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1 and within-group cooperation (e.g. parochial altruism).
2 ew that competition puts any such demands on altruism.
3  sufficient for the evolution of one form of altruism.
4 onsumption of a common resource is a form of altruism.
5 r selfishness help to "pay" for second-order altruism.
6  than others, a situation called competitive altruism.
7 nd recipient for explaining the evolution of altruism.
8 e punisher, making it a form of second-order altruism.
9 us action performance predicts self-reported altruism.
10 e punisher, making it a form of second-order altruism.
11 wo alleles which code for different kinds of altruism.
12 n alternative route towards the evolution of altruism.
13 m interspersed with phases of transient true altruism.
14 mpetition could account for the evolution of altruism.
15  are highly unstable, leading to the loss of altruism.
16 encouraging the origin and stability of true altruism.
17 the system towards the point of 50% marginal altruism.
18 y different perspectives on the evolution of altruism.
19 relationship between sexual reproduction and altruism.
20 relationship between sexual reproduction and altruism.
21  are motivated more by self-interest than by altruism.
22 l infinite models) plays in the evolution of altruism.
23 lassic "haystack" models of the evolution of altruism.
24 ups contribute to research solely because of altruism.
25 n relatives can counteract kin selection for altruism.
26 d in terms of extended kinship or reciprocal altruism.
27 upport the selection of both weak and strong altruism.
28 ffects can cancel, limiting the viability of altruism.
29 tly responding quantitatively to a partner's altruism.
30 on need to be interpreted solely in terms of altruism.
31 table component of the immune system and kin altruism.
32 relatedness), group selection and reciprocal altruism.
33 hypothesized to be an important precursor to altruism.
34 at a cost to themselves, a phenomenon termed altruism.
35  threat (the COVID-19 pandemic) and everyday altruism.
36 s and cultural context in the development of altruism.
37 es several novel insights into the nature of altruism.
38 s been described in terms of cooperation and altruism.
39 urrounding explanations for the evolution of altruism.
40 le of the neuropeptide oxytocin in promoting altruism.
41 sibility of a neural basis for extraordinary altruism.
42 eciprocal activity yielded little subsequent altruism.
43  is applied to model the real motivations of altruism.
44  close kin but share a "greenbeard" gene for altruism?
45    Does empathy necessarily impede equity in altruism?
46 ress of self and others to real-world costly altruism, (2) reinforce distinctions between empathy for
47  and cultural beliefs (9 studies [50%]), and altruism (7 studies [39%]).
48                             The evolution of altruism, a behaviour that benefits others at one's own
49 ether mindfulness meditation activates human altruism, a component of social cooperation.
50 withstanding that examples of pathologies of altruism abound.
51 nces in the social preferences that motivate altruism across the primate order, and there is currentl
52 ection can favor reproductive altruism if an altruism allele aids copies of itself by helping relativ
53 fies the degree of an agent's selfishness or altruism, allowing us to better predict how the agent wi
54                     Concepts of pathological altruism, altruism bias, and guardian systems may help o
55 or kinship per se to achieve cooperation and altruism among group members.
56         Competition hinders the evolution of altruism amongst kin when beneficiaries gain at the expe
57                            With this type of altruism, an offspring will perform any act for which th
58  is unlikely that a single gene can code for altruism and a recognizable tag.
59 tween caring motivation and various forms of altruism and aggression are discussed.
60 cial behaviors such as extraordinary acts of altruism and aggression can often be best understood as
61 ing a common prosocial motivation underlying altruism and cooperation.
62 re, scientifically informed understanding of altruism and cooperative behavior.
63 istic scenarios, competition influences both altruism and defection.
64          Heritable variation in selfishness, altruism and discrimination is predicted to be particula
65 us social preferences in terms of both their altruism and equality-efficiency tradeoffs.
66 els of the gene-culture coevolution of human altruism and further sharpen what any theory of human co
67 pactful papers published on the evolution of altruism and identify 43 evolutionary models in which al
68            Our study suggests that parochial altruism and in-group/out-group biases emerge early duri
69              Second, we ask why reproductive altruism and individuality arise only in the larger memb
70 e of cooperative agreements, from reciprocal altruism and insurance arrangements to the social norms
71 ormation, allowing the ethical principles of altruism and justice to guide organ allocation.
72  were thought to potentially benefit through altruism and maintenance of hope.
73 sness was inversely predictive of children's altruism and positively correlated with their punitive t
74 s been theoretically linked with cooperative altruism and prosociality.
75           We show in a simulation model that altruism and punishment paradoxically become negatively
76 nstitutions of integration can unleash human altruism and restore cooperation in the presence of dive
77                                              Altruism and selfishness are 30-50% heritable in man in
78          This genetically based variation in altruism and selfishness requires explanation.
79 ions initially in stable equilibrium between altruism and selfishness.
80 eories on the explanation of both biological altruism and sex-ratio conflicts, and defend that the en
81 veral fundamental issues in the evolution of altruism and spite have remained contentious.
82 Humans are a cooperative species, capable of altruism and the creation of shared norms that ensure fa
83 sults imply high context modularity of human altruism and the development of intervention approaches
84 y highlighting the relevance of pathological altruism and the neuroendocrine pathways associated with
85                                              Altruism and the potential for therapeutic benefit were
86                            Here, we assessed altruism and third-party evaluation of scenarios depicti
87 owever, organ donation is a process based on altruism and trust, not a simple biological phenomenon.
88 e interactions, particularly those involving altruism and trust, remains unknown.
89 e enigmatic global association between avian altruism and unpredictable rainfall.
90                                    Both pure altruism and warm-glow motives appear to determine the h
91 cussion of the connection between other-only altruism and whole-group altruism, in which the donor ga
92  relatedness predisposes individuals towards altruism, and as haploid germ cells of an ejaculate will
93 dual-level ones, need not produce behavioral altruism, and do not require competition between groups
94 as political mobilization, health practices, altruism, and emotional states exhibit similar dynamics
95  entered their children for medical benefit, altruism, and hope of cure.
96 cision on a choice between self-interest and altruism, and if improving this sensitivity through trai
97 ad private insurance, showed lower levels of altruism, and less understanding of study design.
98 , exhibit stronger conspiracy beliefs, lower altruism, and limited environmental knowledge, are more
99 enefit from medical improvement, feelings of altruism, and maintenance of hope, the chance of cure or
100  structure for the maintenance of mutualism, altruism, and niche construction or ecosystem engineerin
101 n ambivalent about their values (protection, altruism, and respect) and the deceased's wishes, not wa
102 t, often taken as evidence of uniquely human altruism, and show that it 1) disappears when cooperatio
103 m benefits the group, selfishness undermines altruism, and the purpose of the model is to identify me
104   METHODS/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: In our AlAn's (altruism-antisocial) game a computer program presents su
105 eard effect and find that if recognition and altruism are always inherited together, the dynamics are
106 despite the fact that virtually all forms of altruism are associated with tradeoffs--some of enormous
107 ve been proposed to explain the evolution of altruism are direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity
108  related individuals so that the benefits of altruism are reaped by copies of the altruistic gene in
109 (Figure 1), and kin selection and reciprocal altruism are the foundation of the kinds of cooperative
110 cial interactions, including cooperation and altruism, are characteristic of numerous species, but ma
111 ong evolutionary trajectories, and find that altruism arises before directly beneficial behavior, des
112           Participants acknowledged hope and altruism as reasons for entering the trial more than exp
113 enomena, chiefly the evolution of biological altruism as that found in sterile castes of eusocial ins
114 netically based variation in selfishness and altruism, as in man, altruists with an innate ability to
115 t to the system's evolved functions: sibling altruism, aversion to personally engaging in sibling inc
116                                     And, can altruism be favored between individuals who are not clos
117  of competition, selection will often favour altruism because its alternatives provide lower fitness.
118     In the typical evolutionary formulation, altruism benefits the group, selfishness undermines altr
119                                              Altruism between close relatives can be easily explained
120 ed oxytocin system activity induces a social altruism bias at the cost of ecological responsibility.
121 eptual approach toward the quantification of altruism bias is presented.
122           Concepts of pathological altruism, altruism bias, and guardian systems may help open many n
123 despite fear), and adaptive social behavior (altruism, bonding, and teamwork) were found to be releva
124 ial insect colonies are pinnacles of evolved altruism but also exhibit dramatic conflict among relati
125 sity of the population slows up selection of altruism, but does not affect its direction, and this ho
126 mportant mechanism favoring the evolution of altruism, but punishment can be costly to the punisher,
127 uently relied on kin selection or reciprocal altruism, but recent models suggest that guarding may be
128 e hypothalamic peptide oxytocin in promoting altruism, but whether the influence of oxytocin benefits
129  of individual and contextual differences in altruism by examining altruistic choices in different in
130   This effect both supports the evolution of altruism by focusing the altruists' gifts on relatives o
131 provide a new perspective on strong vs. weak altruism by identifying their different underlying game
132                                   Appeals to altruism by reminding the public about the benefits of q
133 conditions associated with outgroup-directed altruism by showing that charitable social cues co-occur
134   In a brood from a single egg, reproductive altruism by soldiers reflects clone-level allocation to
135 uestions about the proximate source of human altruism by suggesting that prosocial behavior results,
136 on amongst defectors nevertheless undermines altruism, by facilitating invasion of unrelated benefici
137 cartoonish thought experiment to explain why altruism can be a selfish strategy from the perspective
138 viduals are genetically related, alleles for altruism can be favored by selection because they are ca
139 en helped by the beneficiary, discriminating altruism can be resistant against invasion by defectors.
140                                   Reciprocal altruism can become established among selfish, unrelated
141 m, the model shows that both strong and weak altruism can evolve in periodically formed random groups
142                         The fact that strong altruism can increase when groups are periodically and r
143     We show how kin selection and reciprocal altruism can promote cooperation in diverse 2x2 matrix g
144 losses suffered in the first and in this way altruism can ratchet up to high levels.
145         Together, a little bit of reciprocal altruism can, however, greatly reduce the threshold at w
146 olving an absolute cost to altruists (strong altruism) cannot evolve when populations are structured
147 ow religion negatively influences children's altruism, challenging the view that religiosity facilita
148  Much of what we know about the evolution of altruism comes from animals.
149             The study of prosocial behavior--altruism, cooperation, trust, and the related moral emot
150                                              Altruism, defined as costly other-regarding behavior, va
151 tress, we examined whether stress effects on altruism depend on participants' general capacity to men
152                              Empathy-induced altruism derives its strength from the emotional stake i
153                                    A species altruism directed toward repair of human problems is cou
154 s the essential factors for the evolution of altruism directly in its parameters and integrates impor
155                           Here, we show that altruism does indeed reduce environmentally induced repr
156                               Moreover, when altruism does occur among other primates, it is typicall
157 engaged in extraordinarily costly real-world altruism: donating a kidney to a stranger.
158                                      Whereas altruism drives the evolution of human cooperation, ethn
159                        This species exhibits altruism during both asexual and sexual cycles of its li
160                   In some cases however, kin-altruism effects appear to be modest.
161                                   Reciprocal altruism emerges from iterated games where players have
162 and identify 43 evolutionary models in which altruism evolves and where the authors attribute the evo
163                              This nepotistic altruism evolves under natural selection only if the rat
164               The study of human and primate altruism faces an evolutionary anomaly: There is ample e
165  support decisions about trust, reciprocity, altruism, fairness, revenge, social punishment, social n
166 rlapping generations hinder the evolution of altruism, fecundity effects are more conducive to altrui
167 iprocal interactions are a potent trigger of altruism for young children, and that these interactions
168 ibly accounting for the distinctive forms of altruism found in our species.
169  of such functions when observing refusal of altruism from a genetic sister.
170 xperience fostered children's expectation of altruism from others.
171 l design allows us to rigorously distinguish altruism from preferences regarding equality-efficiency
172                                Extraordinary altruism generally reflected opposite patterns of moral
173  and TgrB1 as its receptor, but evidence for altruism has been indirect.
174              Cooperation based on reciprocal altruism has evolved in only a small number of species,
175  Efforts to solve the evolutionary puzzle of altruism have a lengthy history, and recent years have s
176 number of supposedly alternative pathways to altruism have been published, leading to controversies s
177    However, the potential hurtful aspects of altruism have gone largely unrecognized in scientific in
178 al decades of investigating the evolution to altruism have resulted in the systematic and unwitting r
179 as been used extensively to study reciprocal altruism, here we show that the n-player prisoner's dile
180 rom the novel formulation to prevent 'forced altruism' hidden in previous static algorithms while all
181 owever, in conditions that do not select for altruism, host bacteria promoting transfer are outcompet
182                     The genetic evolution of altruism (i.e., a behavior resulting in a net reduction
183 ate mechanism to underlie so-called directed altruism, i.e., altruism in response to anothers's pain,
184                                    An act of altruism (ie, participation in an invasive clinical stud
185             Selection can favor reproductive altruism if an altruism allele aids copies of itself by
186 indirect fitness options and helping is only altruism if it reduces the helper's direct fitness.
187 reciprocal activity elicited high degrees of altruism in 1- and 2-y-old children, whereas friendly bu
188 vity to inequality is strongly predictive of altruism in an independent task domain.
189 o far, and I apply the theory of competitive altruism in arguing how strategic investment in behaviou
190  in a non-social decision task yet simulated altruism in dictator games.
191  further our understanding of the origins of altruism in humans by highlighting the importance of emo
192 eted theoretical results on the selection of altruism in inelastic viscous homogeneous populations, n
193 is may explain reported genetic variation in altruism in man.
194                     The profound benefits of altruism in modern society are self-evident.
195 selection theory predicts that the degree of altruism in queenless colonies should be reduced because
196  underlie so-called directed altruism, i.e., altruism in response to anothers's pain, need, or distre
197 tions meet the most stringent definitions of altruism in that they represent an intentional behavior
198 st defectors presents relative advantages to altruism in the simplest games between altruists and def
199                Early research was focused on altruism in the social insects, where the problem of coo
200 milton's relatedness drives the evolution to altruism in their models.
201 fications of pathological altruism, that is, altruism in which attempts to promote the welfare of oth
202 of Hamilton's rule in the case of other-only altruism in which the benefits are shared by other membe
203 d, providing field evidence for 'competitive altruism' in which helpful acts are used as a display to
204         Here we demonstrate the evolution of altruism, in the form of conditional reproductive restra
205                Acts of extraordinary, costly altruism, in which significant risks or costs are assume
206  between other-only altruism and whole-group altruism, in which the donor gains some benefit from its
207 other prominent theories of the evolution of altruism: inclusive fitness and multilevel selection.
208 s us to combine kin selection and reciprocal altruism into a general matrix game model.
209                                    Effective altruism is a growing humanitarian movement with a track
210                                              Altruism is consequently deemed to require stronger kin
211                                              Altruism is critical for cooperation and productivity in
212               The evolution of sociality and altruism is enigmatic because cooperators are constantly
213 is caused by loosely coupled separate genes, altruism is facilitated through beard chromodynamics in
214                                              Altruism is favored by natural selection provided that i
215                        In non-human animals, altruism is generally directed towards relatives, and sa
216                                              Altruism is globally associated with unpredictable envir
217                         This is true even if altruism is initially rare, migration between groups all
218 enome sequencing reveals that this bacterial altruism is made possible by drug-resistance mutations u
219                                   In humans, altruism is motivated at least in part by empathy and co
220                        Our findings show how altruism is preserved from the disruptive effects of suc
221                    Although the evolution of altruism is robust to perturbations in most of the defau
222                                If reciprocal altruism is to provide an explanation for altruistic beh
223 e for charitable contributions, called "pure altruism," is satisfied by increases in the public good
224 ding to evolutionary theories of generalized altruism, market integration should lead to greater leve
225  In the absence of kin selection, reciprocal altruism may be an evolutionarily stable strategy but is
226                                              Altruism may be learned (behavioral evolution) in a way
227 ltruist, and also limits the extent to which altruism may emerge by exposing clusters of altruists to
228 riodically and randomly formed suggests that altruism may evolve more readily and in simpler organism
229 support prior suggestions that self-reported altruism may not reliably predict altruistic behaviour.
230                     However, a self-reported altruism measure previously linked to peer evaluations b
231 riments, interoceptive sensitivity predicted altruism measured through monetary generosity.
232 l of remittances can be explained by our kin-altruism model.
233 ndividuals favour kin to the extent that kin-altruism models predict?
234  that if punishing inequity is predictive of altruism more broadly, extraordinary altruists should pu
235 aggregate of scores from Ego-Resiliency, NEO Altruism, NEO Straightforwardness (positive predictors)
236 itness of the actor and also either benefit (altruism) or harm (spite) other individuals.
237                                              Altruism (over social space) corresponds to self-control
238                                              Altruism, particularly understanding that organ donation
239  parents, who had higher levels of trust and altruism, perceived the potential for enhanced care, ref
240 an example of dedication to science based on altruism, personal growth, and tenacity.
241 ons suggest that enforcement of reproductive altruism (policing) in hymenopteran insect societies is
242                                              Altruism presents a challenge to evolutionary theory bec
243 ions, and hence, perhaps surprisingly, serve altruism rather than selfishness.
244  explanations and models for cooperation and altruism--reciprocity, kin and group selection, and puni
245    Although the neural mechanisms underlying altruism remain unknown, empathy and its component abili
246 d through which mechanisms stress may impact altruism remains elusive.
247 teria to humans: Is the evolution of extreme altruism, represented by the sterile workers of social i
248               In order to be able to enforce altruism, reproductive cheaters need to be reliably iden
249 ved a great deal of attention with regard to altruism, reproductive value has been surprisingly negle
250                                   Greenbeard altruism resolves this paradox by allowing cooperators t
251 h as cooperation, giving, and other forms of altruism--result from covert attempts to avoid social in
252                                              Altruism should be the guiding motivation for all donati
253 used to model Herbert Simon's explanation of altruism, showing that altruistic norms can "hitchhike"
254 origin of the genetic basis for reproductive altruism (somatic cells specialized at vegetative functi
255 social conformity in general and competitive altruism specifically.
256  selective pressures leading to reproductive altruism stem from the increasing cost of reproduction w
257 test case was based on the "biofilms promote altruism" study previously implemented in BacSim because
258 for altruistic sterility is favored when the altruism sufficiently benefits relatives carrying the ge
259 al responsibility emphasize the relevance of altruism, suggesting that more altruistic individuals ar
260 h other individuals carrying the alleles for altruism than random individuals in the population ("kin
261 ism, fecundity effects are more conducive to altruism than survival effects, and one demographic regi
262 to a stranger is a rare act of extraordinary altruism that appears to reflect a moral commitment to h
263  and potential ramifications of pathological altruism, that is, altruism in which attempts to promote
264 ndependently inherited loci, one controlling altruism the other discrimination, or a one locus model
265 range of puzzling behaviors, such as extreme altruism, the use of ethical principles, and romantic lo
266 hoices, we considered participants' level of altruism, their reciprocity expectations, their optimism
267 redictions from kin selection and reciprocal altruism theory.
268 ral network positively reinforces reciprocal altruism, thereby motivating subjects to resist the temp
269    After a brief exploration on the basis of altruism, this review will discuss the assessment, evalu
270 gn, physician involvement, personal benefit, altruism, time, and incentives.
271 where the authors attribute the evolution of altruism to a pathway other than kin selection and/or de
272 the positive assortment necessary for strong altruism to evolve does not require these additional mec
273 it defectors against each other allow strong altruism to evolve even in populations with negligible k
274  such as kinship or reciprocity, that enable altruism to evolve.
275 that spermatozoa may display cooperation and altruism to gain an advantage when inter-male sperm comp
276                                  This allows altruism to persist even in weakly structured population
277 lution of all forms of social behavior, from altruism to spite, across all organisms, from viruses to
278 should consider kin selection and reciprocal altruism together rather than as alternatives, and they
279                     The cowbird's unexpected altruism toward host offspring simply promotes its selfi
280 totally negate, the kin-selected benefits of altruism toward relatives.
281 ophobia generally failed to exhibit enhanced altruism toward the outgroup.
282 not affect its direction, and this holds for altruism towards any individual, not just immediate neig
283                                 By directing altruism towards kin, D. purpureum should generally avoi
284 wever, paradoxes arise when organisms divert altruism towards more distantly related recipients.
285 ble signals, signal recognition ability, and altruism towards others that display the same signal.
286 dividuals will show less aggression and more altruism towards relatives.
287 iduals should show less aggression, and more altruism, towards closer kin.
288                Additional questions assessed altruism, trust, value for research, and perceptions of
289                                              Altruism underlies cooperative behaviours that facilitat
290                       The idea of reciprocal altruism usually involves direct reciprocity: repeated e
291                         Consistent with pure altruism, we find that even mandatory, tax-like transfer
292 ons (e.g., stress and anxiety), and everyday altruism were collected.
293 aphic regime (so-called death-birth) permits altruism whereas another (so-called birth-death) does no
294 e reciprocal cues remain potent elicitors of altruism, whereas a fourth study with preschoolers showe
295 n and obtain conditions for the stability of altruism which differ from Hamilton's rule by simply rep
296  neural bases of this unique aspect of human altruism, which extends beyond interpersonal interaction
297 y phenomena of human interactions: authentic altruism, why people cooperate intuitively, one-shot coo
298 udy is best described as egoistically biased altruism, with important implications for our understand
299  group formation, the origin of reproductive altruism within the group, and the further specializatio
300 ves, while defectors receive the benefits of altruism without providing any help in return.

 
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