ライフサイエンスコーパス: payment

1 ties (as percent of Medicare Diagnosis Group payments).

2 cian characteristics and reported receipt of payment.

3 complication to understand how this impacted payment.

4 sation, and 9% were negatively influenced by payment.

5 culated with and without each hospital's DSH payment.

6 acizumab, than those who did not receive any payment.

7 ed to 2015 Open Payments reports of industry payments.

8 ween hospital complication rates and episode payments.

9 icipating hospitals' average episode-of-care payments.

10 ship interests, and $75 million for research payments.

11 e quintiles with risk-adjusted total episode payments.

12 associated with lower total surgical episode payments.

13 isodes of care and calculated 90-day episode payments.

14 cizumab as compared to those who received no payments.

15 0.92, demonstrating unequal distribution of payments.

16 ion of Medicaid losses recovered through DSH payments.

17 ey accounted for only 13% of total amount of payments.

18 ital mortality, length of stay, and hospital payments.

19 ), royalty or license payments, and research payments.

20 yments and did not completely disclose these payments.

21 01% of Medicare base diagnosis-related-group payments.

22 1.7%), consulting fees (21.6%), and research payments (16.5%) comprised 69.8% of total payment amount

23 1204 ophthalmologists analyzed for industry payments, 176 (4.2%) women had industry ties compared wi

24 Episode payments were slightly lower (mean payment, $21670) when the Hospital Compare definition wa

25 Of the 40 authors receiving payments, 22 did not accurately disclose industry relati

26 odel ranged from $17349 to $29465 (mean [SD] payment, $22122 [$2600]).

27 ed, 40 received at least 1 reported industry payment, 31 accepted more than $1000, 25 accepted more t

28 uding approximately $1.8 billion for general payments, $544 million for ownership interests, and $75

29 f 181372) were reported as receiving general payments (absolute difference, 13.3%; 95% CI, 13.1-13.6;

30 e change in hospitals' mean surgical episode payments according to their change in LOS mode during th

31 as providers being paid fee-for-service with payment adjustments up or down based on value metrics, r

32 es were more often associated with indemnity payment after a plaintiff verdict (odds ratio [OR], 3.12

33 account for selection bias, actual Medicare payments after each procedure were evaluated.

34 sites were successfully paid through mobile payment, although some challenges remain to be addressed

35 ch payments (16.5%) comprised 69.8% of total payment amount.

36 Financial payments amounted to a mean of $157177 per author.

37 nd speaker fees were associated with highest payment amounts to fewest providers.

38 less than in the base case ($260 commercial payment and $197 Medicare payment), for the MT-sDNA test

39 We review existing payment and delivery reforms that affect cardiologists,

40 American Heart Association on the impact of payment and delivery system reform, as well as how the A

41 American Heart Association's Expert Panel on Payment and Delivery System Reform, serves to offer supp

42 was noted between greater number of industry payments and bevacizumab injection use (r = 0.07; 95% CI

43 guideline authors received sizable industry payments and did not completely disclose these payments.

44 Associations between surgical episode payments and hospitals' length of stay (LOS) mode were e

45 Payments and joint management rates of cataract surgery

46 Total payments and number of transactions per category of paym

47 or Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Open Payments and Provider Utilization and Payment data.

48 rovided during an episode of care on episode payments and quality of care.

49 APMs and MIPS will focus on bundling payments and reimbursing based on "fee-for-service-plus"

50 tandardized, 90-day overall surgical episode payments and their components, including index, outlier,

51 g, physical activity, obesity, out-of-pocket payments and unmet needs for healthcare using national h

52 nd valid enough to use for public reporting, payment, and accreditation are not well-defined.

53 frequency of confirmation of intent, direct payment, and funeral expense reimbursement, priority for

54 ent accuracy, detail the companies providing payments, and evaluate Administrative Regulations enforc

55 nies was reviewed for representation, median payments, and mean payments by women and men for industr

56 etween hospital teaching intensity, Medicare payments, and perioperative outcomes.

57 ons, partnership shares), royalty or license payments, and research payments.

58 rvices as a strategy to assess a value-based payment approach toward reduction in 10-year predicted r

59 However, emerging payment approaches offer new potential for coverage of h

60 cility (more than nine-tenths of which offer payment arrangements for low-income populations), (2) of

61 accountable care organizations, and bundled payment arrangements.

62 d with central regulators using compensatory payments as a means of resolving jurisdictional conflict

63 Botulinum toxin injection payment averaged $874 per procedure compared with $2783

64 renal dialysis services and legislated that payment be tied to quality measures.

65 Medicare and Medicaid Services to expand the payment bundle for renal dialysis services and legislate

66 dence of impoverishment due to out-of-pocket payments by aggregating up from each country, using a su

67 or representation, median payments, and mean payments by women and men for industry relationships in

68 13 to 2014 were analyzed by anti-VEGF agent, payment category, and dollar amount.

69 These spill-over effects suggest that major payment changes in Medicare can affect all patients with

70 ts who survived following complications, and payment components were analyzed across hospitals.

71 d from the Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid

72 m the 2012 Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid

73 Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data furnished by the Centers for Medicare and M

74 ) Open Payments and Provider Utilization and Payment data.

75 Data were collected from the Open Payments database and analyzed descriptively.

76 ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services Open Payments database for payments to ophthalmologists by bi

77 eived by 49 guideline authors using the Open Payments database.

78 t 21 months of the BPCI initiative, Medicare payments declined more for lower extremity joint replace

79 Facility base payments decreased 14.8% ($13,444; $11,458), professiona

80 decreased 43.9% ($5,180; $2,906), and other payments decreased 36.2% ($1,422; $908).

81 eased 14.8% ($13,444; $11,458), professional payments decreased 43.9% ($5,180; $2,906), and other pay

82 here are no clear recommendations on bundled payment design, and research on bundled payments for der

83 The average 90-day episode payments determined by both definitions of an episode of

84 The average payment difference between these 2 types of episodes of

85 near regression models to understand whether payment differences were associated with specific hospit

86 e strongly correlated, and there was a small payment differential for most hospitals.

87 ned had a minimal impact or no impact on the payment differential.

88 ed to account for graduate medical education payments, disproportionate share costs, and regional wag

89 ed to account for graduate medical education payments, disproportionate share costs, and regional wag

90 Mean patient OOP payments dropped by 4% per year over the study period, w

91 e assessed using price-standardized Medicare payments during hospitalization.

92 d the highest reductions in surgical episode payments during the study period.

93 Restriction based on Medicare-payment eligibility to patients with length of stay >/=3

94 the National Death Registry, and the bundled-payment enrollment file.

95 While 83% of payment entries were for food and beverage, they account

96 lity indicators, survival rates, and medical payments (excluding bonuses paid in the bundled-payment

97 undling injectable medications into a single payment for treatment and paying for home dialysis train

98 in Medicare spending, risk-adjusted Medicare payments for an episode of surgical care were similar at

99 in Medicare spending, risk-adjusted Medicare payments for an episode of surgical care were similar at

100 totaling more than $2.3 billion in Medicare payments for anti-VEGF agents in 2013.

101 Medicare payments for bariatric surgery are significantly lower a

102 recent payment trends directing value-based payments for bundles of care advance the imperative for

103 Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) is a voluntary init

104 risk and higher quality of care or Medicare payments for colorectal surgery.

105 dled payment design, and research on bundled payments for dermatologic care is limited.

106 We evaluated a program of payments for ecosystem services in Uganda that offered f

107 ncludes all physicians who received Medicare payments for MMS from any practice performing MMS on the

108 We compared payments for patients who died vs patients who survived

109 Hospitals were stratified using average payments for patients who survived following complicatio

110 Assessing variation across hospitals, payments for patients who were rescued at the highest co

111 s did not exhibit a compensatory increase in payments for postdischarge care use ($4011 vs $5083 for

112 ed among ophthalmologists receiving industry payments for research (25 of 241 [10.4%]), consulting (1

113 Total surgical episode payments for risk and postoperative complication-matched

114 roup remained stable, the cumulative medical payments for the FFS group steadily increased from $1600

115 e ($260 commercial payment and $197 Medicare payment), for the MT-sDNA test to be preferred over FIT

116 Reported physician payment from industry (including nature, number, and val

117 Payments from 2013 to 2014 were analyzed by anti-VEGF ag

118 use ranibizumab, and those receiving >90% of payments from aflibercept were more likely to use aflibe

119 Authors received payments from companies with products directly related t

120 physician specialty and sex with receipt of payments from industry.

121 From 2006 to 2013, the proportion of payments from Medicare for reoperations increased from 1

122 were more likely to receive the majority of payments from one source or the other, but not both.

123 We find that compensatory payments from Pennsylvania Act 13, which are based upon

124 Providers receiving >90% of payments from ranibizumab were more likely to use ranibi

125 s because of new legislation and redesign of payments from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Serv

126 levance: Dermatologists received substantial payments from the pharmaceutical industry.

127 s and number of transactions per category of payment, geographic region, and payment source were also

128 patients included 4485 (25%) in the bundled-payment group and 13455 (75%) in the FFS group.

129 II breast cancer were 84.48% for the bundled-payment group and 80.88% for the FFS group (P < .01).

130 h the 5-year medical payments of the bundled-payment group remained stable, the cumulative medical pa

131 y analysis for bonus payments in the bundled-payment group was also performed.

132 ments (excluding bonuses paid in the bundled-payment group).

133 In the bundled-payment group, 1473 of 4215 patients (34.9%) with applic

134 ederal Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments help hospitals recover such uncompensated costs

135 geted procedures reducing readmission before payments implemented) and a spillover effect (nontargete

136 lue metrics, remains a core element of value payment in Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act

137 counted for 85% of total ophthalmic Medicare payments in 2013, an 11% increase from 2012.

138 stric band surgery as well as the associated payments in a longitudinal national cohort.

139 TOAM prices and patient out-of-pocket (OOP) payments in Medicare Part D and estimated the actual eff

140 Sensitivity analysis for bonus payments in the bundled-payment group was also performed

141 tation of a policy to reduce Housing Benefit payments in the United Kingdom in April 2011 represents

142 incidence was positive whatever catastrophic payment incidence measure was used.

143 median annual rate of change of catastrophic payment incidence was positive whatever catastrophic pay

144 lth is not sufficient to reduce catastrophic payment incidence; rather, what is required is increasin

145 , number, and value), categorized as general payments (including consulting fees and food and beverag

146 ed to have received $2.4 billion in industry payments, including approximately $1.8 billion for gener

147 derway, and as they prove their value and as payment increasingly becomes aligned with better outcome

148 ppear well aligned with the goals of bundled payment initiatives for surgical episodes.

149 The distribution of all anti-VEGF payments is unequal.

150 ng payment models to succeed in the evolving payment landscape.

151 The 2014 Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Limited 100% and 5% datasets from the Centers fo

152 from legacy fee-for-service reimbursement to payments linked to high-value health care is acceleratin

153 ervational study using PVBM Program data for payments made in 2015 based on performance of large US p

154 gh associated with a lower rate of indemnity payments, malpractice lawsuits, including informed conse

155 al companies from which the authors received payments manufactured products related to the guidelines

156 mpared with the regular FFS program, bundled payment may lead to better adherence to quality indicato

157 l and the clinically narrow Hospital Compare payment measure, we constructed episodes of care and cal

158 Standardized Medicare-allowed payments (Medicare payments), utilization, and quality (

159 ristics (i.e., age, race/ethnicity, sex, and payment method), and confounding by other gaseous air po

160 ountable care organizations, and alternative payment methods evolve, these new systems of care must c

161 Thus, we propose a payment model using a graded array of benchmarked reward

162 health care delivery system with a capitated payment model.

163 lities under the traditional fee-for-service payment model.

164 entive Payment Systems (MIPS) or Alternative Payment Models (APMs).

165 funding for research and education, shifting payment models emphasizing efficiency and value, and inc

166 These new payment models for environmental interventions can be di

167 Future research should expand on emerging payment models for nurse-specific tasks.

168 Although dialysis-specific alternative payment models have already been implemented, current mo

169 Cardiologists need to understand emerging payment models to succeed in the evolving payment landsc

170 d direct costs were calculated and 8 bundled payment models were developed.

171 Early participation in new payment models will allow clinicians to develop expertis

172 ll become less viable, and enrollment in new payment models will be unavoidable.

173 ross different types of health-care systems, payment models, and health services.

174 inning to implement alternative delivery and payment models, such as the patient-centered medical hom

175 re currently in development, and alternative payment models.

176 recently launched the Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier (PVBM) Program, a mandatory pay-for-per

177 t year of the Medicare Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier Program, physician practices that serve

178 Most (59%) indicated that payment of $50000 would make them even more likely to do

179 To analyze trends in utilization and payment of ophthalmic services in the Medicare populatio

180 hat these new possibilities are emerging for payment of the goods and services needed for indoor envi

181 that offered forest-owning households annual payments of 70,000 Ugandan shillings per hectare if they

182 nnovation is rewarded with a fixed series of payments of a predictable size.

183 estimated the actual effects on patient OOP payments of partial filling of the coverage gap by 2012.

184 Although the 5-year medical payments of the bundled-payment group remained stable, t

185 m antibiotic sales through prizes, milestone payments, or insurance-like models in which innovation i

186 In contrast, under the bundled payment paradigm, the net margin per patient was $3442 (

187 omes and medical expenditures with a bundled-payment pay-for-performance program for breast cancer in

188 njections and the mean Medicare-allowed drug payment per anti-VEGF injection was calculated nationall

189 The mean payment per charge was the same for men and women, $66 i

190 The median total payment per dermatologist was $298 with an interquartile

191 vitreal injection rates and in Medicare drug payments per anti-VEGF injection across the United State

192 Comparing risk-adjusted Medicare payments per episode of surgery, very major teaching hos

193 Comparing risk-adjusted Medicare payments per episode of surgery, very major teaching hos

194 tients where the difference of total episode payments per patient between lowest and highest quintile

195 calculated total drug costs (prices) and OOP payments per patient per month and compared their rates

196 hanced fee-for-service reimbursement and set payments per patient that cover asthma-related costs.

197 evaluated the effects of changes in dialysis payment policies and product labeling instituted in 2011

198 Several emerging payment policies penalize hospitals for low-value health

199 Several emerging payment policies penalize hospitals for low-value health

200 risks associated with ESA use and changes in payment policy did not result in a relative increase in

201 a total of $2.4 billion in industry-related payments, primarily general payments, with a higher like

202 erspective on the effects of MACRA's Quality Payment Program after analysis of the proposed rule, fin

203 The Quality Payment Program is a substantial improvement over the ne

204 as used to examine the effect of the bundled-payment program on overall and event-free survival.

205 Patients in the bundled-payment program were matched at a ratio of 1:3 with cont

206 Federal public reporting and payment programs have increasingly emphasized the measur

207 Prior to the Open Payments provisions of the Affordable Care Act, financia

208 rams' patient support costs and differential payment rates by commercial insurers vs Medicare.

209 data extraction was used to record financial payments received by 49 guideline authors using the Open

210 To evaluate payments received by physicians who author dermatology c

211 utcomes are the monetary values and types of payments received by physicians who author dermatology g

212 Payments received by the authors from the date of the in

213 tween the total dollars of reported industry payments received to injection use.

214 rence between total hospital costs and total payments received.

215 ld increase penalties (mean [+/-SE] Medicare payment reductions across all hospitals) from 0.42+/-0.0

216 mprove health care quality as payers turn to payment reform for greater value.

217 ces and developing standards for value-based payment reform for imaging services.

218 Although there is widespread agreement that payment reform is needed, existing programs have signifi

219 New payment reforms address some of these problems, but many

220 commercial payers have recently implemented payment reforms and new models are evolving.

221 Early payment reforms were voluntary and cardiologists' partic

222 , this analysis cannot determine whether the payments reported caused the increased use, are a result

223 ider Enumeration System) linked to 2015 Open Payments reports of industry payments.

224 According to data from 2015 Open Payments reports, 48% of physicians were reported to hav

225 In addition to total episode payment savings, hospitals with the lowest complication

226 controls should be considered in regulatory/payment schemas and planning clinical care.

227 both costs and quality through "value-based" payment schemes.

228 ms to support the DDM process, and temporary payment sites were set up to facilitate payment to vacci

229 category of payment, geographic region, and payment source were also assessed.

230 230 and exceeded pay-for-performance bundled payments starting in 2008.

231 In the era of bundled health care payment, strategies should be implemented to eliminate c

232 Physicians will need to use 1 of 2 payment structures: Merit-Based Incentive Payment System

233 The publication of the US Physician Payments Sunshine Act provides insight into the financia

234 The QIP is tied to the ESRD prospective payment system and mandated by the Medicare Improvements

235 The ESRD Prospective Payment System associated with a 5.0% (95% confidence in

236 The ESRD Prospective Payment System bundling, but not the training add-on, as

237 Such a payment system has not been researched satisfactorily in

238 The ESRD Prospective Payment System introduced two incentives to increase hom

239 valuated the effects of the ESRD Prospective Payment System on home dialysis use by patients starting

240 Value-driven payment system reform is a potential tool for aligning e

241 Payments under the bundled payments system were lower and the proportion of patient

242 2 payment structures: Merit-Based Incentive Payment Systems (MIPS) or Alternative Payment Models (AP

243 This is amplified by payment systems and policies that create impediments, mi

244 Importance: Medicaid payments tend to be less than the cost of care.

245 ialty had a higher odds of receiving general payments than did women: surgery, 62.5% vs 56.5% (OR, 1.

246 The QIP links 2% of the payment that a dialysis facility receives for Medicare p

247 are held accountable for nearly all Medicare payments that occur during the initial hospitalization u

248 complication rates had average total episode payments that were $1321 per patient less than hospitals

249 As 7% of ophthalmologists received 90% of payments, the Gini index was 0.92, demonstrating unequal

250 the use of laparoscopy reduced total episode payments, the source of savings is in the postacute care

251 In the context of joint replacement bundled payments, these data suggest that hospital performance w

252 rary payment sites were set up to facilitate payment to vaccination personnel at the grassroots level

253 , the WHO and DDM partners introduced mobile payment to vaccination personnel in May 2015 in complian

254 After exclusion of J and Q codes, the total payments to and the number of charges by individual opht

255 ncial incentive program that provided annual payments to critical care physicians contingent on unit-

256 Disproportionate Share Hospital payments to FSCHs reduced their Medicaid losses by almos

257 Thirty-day total episode Medicare payments to hospitals for the index operation and any su

258 utcome measures were the mean and median CMS payments to male and female ophthalmologists in outpatie

259 Medicaid Services Open Payments database for payments to ophthalmologists by biomedical companies was

260 Retrospective review of the CMS database for payments to ophthalmologists from January 1, 2012, throu

261 factor (anti-VEGF) agent-associated industry payments to ophthalmologists using the Centers for Medic

262 Of the total drug payments to ophthalmologists, biologic anti-VEGF agents

263 aggregate beneficiary demographics, Medicare payments to ophthalmologists, ophthalmic medical service

264 ment represented 32.8% of the total Medicare payments to ophthalmologists.

265 lvania Act 13, which authorizes Commonwealth payments to Pennsylvania counties to offset damages from

266 ore likely than those not receiving industry payments to perform a greater percentage of their inject

267 e types and distribution of industry-related payments to physicians in 2015 and the association of ph

268 with a higher likelihood and higher value of payments to physicians in surgical vs primary care speci

269 e types and distribution of industry-related payments to physicians.

270 Payments to the delivery system were lower in the TBC gr

271 Mean payments to women were $11419 compared with $20957 for m

272 Mean payments to women were $14848 compared with $30513 for m

273 d with $20957 for men (P = .001), and median payments to women were $3000 compared with $4787 for men

274 d with $30513 for men (P = .004), and median payments to women were $3750 compared with $5000 for men

275 tal of 3207 ophthalmologists received 13 449 payments totaling $4 454 325 associated with ranibizumab

276 As prospective payment transitions to bundled reimbursement, many US ho

277 In the United States, recent payment trends directing value-based payments for bundle

278 The median payment under the fee-for-service structure was $29603 (

279 Payments under the bundled payments system were lower an

280 n compared hospitals' average 90-day episode payments using the 2 definitions of an episode of care a

281 nd difference between average 90-day episode payments using the broad definition of an episode of car

282 The 90-day episode payments using the broad definition of the CJR model ran

283 dardized Medicare-allowed payments (Medicare payments), utilization, and quality (unplanned readmissi

284 Surgeons had a mean per-physician reported payment value of $6879 (95% CI, $5895-$7862) vs $2227 (9

285 Incidence of catastrophic payments was correlated positively with GDP per person a

286 ers (74%), greater than 90% of the anti-VEGF payments were associated exclusively with either ranibiz

287 In linear regression models, higher EITC payments were associated with improved short-term BPI sc

288 f physician, readmission, and postacute care payments were evaluated.

289 edures, of which $224 million (47.6%) of the payments were for reoperations.

290 ists who received aflibercept or ranibizumab payments were more likely to receive the majority of pay

291 Those who received anti-VEGF payments were more likely to use ranibizumab or afliberc

292 in Medicare spending, risk-adjusted Medicare payments were not statistically different between very m

293 Risk-adjusted 30-day Medicare payments were price-standardized to account for graduate

294 Risk-adjusted 30-day Medicare payments were price-standardized to account for graduate

295 Episode payments were slightly lower (mean payment, $21670) when

296 The data source for FCOIs was Open Payments, which is publically reported by the Centers fo

297 Such payments, which may be given to the relatives or paid di

298 In contrast, the mean-based payment with adjustments resulted in the smallest theore

299 industry-related payments, primarily general payments, with a higher likelihood and higher value of p

300 s accountable care organizations and bundled payments; yet, value-based purchasing (VBP) or pay-for-p