ライフサイエンスコーパス: pay for performance

1 politan areas across the nation about use of pay for performance.

2 gh-income countries that were not exposed to pay-for-performance.

3 fairly disadvantaged in public reporting and pay-for-performance.

4 d using the results for public reporting and pay-for-performance.

5 etting that are used for public reporting or pay-for-performance.

6 the current climate of public reporting and pay-for-performance, 30-day mortality after inpatient su

7 spitals engaged in both public reporting and pay for performance achieved modestly greater improvemen

8 therapies and in-hospital mortality between pay for performance and control hospitals.

9 hors examine the potential conflicts between pay for performance and medical professionalism and conc

10 n level between variations in achievement of pay for performance and mortality.

11 t of quality-improvement initiatives such as Pay for Performance and the Physician Consortium for Per

12 or measuring postoperative complications for pay-for-performance and public reporting polices.

13 To acquaint rheumatologists with pay-for-performance and the American College of Rheumato

14 d and tested, particularly bundled payments, pay for performance, and value-based purchasing.

15 Public reporting and pay for performance are intended to accelerate improveme

16 Additional studies of pay for performance are needed to determine its optimal

17 such programs, and examined the adoption of pay for performance as a function of the characteristics

18 for public reporting of hospital quality and pay-for-performance because they are a relatively common

19 increased from $16000 to $19230 and exceeded pay-for-performance bundled payments starting in 2008.

20 h Service of the United Kingdom introduced a pay-for-performance contract for family practitioners.

21 of achievement in the first year of the new pay-for-performance contract.

22 e services, levels of detected hypertension, pay for performance data) as candidate explanatory varia

23 ican College of Physicians hopes to move the pay-for-performance debate forward with a patient-center

24 yments; yet, value-based purchasing (VBP) or pay-for-performance, defined as providers being paid fee

25 lities that simultaneously participated in a pay-for-performance demonstration project funded by the

26 e 2 diabetes (T2D) patients using the Taiwan Pay-for-Performance Diabetes Registry and claim data fro

27 th the potential limiting of resources, in a pay-for-performance environment, the provision of futile

28 erences in hospital performance rankings and pay-for-performance financial incentive categories (top

29 ally, 16.5% of institutions (n = 74) changed pay-for-performance financial status categories after ac

30 Conversely, we did not find evidence that pay for performance had an adverse association with impr

31 Pay for performance has become a central strategy in the

32 Pay for performance has been promoted as a tool for impr

33 Among newer efforts to improve quality, pay for performance has been proposed to propel better r

34 Pay for performance has increasingly become the subject

35 Pay-for-performance has the potential to help improve th

36 While public reporting and pay for performance have the potential to improve qualit

37 Among both pay-for-performance hospitals and those in the national

38 As compared with the control group, pay-for-performance hospitals showed greater improvement

39 and Medicaid Services; we then compared the pay-for-performance hospitals with the 406 hospitals wit

40 as inversely associated with improvement; in pay-for-performance hospitals, the improvement in the co

41 The introduction of pay for performance in all NHS hospitals in one region o

42 o assumptions underpin the implementation of pay for performance in Medicare: that with the use of cl

43 mportant to leverage the early experience of pay for performance in the commercial market.

44 nting more than 80% of persons enrolled, use pay for performance in their provider contracts.

45 es such as additional collaboration fees and pay for performance incentives.

46 e physicians will limit the effectiveness of pay-for-performance initiatives that rely on a single re

47 RATIONALE: Pay for performance is an increasingly common quality im

48 sults, but many observers are concerned that pay for performance is at odds with medical professional

49 Pay for performance is intended to align incentives to p

50 Pay for performance is now commonly used by HMOs, especi

51 Value-based purchasing, or pay-for-performance, is a major emerging theme in U.S. h

52 In the era of pay for performance, it is imperative that we understand

53 romoting quality measurement, reporting, and pay for performance, it is unknown whether these ideas h

54 Unless significantly redesigned, pay-for-performance may not be a successful strategy to

55 Performance measures, particularly pay for performance, may have unintended consequences fo

56 minently in surgical quality improvement and pay-for-performance measures.

57 a marker of quality of care and are used in pay-for-performance metrics.

58 for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as pay-for-performance metrics.

59 A better solution may lie in a pay-for-performance model.

60 ionalism and conclude that properly designed pay-for-performance models can support professional obje

61 As the design of Medicare with pay for performance moves forward, it will be important

62 We found that the effects of pay for performance on mortality did not differ signific

63 Although pay for performance (P4P) has become common, many worry

64 Pay for performance (P4P) is a mechanism by which purcha

65 Most evaluations of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives have focused on lar

66 Pay-for-performance (P4P) is increasingly touted as a me

67 antial financial penalties from readmissions pay-for-performance (P4P) measures.

68 The benefits of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are uncertain.

69 At the same time, a large literature on pay-for-performance (PFP) linkages does exist, but most

70 Medicaid Services (CMS) launched the largest pay-for-performance pilot project to date in the United

71 Practice guidelines have been usurped by pay-for-performance police, on patrol for deviations--no

72 text article.) CONCLUSION: A provider-driven pay-for-performance process for CABG, enabled by an elec

73 Program (QIP) is the first mandatory federal pay for performance program launched on January 1, 2012.

74 ractices in England in the first year of the pay-for-performance program (April 2004 through March 20

75 failure, and pneumonia for hospitals in the pay-for-performance program and those in the national sa

76 A pay-for-performance program based on the Hospital Qualit

77 mortality for the conditions included in the pay-for-performance program decreased significantly, wit

78 medical expenditures with a bundled-payment pay-for-performance program for breast cancer in Taiwan

79 Payment Modifier (PVBM) Program, a mandatory pay-for-performance program for physician practices.

80 l incentives in hospitals participating in a pay-for-performance program in England were not maintain

81 no evidence that the largest hospital-based pay-for-performance program led to a decrease in 30-day

82 oluntary quality-improvement initiative, the pay-for-performance program was not associated with a si

83 In the English pay-for-performance program, physicians use a range of c

84 ive design in phase 2 of Medicare's flagship pay-for-performance program, the Premier Hospital Qualit

85 al infarction to 24 hospitals covered by the pay-for-performance program.

86 ed for approximately 1.5% of the cost of the pay-for-performance program.

87 rk (QOF) is the world's largest primary care pay-for-performance programme.

88 Pay for performance programs being introduced by Medicar

89 Pay for performance programs compare metrics that are ri

90 Pay-for-performance programs are being adopted internati

91 Pay-for-performance programs are growing, but little evi

92 As pay-for-performance programs focus attention on individu

93 gs and eligibility for financial benefits in pay-for-performance programs for treatment of myocardial

94 Forces enhancing adoption of pay-for-performance programs include continued increases

95 research is needed on how implementation of pay-for-performance programs influences their effects.

96 Pay-for-performance programs may be a promising quality

97 Pay-for-performance programs may be associated with impr

98 measures, patient ratings of their care, and pay-for-performance programs may penalize healthcare pro

99 are important components of public reports, pay-for-performance programs, and quality improvement in

100 We determined the prevalence of pay-for-performance programs, detailed the features of s

101 Of the 126 health plans with pay-for-performance programs, nearly 90% had programs fo

102 ion reporting brings substantial benefits to pay-for-performance programs, providing that the process

103 incorporating 30-day surgical mortality into pay-for-performance programs, these findings serve as a

104 tient-centered care of chronic conditions in pay-for-performance programs.

105 lth plans are establishing a wide variety of pay-for-performance programs.

106 VTE rates are publicly reported and used in pay-for-performance programs.

107 ld likely not be used in public reporting or pay-for-performance programs.

108 reported quality metrics soon to be used in pay-for-performance programs.

109 l quality assessment programs in the form of pay for performance, report cards and national rankings

110 Pay for performance resulted in modest changes in physic

111 on immediately after the introduction of the pay-for-performance scheme (P<0.001) and then continued

112 A pay-for-performance scheme based on meeting targets for

113 As compared with the period before the pay-for-performance scheme was introduced, the improveme

114 increases in the quality of care before the pay-for-performance scheme was introduced, the scheme ac

115 ital mortality were incrementally greater at pay-for-performance sites (change in odds of in-hospital

116 Prevention (CDC) risk adjustment models for pay-for-performance SSI did not adjust for patient comor

117 e providers are reimbursed by implementing a pay for performance system that rewards providers for hi

118 ity remained similar after 6 years under the pay-for-performance system (11.82% for Premier hospitals

119 in rates for specific patient subgroups, and pay for performance therapeutic thresholds.

120 improvement for 2 of 6 targeted therapies at pay-for-performance vs control hospitals (odds ratio [OR

121 To determine if pay for performance was associated with either improved

122 formance and other hospital characteristics, pay for performance was associated with improvements ran

123 Use of pay for performance was statistically associated with ge

124 physicians and hospitals will be receiving 'pay-for-performance', whereby our income will depend on