement

132 al care and use committees and institutional officials to ensure appropriate consideration of allegat

133 Our study may allow public-health officials to predict seasonal outbreaks in Arizona and t

134 It should enable public health actors and officials to preempt these strategies and develop realis

135 ear of bioterrorism agents has caused health officials to re-examine the potential of these agents to

136 uns are increasingly used by law enforcement officials to restrain violent subjects, who are frequent

137 ) virus provided reason for US public health officials to revisit existing national pandemic response

138 e public discourse and pressuring government officials to severely limit the scope of the work.

139 rn led clinicians, academics, and government officials to talk, telling stories and sometimes making

140 n more detailed interviews with 16 financial officials, we found striking disagreements over the perc

141 , including military officers and government officials, we found that, compared with nonleaders, lead

142 Local, state, and federal health department officials were involved in investigating the source of t

143 isease should be considered by public health officials when addressing Ebola virus disease outbreaks

144 f poxvirus infection and alert public health officials when cases are suspected.

145 Public health officials (when promulgating these recommendations) and

146 PA would put Drug Enforcement Administration officials, who have no medical expertise, in the positio

147 While local officials within Texas have succeeded in developing frac

148 This question confronts public-health officials worldwide, particularly infectious disease per