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1 nterests, but also like to see themselves as moral.
2 esults support a disparity between simulated moral action and moral judgment.
3 on provides a better assessment of simulated moral action, and illustrates the embodied nature of mor
4 ologies allow the investigation of simulated moral actions in visually immersive environments.
5 orally significant decisions involve several moral agents whose actions are interdependent - and agen
6 oral attribution and not simply the positive moral analogue of blame attributions.
7 complex, multiscalar phenomenon with immense moral and economic costs.
8 e, suggestive that children's evaluations of moral and epistemic responsibilities in joint collaborat
9 on of moral emotion is key for the spread of moral and political ideas in online social networks, a p
10 ms has created an environment favourable for moral and public health crises, as evident in the separa
11  but because of their commitment to abstract moral and sacred ideas.
12 wealthy and generous, and those who abide by moral and social rules.
13 f distribution must be balanced with (a) the moral and statutory imperatives to reduce inequities res
14 ge body of research has established norms of moral assessment that promote cooperation, assuming repu
15 tuitions, and are compelled to justify their moral assessments as good and rational (even erroneously
16 good and bad, and these intuitions influence moral assessments outside of conscious awareness.
17 ral praise is a fundamentally unique form of moral attribution and not simply the positive moral anal
18                                              Moral behavior requires learning how our actions help or
19  know little about how such principles guide moral behavior.
20  dependent on irrelevant factors, then those moral beliefs are based on defective belief-forming proc
21                          May assumes that if moral beliefs are counterfactually dependent on irreleva
22 ons (accommodation states where religious or moral beliefs must be taken into consideration when decl
23 argues that framing effects do not undermine moral beliefs, because they affect only a minority of mo
24       In contrast to the large literature on moral blame, work on how people attribute praise has, un
25 social science theory saw the enforcement of moral boundaries as a critical way by which group member
26 rcement, highlighting how the enforcement of moral boundaries offers an efficient solution to coopera
27            The synthesis conveyed relatives' moral career as comprising four stages, each depicting r
28                               The concept of moral career was adopted in producing this synthesis.
29   For individuals, integrity is an aspect of moral character and experience.
30 primarily for punishment and signaling one's moral character, praise is primarily for relationship bu
31  in behavior, and often exhibit questionable moral character.
32 nct downstream consequences for judgments of moral character.
33 ocial challenge in the design of a universal moral code for autonomous vehicles.
34 ings of guilt are associated with social and moral cognition (inferior parietal lobule [IPL], prefron
35 ter Dilemmas, respectively, and I argue that moral cognition is inextricable from social cognition, w
36 dence is used to support the conclusion that moral cognition relies on rule-based inference.
37 then argued that this salient feature of our moral cognition represents a profound puzzle for evoluti
38                                              Moral cognition, by its very nature, stems from intuitio
39                       It demonstrates shared moral cognition, not shared moral judgment, and therefor
40  to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition.
41  advertise our externalization of particular moral commitments generates features of our social inter
42 , relative to conservatives, express greater moral concern toward friends relative to family, and the
43 h these exciting research possibilities come moral concerns about the moral humanization of animals,
44 nsion between the greater good and competing moral concerns.
45 pen crucial questions about how we reason to moral conclusions.
46  charitability, self-conscious emotions, and moral condemnation.
47 n online social networks, a process we call "moral contagion." Using a large sample of social media c
48 out sacrificial dilemmas generalize to other moral contexts where there is tension between utilitaria
49                                     Stronger moral conviction about a given attitude object, for exam
50                                  Variance in moral conviction also predicts important social and poli
51 cept of injunctive norms and the relation to moral conviction.
52 quences of attitudes that are experienced as moral convictions, that is, attitudes that people percei
53                             We conclude that moral decision making should evolve as the science of ge
54 tic and hyperaltruistic tendencies influence moral decision making, we investigated trade-off decisio
55 luences on behaviour, science communication, moral decision-making, leadership, and stress and coping
56 wever, is accounting for the biases in human moral decision-making.
57  also consider questions of robot rights and moral decision-making.
58                                              Moral decisions also modulated functional connectivity b
59                                We argue that moral decisions are hardly to be left to a computer.
60 er, it determines the variations in people's moral decisions that can be attributed to the situationa
61                     These biases in people's moral decisions underline the social challenge in the de
62  building machine morality based on people's moral decisions, however, is accounting for the biases i
63                              Under intuitive moral decisions, participants shift more towards a deont
64 e reported studies demonstrate that people's moral decisions, regardless of the presented dilemma, ar
65 t, a public collection of roughly 40 million moral decisions.
66 er se but that it depends on an individual's moral default.
67 thesis, showing why the status we ascribe to moral demands and considerations exhibits the otherwise
68 inctive tendency to objectify or externalize moral demands, and it is then argued that this salient f
69 ow the human brain is engaged when viewing a moral dilemma between genetic vs. non-genetic sisters.
70                                              Moral dilemma judgements frequently involve decisions wh
71 ffect of the steroid hormone testosterone on moral dilemma judgements using a double-blind administra
72                                  Sacrificial moral dilemmas are widely used to investigate when, how,
73 n-making modes affect their decisions in the moral dilemmas faced by autonomous vehicles.
74  reviews the debate around these ethical and moral dilemmas more broadly but focuses specifically on
75 ing COVID-19 pandemic has raised ethical and moral dilemmas that Western nations with first-rate medi
76  administration led to increased inaction in moral dilemmas where harmful actions prohibited by moral
77  reasoning in a more focused way to specific moral dilemmas, all of which involve a tension between t
78  on skeptics of moral knowledge to show that moral disagreement arises from non-rational origins.
79 It is overly charitable to the argument that moral disagreement undermines moral knowledge.
80 nce and cognitive reflection explain much of moral disagreement.
81  elements that allow human groups to resolve moral disagreement.
82 nt's condition were more likely to have high moral distress (34% vs 22%, p < 0.001), and this persist
83 is a valid and reliable instrument to assess moral distress among critical care clinicians and develo
84                                              Moral distress experienced by clinicians can lead to low
85                       Most of the studies on moral distress have used the Moral Distress Scale or its
86                                              Moral distress is a common experience among critical car
87  the studies on moral distress have used the Moral Distress Scale or its revised version (Moral Distr
88 ms to explore the factorial structure of the Moral Distress Scale-Revised and develop a valid and rel
89                                  The Italian Moral Distress Scale-Revised evinces good reliability (a
90 factor analysis was conducted to explore the Moral Distress Scale-Revised factorial structure.
91                                  The Italian Moral Distress Scale-Revised is a valid and reliable ins
92                                  The Italian Moral Distress Scale-Revised is composed of 14 items ref
93                                          The Moral Distress Scale-Revised was translated into Italian
94 Moral Distress Scale or its revised version (Moral Distress Scale-Revised).
95  included questions adapted from the revised Moral Distress Scale.
96 No significant differences were found in the moral distress total score between physicians and nurses
97                                              Moral distress was higher for those clinicians consideri
98                          Surgeons experience moral distress when they feel pressured to perform surge
99 end of life that may contribute to surgeons' moral distress, particularly when external factors, such
100 ntion, were not associated with high surgeon moral distress.
101  to seriously ill older adults and surgeons' moral distress.
102 ay reduce non-beneficial surgery and surgeon moral distress.
103 he nature of moral intuitions, the status of moral dumbfounding, and the prospects of dual-process mo
104         Here, we show that the expression of moral emotion is key for the spread of moral and politic
105 mpt is typically studied as a uniquely human moral emotion.
106 in the videos that included risk-related and moral-emotional language, highlighting content features
107 = 563,312), we observed that the presence of moral-emotional words in messages increased their diffus
108                                 The norms of moral evaluation previously considered most socially ben
109 ondition, suggesting that these two types of moral evaluations are neurobiologically dissociable.
110 udy the role of empathy-the capacity to form moral evaluations from another person's perspective.
111  measure DLPFC/TPJ activity recruited during moral flexibility, and examined its effect on other doma
112 (Michaelis-Menten, Briggs-Haldane, and Botts-Morales formalisms), and genetic repressor kinetics, the
113 sequences for ourselves and others forms the moral foundation of our society.
114                       I demonstrate that the moral foundations literature is not able to do the work
115 al knowledge via appeal to empirical work on moral foundations.
116  possibilities come moral concerns about the moral humanization of animals, especially when it comes
117 nce of emotion in the social transmission of moral ideas and also demonstrate the utility of social n
118 works to investigate processes by which some moral ideas spread more rapidly or broadly than others.
119 luded the unequal worth of human beings, the moral imperative of preserving a pure Aryan people, the
120                               I focus on the moral implications of this discrimination and on the pos
121 ure to violence disrupts the ability to form moral impressions that dissociate between agents with di
122 nowledgment of and strategies for addressing moral injury; 6) the need for peer and social support in
123 timistic about the prospects for progress in moral inquiry than he contends.
124 y interprets the prevalence of non-emotional moral intuitions as indicating support for rationalism.
125 ever, because humans evolved a shared set of moral intuitions, and are compelled to justify their mor
126 h perspectives on measurement, the nature of moral intuitions, the status of moral dumbfounding, and
127  target article) omits humans' deontological moral intuitions.
128 is a global public health, human rights, and moral issue that is associated with a substantial mental
129 l of post-conventional moral reasoning judge moral issues based on deeper principles and shared ideal
130                                          The moral issues surrounding equal access aside, understandi
131 ts indicate that the role of testosterone in moral judgements is more complex than suggested by previ
132                                              Moral judgements regarding the function of the aggressio
133 emotional disgust and disgust sensitivity in moral judgment and decision-making has been debated inte
134  too weak to be the basis of any substantive moral judgment and do not fit with the idea that moralit
135 mation, but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.
136 aims about the causal influence of affect on moral judgment are overblown.
137   We note that though the role of disgust in moral judgment has been questioned recently, few studies
138 y the perceived suffering of a victim colors moral judgment of an accidental harmdoer.
139 ventional version of the same dilemma with a moral judgment, a policy preference, or an economic choi
140 quantitative predictions in studies of human moral judgment, and distinguish it from alternative mode
141 onstrates shared moral cognition, not shared moral judgment, and therefore, May's attempt to defeat g
142 asoning, planning, linguistic communication, moral judgment, etc.
143 gside other well-characterized mechanisms of moral judgment, such as outcome-based and rule-based thi
144 s and sets the stage for a broader theory of moral judgment, which the coming decades may bring forth
145 disparity between simulated moral action and moral judgment.
146 ubstantial diversity in what has been called moral judgment.
147  and the prospects of dual-process models of moral judgment.
148 arning varied with individual differences in moral judgment.
149 age) improves a computational model of human moral judgment.
150 eoretically and empirically, four classes of moral judgment: evaluations, norm judgments, moral wrong
151  experiment, groups whose members could make moral judgments achieved greater cooperation than groups
152  level of conscious awareness) in generating moral judgments and decisions.
153  the brain's frontostriatal reward system in moral judgments and prosocial behaviors.
154           Morality has two key features: (1) moral judgments are not solely determined by what your g
155 etermined by what your group thinks, and (2) moral judgments are often applied to members of other gr
156       We show that adults spontaneously make moral judgments consistent with the logic of universaliz
157 that framing effects would cause trouble for moral judgments even if his estimates were correct.
158 other's self-interest and build cooperation, moral judgments have most often been studied as processe
159 iefs, because they affect only a minority of moral judgments in small ways.
160                                       Mature moral judgments rely on the consideration of a perpetrat
161 rmfulness information for different types of moral judgments, and individual differences in the exten
162 stimates of the extent of framing effects on moral judgments, and then we argue that framing effects
163 ght the role that reasoning quality plays in moral judgments, we review literature that he did not me
164           At the center of this research are moral judgments-evaluative judgments that a perceiver ma
165 se against the primacy of emotion in driving moral judgments.
166 t might serve as the rational foundations of moral judgments.
167 other factors into consideration when making moral judgments.
168  same time, emotion certainly is involved in moral judgments.
169 out the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments.
170 natomical basis of individual differences in moral judgments.
171 rmfulness information determined severity of moral judgments.
172                 The burden is on skeptics of moral knowledge to show that moral disagreement arises f
173      Joshua May responds to skepticism about moral knowledge via appeal to empirical work on moral fo
174                    Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people
175 which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.
176  argument that moral disagreement undermines moral knowledge.
177 e of moral obligation, observations of early moral language may provide useful evidence complementary
178                         Our findings suggest moral learning favors efficiency over flexibility and is
179                          Finally, model-free moral learning varied with individual differences in mor
180 , neural activity consistent with model-free moral learning was observed in subgenual anterior cingul
181                                   There is a moral logic to reasoning about political violence.
182 y this exploratory method on a subset of the Moral Machine dataset, a public collection of roughly 40
183 y selfish actions, thus suggesting that some moral manipulations may backfire.
184 commentary on May's Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, I argue that many of the interdisciplinary m
185 iversalizing holds an important place in our moral minds.
186 created and maintained in the form of shared moral narratives and system-justifying ideologies.
187 annot easily handle cleansing effects in non-moral, non-disgusting contexts.
188 ents that a perceiver makes in response to a moral norm violation.
189  sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms and general preference for inaction versus a
190 udgements frequently involve decisions where moral norms and the greater good are in conflict.
191 dilemmas where harmful actions prohibited by moral norms increase overall well-being.
192 nced judgements by increasing sensitivity to moral norms.
193 ne were associated with lower sensitivity to moral norms.
194 the role of emotions in the social origin of moral norms.
195             Previous research has found that moral nudges (e.g., making norms salient) can promote pr
196               We find that, in this context, moral nudges increase donations by about 44 percent.
197               In Study 5, we explore whether moral nudges promote charity donations to humanitarian o
198            Here we present a class of simple moral nudges that have a great positive impact on pro-so
199     Drawing on research on sacralization and moral objectivism, I show how "moral rigidity" may have
200 ce that nonhuman animals manifest a sense of moral obligation (i.e., the concept of fairness) in thei
201       Tomasello argues that humans' sense of moral obligation emerges early in development, relies on
202         Tomasello describes how the sense of moral obligation emerges from a shared perspective with
203 argues in the target article that a sense of moral obligation emerges from the creation of a collabor
204 on" is psychological, what it is a sense of, moral obligation itself, is not.
205 sello's account of the origins and nature of moral obligation rightly emphasises the key roles of soc
206 alth care system, including patients, have a moral obligation to contribute to improving that system.
207 lo's proposed ontology of the human sense of moral obligation, observations of early moral language m
208 umans' understanding of the relation between moral obligation, sociality, and stancetaking in interac
209 of Tomasello's explanation for the source of moral obligation, we suggest that it develops from the c
210 d individuals who perceived vaccination as a moral obligation.
211 d more so the stronger they perceive it as a moral obligation.
212 tionships and this develops into respect and moral obligation.
213 , is key to the emergence and development of moral obligation.
214 lifelong preoccupation with the sociality of moral obligation.
215                                              Moral obligations conflict (loyalty vs. fairness), and s
216 young children reject unfairness, and assert moral obligations, both inside and outside their groups.
217  between how humans judge different types of moral obligations, such as prescriptive obligations (i.e
218  for how people balance different social and moral obligations.
219            We also identify a new strategy, 'moral opportunism', in which participants adaptively swi
220 , and realistic human sculptures, to enhance moral paradigms that are often contextually impoverished
221 and independently validate three interesting moral phenomena: criminal dehumanization, age of respons
222 obligation as a distinctly human motivation, moral philosophers have identified two of its key featur
223   The Foundation will include a committee on moral philosophy that will accompany and supervise biome
224                                              Moral philosophy, however, can handle contemporary biome
225  media communications about three polarizing moral/political issues (n = 563,312), we observed that t
226                              Assessing human moral potential needs to integrate a transdisciplinary a
227 How do people judge whether someone deserves moral praise for their actions?
228 developmental, and consumer) suggesting that moral praise is a fundamentally unique form of moral att
229                  Most participants displayed moral preferences, placing a higher cost on harming othe
230 isgust is associated with more deontological moral preferences.
231                                          The moral principle guiding intersubject trade-off decision
232 roup membership, suggesting an unconditional moral principle.
233  emotion interacts with beliefs, values, and moral principles through a process of coherence-based re
234                 Individuals employ different moral principles to guide their social decision-making,
235  different individuals may utilize different moral principles.
236 -human entities, such as ideals, values, and moral principles.
237 ven erroneously) to others, moral virtue and moral progress are still possible.
238 , I argue that many of the interdisciplinary moral psychologists whom May terms "pessimists" are ofte
239                                     However, moral psychology has yet to incorporate the study of soc
240                                  An adequate moral psychology of obligation must bear in mind that al
241                                  Tomasello's moral psychology of obligation would be developmentally
242                                              Moral psychology suggests that judgments of robot respon
243  puzzle for evolutionary approaches to human moral psychology that existing proposals do not help to
244 compelling case that reasoning is central to moral psychology.
245 actices that help people ask more and better moral questions promise to improve moral reasoning.
246 g, so it is a matter of asking and answering moral questions, which requires both creativity and curi
247                                        Human moral reason (nous) emerges from all of these.
248 at what I call philosophical optimists about moral reason are also committed to empirical optimism, o
249                 The "veil of ignorance" is a moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial dec
250                                              Moral reasoning is a species of such reasoning, so it is
251 gs suggest that high-level post-conventional moral reasoning is associated with increased activity in
252 reach the highest level of post-conventional moral reasoning judge moral issues based on deeper princ
253 In response, I elaborate on my conception of moral reasoning, as well as clarify the structure of deb
254 e pre-conventional and conventional level of moral reasoning, post-conventional individuals showed in
255 nd better moral questions promise to improve moral reasoning.
256                  People vary considerably in moral reasoning.
257 le of 64 participants at different levels of moral reasoning.
258 riendly criticism of May's fantastic book on moral reasoning: It is overly charitable to the argument
259 toring justice, while also highlighting that moral reputation hinges on whether punishment is enacted
260 ory mouse welfare is a fundamental legal and moral requirement as it is critical part of both maintai
261 mics may also lead individuals to relinquish moral responsibility by conforming to the majority's pre
262  and prevail in conflict are high levels of "moral rigidity" in their tribal members, that is, of inf
263 alization and moral objectivism, I show how "moral rigidity" may have evolved through partner selecti
264 582 in study 2) were presented with a set of moral scenarios and asked to judge the acceptability of
265                                          The MORAL score provides a simple, highly accurate tool for
266                                      The Pre-MORAL score was constructed from the hazard ratios and a
267  to both pursue personal gain and preserve a moral self-image is to misremember the extent of one's s
268 s, such as the willingness to maintain one's moral self-image, but also by instrumental or strategic
269 mediate this conflict between reward and our moral self-image, the exact role of cognitive control in
270 eby potentially warding off threats to their moral self-image.
271 ften engage in actions that contradict their moral self.
272      Hypotheses include inequity aversion, a moral sense that inequality is intrinsically unfair, and
273 t punishment acts as a conduit for different moral signals depending on the social context in which i
274 orate realistic haptic feedback into virtual moral simulations.
275 he resulting prevalence of a divided "we" in moral social groups.
276                        I thus opine that our moral-social capacities fare badly in profoundly unjust
277 togenetic, and evolutionary relations of the moral stance to the intentional and group stances and to
278                   The natural history of our moral stance told here in this commentary reveals the cl
279  may help prevent future confusion about the moral status of complex models of human development.
280    Which computations characterize different moral strategies, and how might they be instantiated in
281 ntaneously and consistently employ different moral strategies.
282 decision-making, thus expressing a specific 'moral strategy'.
283                                              Moral systems universally prohibit harming others for pe
284        Extant reports of children's everyday moral talk reveal patterns of participation and content
285                                Adults punish moral transgressions to satisfy both retributive motives
286 We discuss how relational values differ from moral values and raise the issue of their ontogeny from
287 e Nazi Party and imparted Nazi political and moral values in their teaching.
288  mechanisms by which social influence alters moral values.
289  plant binary food choice reflects society's moral views on eating right.
290 red to Victims, Jurors are more sensitive to moral violation severity and less readily swayed by the
291 unitive preference also extends to weightier moral violations such as assault and theft.
292 trast, dehumanization does not contribute to moral violence because morally motivated perpetrators wi
293 letely human-increases instrumental, but not moral, violence.
294 d and rational (even erroneously) to others, moral virtue and moral progress are still possible.
295                                     The post-MORAL was constructed similarly using the 4 postoperativ
296                            The pre- and post-MORAL were superior to Milan at predicting recurrence wi
297 ird-parties are perceived as relatively more moral when they punish, while victims are not.
298  then combined the scores to produce a combo-MORAL, with a c-statistic of 0.91 for predicting recurre
299 moral judgment: evaluations, norm judgments, moral wrongness judgments, and blame judgments.
300 onal devaluation of offenders, judgements of moral wrongness, mock-legislated punishments and perpetr

 
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