ライフサイエンスコーパス: payoff

1 eward to one of two alternatives ("potential payoff").

2 items to cut are those with the longest-term payoff.

3 ve that was most probable or had the largest payoff.

4 costly punishment applied, increases average payoff.

5 ues with gambling outcomes to maximize their payoff.

6 ian interpretation to guarantee considerable payoff.

7 es of key program features would have a high payoff.

8 Individuals reproduce proportional to payoff.

9 o effect on contributions and leads to lower payoff.

10 es is optimal if it ensures maximal expected payoff.

11 ted based on the expected time of the larger payoff.

12 ers sometimes choose the strategy with lower payoff.

13 or), where each decision offers a stochastic payoff.

14 ions range adaptation maximizes the expected payoff.

15 by copying the group member with the highest payoff.

16 e, disfavors defection but decreases average payoff.

17 ed more effort and thereby achieved a higher payoff.

18 ation would thrive regardless of its average payoff.

19 symmetric payoffs but a slightly lower total payoff.

20 ocks, consequently corresponding to a higher payoff.

21 lay of the strategy leading to the symmetric payoffs.

22 gree of control over both players' long-term payoffs.

23 rate of cooperation typically depends on the payoffs.

24 he agent, who then distributes the coalition payoffs.

25 iduals have complete information about their payoffs.

26 nificantly increased, leading to mutualistic payoffs.

27 nal and care only about maximizing their own payoffs.

28 and when it does, it enhances group-average payoffs.

29 at entails a conflict between their material payoffs.

30 gh-risk research that could have the largest payoffs.

31 ymmetries and small observable variations in payoffs.

32 of one's actions and the value of potential payoffs.

33 equently modifies the commons and associated payoffs.

34 require information on others' strategies or payoffs.

35 e positive correlations between the players' payoffs.

36 dividual decisions interact to determine the payoffs.

37 ed choices in decisions that involve delayed payoffs?

38 chnique were subjected to a reduced foraging payoff, 49% of birds switched their behavior to a higher

39 nd crucially, however, on the deviation from payoff additivity that occurs when both interacting indi

40 erous strategy achieves the maximum possible payoff against its own type.

41 the direction of the mutant that has maximum payoff against the resident population.

42 with previous studies, support the idea that payoff and prior probability manipulations produce flexi

43 gs from other studies, support the idea that payoff and prior probability manipulations produce flexi

44 Here, we characterize the economic payoff and regional emission consequences of BTM storage

45 eflect a fixed policy for the integration of payoff and stimulus information.

46 rce a linear relationship between his or her payoff and that of the opponent even when restricting hi

47 fixed linear relationship between one's own payoff and that of the other player.

48 es of not equally distributing the coalition payoff and the long-term concern to keep cooperation goi

49 suggest that a fast guess process, biased by payoff and triggered by stimulus onset, occurred on a su

50 a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment.

51 ibria: two equilibria with highly asymmetric payoffs and another equilibrium with symmetric payoffs b

52 t aspect of animal interactions, namely that payoffs and asymmetries may both be imperfectly observed

53 ere also initially uninformed about opponent payoffs and could not communicate verbally.

54 e, even if this resulted in lower scores and payoffs and even when there was no need to counteract th

55 Stimuli represented payoffs and participants had to predict their occurrence

56 ndings previously obtained with non-negative payoffs and primary rewards, the animal's choice behavio

57 degree to which there is transparency in the payoffs and risks associated with the decisions agents m

58 volving games in which environment-dependent payoffs and strategies coevolve.

59 where agents make mistakes when judging the payoffs and strategies of others, natural selection favo

60 are averse to differences between their own payoffs and those of others, i.e., inequity.

61 multiplied by reward level to calculate the payoff, and a binary choice task that involved choosing

62 ontrol that must be invested to achieve that payoff, and the cost in terms of cognitive effort.

63 ivalent to a donation game with non-additive payoffs, and has previously been analysed for the single

64 nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information.

65 earn the language of individuals with a high payoff; and (iii) random learning: children learn the la

66 ather than virtual) currency and when higher payoffs are at stake (Study 3).

67 The potential future payoffs are huge in terms of faster approval of more eff

68 ble degrees of cooperation are possible, and payoffs are scaled accordingly.

69 ale-free graph on cooperation when effective payoffs are used.

70 It also predicts that when one's own payoffs are valued more than others', some generous acts

71 ey are motivated to increase their partners' payoff as well as their own.

72 volutionary game theory by allowing players' payoffs as well as their strategies to evolve in respons

73 PFC) encoded the animal's past decisions and payoffs, as well as the conjunction between the two, pro

74 ly-life environment and measured the fitness payoffs associated with the supply of parental care when

75 ics, rather than the rational examination of payoffs assumed by most social preference models.

76 is assured that she will receive the maximum payoff attainable under the desired payoff relation she

77 ividuals frequently demonstrated the highest-payoff behavior in their repertoire, inadvertently filte

78 by strategic considerations and the relative payoff between maxima.

79 There is a payoff between non-PIP anionic lipids attracting the PH

80 We investigated how differences in payoffs between available alternatives affect neural act

81 Breaking the alignment in payoffs between player A and player B reduced the extent

82 hy (EEG) and behavior to examine the role of payoff bias in a difficult two-alternative perceptual de

83 ial exploration and without any evidence for payoff-biased copying.

84 ion of such rules (unbiased social learning, payoff-biased social learning and frequency-dependent bi

85 We find that payoff-biased social learning may evolve under high leve

86 e acquired via two cognitive mechanisms: (1) payoff-biased transmission-a tendency to copy the most s

87 yoffs and another equilibrium with symmetric payoffs but a slightly lower total payoff.

88 theory of ZD strategies and improves his own payoff by adaptively changing his strategy following som

89 While the players would maximize their payoffs by both choosing the largest allowed value, M, t

90 g competitive games, monkeys increased their payoffs by systematically deviating from a simple heuris

91 ifferent strength according to the coalition payoffs can accept a transfer of power to another player

92 ess in the wild suggest that maximal fitness payoffs can be achieved by shifting offspring production

93 accurate-guessing) predictions, and shift as payoffs change, just as equilibrium theory predicts.

94 ion, and more responsive to past history and payoff changes, than two samples of human choices from e

95 of the anger program reflects the ancestral payoffs characteristic of a small-scale social world rat

96 possible moves, and therefore many possible payoffs conditional on those moves.

97 ted mean, variance, and skewness of possible payoffs, consistent with the idea that sequential choice

98 They do not correspond to direct payments or payoff deductions, but they arise from the repercussions

99 djust their vaccinating strategies and their payoffs depend nonlinearly on whether or not the herd im

100 However, these payoffs depend on the particular way in which actions ar

101 we consider symmetric games, which means the payoff depends only on the number of players using eithe

102 The game payoffs determine which interactions are reinforced, and

103 nically on the sensitivity of individuals to payoff difference, but the dependence is non-monotonous

104 Yet aggregated over all rounds, the payoff differences between players are rather small, and

105 al games with weak selection, i.e., when the payoff differences between strategies are small.

106 rted the fast guess account over accounts of payoff effects supported in other studies.

107 fort by incorporating tug-of-war theory into payoff equations from the two main classes of IFD models

108 tive reproductive tactic that yields fitness payoffs equivalent to a non-cooperative route to alpha s

109 n individuals take actions to maximize their payoffs even as their combined payoff is less than the g

110 such, we suggest that rare, high-risk, high-payoff events such as mating and mate competition could

111 ensure that any increase in one player's own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed perce

112 sights and, better yet, when high-risk, high-payoff experiments succeed.

113 n the player's and their opponent's expected payoff (extortionate strategies).

114 andards, or (ii) low variance in group-level payoffs, fails to predict attitudes about redistribution

115 ply our formulation to a system in which the payoffs favor unilateral defection and cooperation, give

116 In the chaotic regime, the total payoffs fluctuate intermittently, showing bursts of rapi

117 ior they try to facilitate leads to the best payoff for all agents on average, and most of the time.

118 pick the larger quantity even when the food payoff for choosing the smaller quantity was increased (

119 We apply our framework to quantify the payoff for Costa Rican birds of changing farm plot and b

120 The payoff for each alternative (which could be biased or un

121 nce, consistent with the hypothesis that the payoff for increasing brain size was greater general cog

122 Exhausting the resource maximizes the payoff for the present generation, but leaves all future

123 attacker, the knowledge level of the victim, payoffs for different outcomes, and the beliefs of each

124 relative value signal that linearly weights payoffs for self and other, captures key patterns of cho

125 Recent clinical findings have provided payoffs for significant preclinical evaluation and refin

126 and thus any direct or indirect reproductive payoffs for staying and working are less likely to be lo

127 of birds switched their behavior to a higher-payoff foraging technique after only 14 days, with young

128 egrates three critical factors: the expected payoff from a controlled process, the amount of control

129 However, the net payoff from energy research and policy directed at RGM m

130 he community of cooperators achieve a higher payoff from interactions within the community than membe

131 ng with a "good" male but a negative fitness payoff from mating with a "bad" male.

132 quences for her: she gets a positive fitness payoff from mating with a "good" male but a negative fit

133 s interact in any one encounter and derive a payoff from that interaction.

134 the case of weak selection, which means the payoff from the game is only a small contribution to ove

135 xpect price controls to reduce the potential payoffs from breakthrough drugs.

136 groups of strangers, even if monitoring and payoffs from cooperation were invariant to group size.

137 a strategy to extort an unfair share of the payoffs from the opponent.

138 ntrality algorithm that uses the concept of "payoffs" from economic theory.

139 We derive the payoff function for these families analytically, and stu

140 assignment problem and learned the implicit payoff function.

141 classes share the feature that knowledge of payoff functions is weakly beneficial for the emergence

142 tiplayer game with non-linear, non-monotonic payoff functions that models the benefits of the acidity

143 players are uncertain about their opponents' payoff functions.

144 d that the error rate is at least 5% and the payoff gain (relative to the status quo) is at least 150

145 ze, such that diffusion is fast whenever the payoff gain from the innovation is sufficiently high and

146 agents interact in small local clusters, the payoff gain of the innovation relative to the status quo

147 egies that adapt to play the equivalent mean payoff gamble.

148 r failures to find cooperation in controlled payoff games.

149 increased, but that the successful-defection-payoff has less impact on the weight of individuals and

150 so suggests that punishment can only enforce payoff-improving strategies, contrary to a widely cited

151 guided choice task and to integrate risk and payoff in a dynamic foraging task.

152 f cooperation is so extreme that the average payoff in a population can decline even as the potential

153 The greatest payoff in combating biological terrorism lies in focusin

154 Rejecting low offers increases relative payoff in pairwise competition between two strategies an

155 The importance of the larger payoff in this model suggests that the salience of large

156 mework for the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in arbitrary iterated games.

157 sense of being able to appropriate 'surplus' payoffs in each interaction, which is selected for withi

158 understand the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in iterated interactions.

159 d rather than rational assessments of modern payoffs in large populations.

160 nexpectedly accelerates again when these A-A payoffs increase even further.

161 With more payoff information subjects are less likely to switch to

162 ts that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information.

163 reward rather than integrating stimulus and payoff information.

164 ls are satisfied if and only if the obtained payoff is larger than a fixed aspiration level.

165 aximize their payoffs even as their combined payoff is less than the global maximum had the players c

166 mulation cannot deal with games in which the payoff is not differentiable.

167 he long run, access to information about own payoffs leads to less cooperative behaviour.

168 ces that were less influenced by anticipated payoff magnitudes and were more driven by recent negativ

169 ategies: fair strategies ensure that the own payoff matches the average payoff of the group; extortio

170 For some payoff matrices the distribution of fixation times can b

171 These equilibrium solutions assume that the payoff matrices under each behavioural context are ident

172 r model can be mapped to particular forms of payoff matrices.

173 tween the two strategies is given by the 2x2 payoff matrix (acbd).

174 Classifying all two by two games with payoff matrix [(a,b),(c,d)], we show that mutation from

175 on population size and the parameter of the payoff matrix and noise factor.

176 hich the positive and negative values of its payoff matrix were realized by the delivery and removal

177 en two strategies, A and B, described by the payoff matrix(abcd).

178 space is equivalent to making changes in the payoff matrix, and once this is done, the behavior of th

179 t not on the number of strategies, n, or the payoff matrix.

180 s whose interactions are described by an nxn payoff matrix.

181 he two graphs induce a transformation of the payoff matrix.

182 cs introduces a simple transformation of the payoff matrix.

183 ccording to the normalised parameters in the payoff matrix.

184 ion and selfishness, quantifiable in a 2 x 2 payoff matrix.

185 whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix.

186 make their decisions either based purely on payoff maximization or by imitating the vaccination beha

187 that individuals for whom trustworthiness is payoff-maximizing will find TPP to be less net costly (f

188 First, cooperation is a rational (expected payoff-maximizing) response to incorrect beliefs about t

189 s to behaviours in the present and how these payoffs may be realised in different currencies.

190 ssing no information about others' traits or payoffs, mobility (via self-propulsion or environmental

191 at are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner'

192 s cooperate, by doing which he maximizes the payoff of the extortioner as well.

193 The payoff of the game is interpreted as fitness.

194 he amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group.

195 sure that the own payoff matches the average payoff of the group; extortionate strategies allow a pla

196 r obtains an advantageous share of the total payoff of the players, and the other players best respon

197 t, our results indicate that the equilibrium payoff of the population can be increased if players som

198 ulation size, evolution acts to maximize the payoff of the whole population.

199 Therefore, the payoff of two individuals using the same strategy can be

200 nce of conspecifics influenced the potential payoffs of a foraging opportunity.

201 Here we show that payoffs of cooperation depend on asymmetric costs of ora

202 y punishment may actually reduce the average payoffs of group members in comparison with groups in wh

203 ring the alternating condition increased the payoffs of mutual prosociality, and prosocial choice inc

204 hich individuals directly value the material payoffs of others, i.e., generosity, and (2) the extent

205 hich individuals directly value the material payoffs of others.

206 Clarifying the condition-dependent payoffs of the dance language provides new insight into

207 ing the successful strategy according to the payoffs of the last round of the game, and then analyse

208 erally enforce a linear relation between the payoffs of the two players.

209 clines translated into sexually antagonistic payoffs: old males fertilized more eggs when they were d

210 proposed stochastic evolutionary model where payoff only weakly drives evolution and individuals can

211 s model suggests that the salience of larger payoffs played a critical role in determining the value

212 are rather small, and the equal division of payoffs predicts about 80% of all groups best.

213 h a novel strategy that would increase their payoffs provided that it is also adopted by their neighb

214 maximum payoff attainable under the desired payoff relation she imposes, without knowing how the oth

215 he capacity for strategic thinking about the payoff-relevant actions of conspecifics is not well unde

216 We consider decision makers who know that payoff-relevant observations are generated by a process

217 cated issues must be resolved, the potential payoff remains large.

218 ifically, velocity initially falls as rising payoffs reward the interactions among the more stationar

219 by combining conformist social learning with payoff-sensitive individual reinforcement (updating of e

220 nd populations that experience heterogeneous payoff shocks.

221 played the strategies leading to asymmetric payoffs significantly more frequently than study partici

222 The resulting "payoff stochasticity" reduces the intensity of selection

223 ived that captures the average effect of the payoff stochasticity.

224 We show how the payoff structure in this scenario and other closely rela

225 metimes conflated with the actual underlying payoff structure of those decisions.

226 rock-paper-scissors games, the nontransitive payoff structure of which means that unilateral control

227 en have conscious knowledge about the task's payoff structure.

228 Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't

229 human opponents, extortion resulted in lower payoffs than generosity.

230 ce of punishers, cooperators can gain higher payoffs than non-cooperators.

231 right temporoparietal junction and expected payoff that was absent in the other groups.

232 ooperative behaviors may reveal the greatest payoff to social science research of all agent-based mod

233 The total payoff to the plant, the benefit obtained from water and

234 wnplays the importance of differences in the payoffs to behaviours in the present and how these payof

235 s to predators), which 'equivalates' fitness payoffs to both risk-takers (red non-droppers) and risk-

236 Payoffs to interactions depend on whether or not individ

237 l mating rates for males are higher, fitness payoffs to monogamy and the maintenance of a single part

238 reased the level of cooperation, the average payoffs to players, and the assortativity between cooper

239 Finally, by modifying the payoffs to satisfy two novel conditions, we found that c

240 f economic games that measured concern about payoffs to themselves and to others: dictator, ultimatum

241 pulation level with a sub-optimal per capita payoff towards which irrigation systems tend to gravitat

242 diness potential (LRP) on a subset of biased payoff trials contralateral to the higher-paying alterna

243 nterest, information use, and contingency of payoff under environmental variation that may be applied

244 cients in a linear inequality containing the payoff values.

245 ility condition, particularly when the value payoff was highest (i.e., $6 and $7).

246 Knowing that the payoff was proportional to the time spent above a target

247 For standard prisoner's dilemma payoffs, we also found that assortativity resulted predo

248 Offering more than you demand increases payoff when many strategies are present simultaneously a

249 plies that humans do not consider neighbors' payoffs when making their decisions in this dilemma but

250 e frequently and earned significantly higher payoffs when matched with other study participants from

251 reward leads to increased contributions and payoff, whereas punishment has no effect on contribution

252 ires that decision makers (i) believe future payoffs will occur and (ii) are not forced to take the i

253 ls may be both less likely to believe future payoffs will occur and less able to forego immediate rew

254 Uncertainty (i.e., variable payoffs with unknown probabilities) brings together a nu

255 rporates terms for the disutility of unequal payoffs, with parameters that index behaviors normally e

256 o exert a physical effort knowing that their payoff would be proportional to their effort duration.