ライフサイエンスコーパス: pay for performance

1 politan areas across the nation about use of pay for performance.

2 hen using these data for quality reports and pay for performance.

3 gh-income countries that were not exposed to pay-for-performance.

4 fairly disadvantaged in public reporting and pay-for-performance.

5 d using the results for public reporting and pay-for-performance.

6 etting that are used for public reporting or pay-for-performance.

7 the current climate of public reporting and pay-for-performance, 30-day mortality after inpatient su

8 spitals engaged in both public reporting and pay for performance achieved modestly greater improvemen

9 service and capitation), less is known about pay for performance and blended systems.

10 therapies and in-hospital mortality between pay for performance and control hospitals.

11 hors examine the potential conflicts between pay for performance and medical professionalism and conc

12 n level between variations in achievement of pay for performance and mortality.

13 t of quality-improvement initiatives such as Pay for Performance and the Physician Consortium for Per

14 or measuring postoperative complications for pay-for-performance and public reporting polices.

15 To acquaint rheumatologists with pay-for-performance and the American College of Rheumato

16 sional regulation, restricted reimbursement, pay for performance, and prescription requirements.

17 d and tested, particularly bundled payments, pay for performance, and value-based purchasing.

18 Public reporting and pay for performance are intended to accelerate improveme

19 Additional studies of pay for performance are needed to determine its optimal

20 such programs, and examined the adoption of pay for performance as a function of the characteristics

21 for public reporting of hospital quality and pay-for-performance because they are a relatively common

22 increased from $16000 to $19230 and exceeded pay-for-performance bundled payments starting in 2008.

23 h Service of the United Kingdom introduced a pay-for-performance contract for family practitioners.

24 of achievement in the first year of the new pay-for-performance contract.

25 e services, levels of detected hypertension, pay for performance data) as candidate explanatory varia

26 ican College of Physicians hopes to move the pay-for-performance debate forward with a patient-center

27 yments; yet, value-based purchasing (VBP) or pay-for-performance, defined as providers being paid fee

28 lities that simultaneously participated in a pay-for-performance demonstration project funded by the

29 e 2 diabetes (T2D) patients using the Taiwan Pay-for-Performance Diabetes Registry and claim data fro

30 th the potential limiting of resources, in a pay-for-performance environment, the provision of futile

31 erences in hospital performance rankings and pay-for-performance financial incentive categories (top

32 ally, 16.5% of institutions (n = 74) changed pay-for-performance financial status categories after ac

33 Conversely, we did not find evidence that pay for performance had an adverse association with impr

34 Pay for performance has become a central strategy in the

35 Pay for performance has been promoted as a tool for impr

36 Among newer efforts to improve quality, pay for performance has been proposed to propel better r

37 Pay for performance has increasingly become the subject

38 Pay-for-performance has the potential to help improve th

39 While public reporting and pay for performance have the potential to improve qualit

40 Among both pay-for-performance hospitals and those in the national

41 As compared with the control group, pay-for-performance hospitals showed greater improvement

42 and Medicaid Services; we then compared the pay-for-performance hospitals with the 406 hospitals wit

43 as inversely associated with improvement; in pay-for-performance hospitals, the improvement in the co

44 The introduction of pay for performance in all NHS hospitals in one region o

45 o assumptions underpin the implementation of pay for performance in Medicare: that with the use of cl

46 mportant to leverage the early experience of pay for performance in the commercial market.

47 nting more than 80% of persons enrolled, use pay for performance in their provider contracts.

48 es such as additional collaboration fees and pay for performance incentives.

49 State-level adoption of GBP with pay-for-performance incentives may be effective for cost

50 benchmarking, sharing of best practices, and pay-for-performance incentives may improve antibiotic us

51 gh benchmarking, sharing best practices, and pay-for-performance incentives.

52 e physicians will limit the effectiveness of pay-for-performance initiatives that rely on a single re

53 RATIONALE: Pay for performance is an increasingly common quality im

54 sults, but many observers are concerned that pay for performance is at odds with medical professional

55 Pay for performance is intended to align incentives to p

56 Pay for performance is now commonly used by HMOs, especi

57 Value-based purchasing, or pay-for-performance, is a major emerging theme in U.S. h

58 In the era of pay for performance, it is imperative that we understand

59 romoting quality measurement, reporting, and pay for performance, it is unknown whether these ideas h

60 Process measure pay-for-performance led to significant improvements in E

61 Unless significantly redesigned, pay-for-performance may not be a successful strategy to

62 Performance measures, particularly pay for performance, may have unintended consequences fo

63 ure in 2015 and is now planning to make it a pay-for-performance measure by incorporating it into the

64 minently in surgical quality improvement and pay-for-performance measures.

65 for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as pay-for-performance metrics.

66 a marker of quality of care and are used in pay-for-performance metrics.

67 In this study, a pay-for-performance model led to modest increases in the

68 A better solution may lie in a pay-for-performance model.

69 ionalism and conclude that properly designed pay-for-performance models can support professional obje

70 As the design of Medicare with pay for performance moves forward, it will be important

71 We found that the effects of pay for performance on mortality did not differ signific

72 Although pay for performance (P4P) has become common, many worry

73 Pay for performance (P4P) is a mechanism by which purcha

74 Most evaluations of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives have focused on lar

75 Pay-for-performance (P4P) is increasingly touted as a me

76 antial financial penalties from readmissions pay-for-performance (P4P) measures.

77 ween a national commercial insurer's ongoing pay-for-performance (P4P) program for oncology and chang

78 Pay-for-performance (P4P) programmes to incentivise heal

79 The benefits of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are uncertain.

80 In 2009/2010, a target-based pay-for-performance (P4P) scheme in Britain was introduc

81 In January 2015, a pay-for-performance (P4P) strategy was included in the p

82 At the same time, a large literature on pay-for-performance (PFP) linkages does exist, but most

83 Medicaid Services (CMS) launched the largest pay-for-performance pilot project to date in the United

84 Practice guidelines have been usurped by pay-for-performance police, on patrol for deviations--no

85 ctive levels of financial incentives used in pay-for-performance policies and associated challenges w

86 n-level net monetary benefit was achieved in pay-for-performance policies with 10-minute door-to-need

87 upper bound of financial incentives used in pay-for-performance policies, although currently, this a

88 formance) compared with various hypothetical pay-for-performance policies.

89 provider payments to quality and value using pay-for-performance policies.

90 text article.) CONCLUSION: A provider-driven pay-for-performance process for CABG, enabled by an elec

91 Program (QIP) is the first mandatory federal pay for performance program launched on January 1, 2012.

92 ractices in England in the first year of the pay-for-performance program (April 2004 through March 20

93 failure, and pneumonia for hospitals in the pay-for-performance program and those in the national sa

94 A pay-for-performance program based on the Hospital Qualit

95 th asthma were identified from Taiwan asthma pay-for-performance program database, but patients with

96 mortality for the conditions included in the pay-for-performance program decreased significantly, wit

97 medical expenditures with a bundled-payment pay-for-performance program for breast cancer in Taiwan

98 Payment Modifier (PVBM) Program, a mandatory pay-for-performance program for physician practices.

99 l incentives in hospitals participating in a pay-for-performance program in England were not maintain

100 no evidence that the largest hospital-based pay-for-performance program led to a decrease in 30-day

101 centive Payment System (MIPS) is a mandatory pay-for-performance program through the Centers for Medi

102 oluntary quality-improvement initiative, the pay-for-performance program was not associated with a si

103 In the English pay-for-performance program, physicians use a range of c

104 ive design in phase 2 of Medicare's flagship pay-for-performance program, the Premier Hospital Qualit

105 al infarction to 24 hospitals covered by the pay-for-performance program.

106 ed for approximately 1.5% of the cost of the pay-for-performance program.

107 rk (QOF) is the world's largest primary care pay-for-performance programme.

108 Many governments have introduced pay-for-performance programmes to incentivise health pro

109 Pay for performance programs being introduced by Medicar

110 Pay for performance programs compare metrics that are ri

111 that are appropriate for public reporting or pay-for-performance programs and is meant to serve as a

112 Pay-for-performance programs are being adopted internati

113 Pay-for-performance programs are growing, but little evi

114 As pay-for-performance programs focus attention on individu

115 gs and eligibility for financial benefits in pay-for-performance programs for treatment of myocardial

116 Forces enhancing adoption of pay-for-performance programs include continued increases

117 research is needed on how implementation of pay-for-performance programs influences their effects.

118 Pay-for-performance programs may be a promising quality

119 Pay-for-performance programs may be associated with impr

120 measures, patient ratings of their care, and pay-for-performance programs may penalize healthcare pro

121 are important components of public reports, pay-for-performance programs, and quality improvement in

122 We determined the prevalence of pay-for-performance programs, detailed the features of s

123 Of the 126 health plans with pay-for-performance programs, nearly 90% had programs fo

124 ion reporting brings substantial benefits to pay-for-performance programs, providing that the process

125 E as a benchmark for hospital comparison and pay-for-performance programs, supporting appropriations

126 incorporating 30-day surgical mortality into pay-for-performance programs, these findings serve as a

127 These findings may have implications for pay-for-performance programs, which may create an incent

128 tient-centered care of chronic conditions in pay-for-performance programs.

129 lth plans are establishing a wide variety of pay-for-performance programs.

130 not yet appropriate for public reporting or pay-for-performance programs.

131 not yet appropriate for public reporting or pay-for-performance programs.

132 y improvement efforts, public reporting, and pay-for-performance programs.

133 urgical site infections for benchmarking and pay-for-performance programs.

134 VTE rates are publicly reported and used in pay-for-performance programs.

135 ld likely not be used in public reporting or pay-for-performance programs.

136 reported quality metrics soon to be used in pay-for-performance programs.

137 l quality assessment programs in the form of pay for performance, report cards and national rankings

138 Pay for performance resulted in modest changes in physic

139 on immediately after the introduction of the pay-for-performance scheme (P<0.001) and then continued

140 A pay-for-performance scheme based on meeting targets for

141 art failure management, including a landmark pay-for-performance scheme in primary care and a nationa

142 As compared with the period before the pay-for-performance scheme was introduced, the improveme

143 increases in the quality of care before the pay-for-performance scheme was introduced, the scheme ac

144 Changes to pay for performance should be carefully designed and imp

145 ital mortality were incrementally greater at pay-for-performance sites (change in odds of in-hospital

146 Prevention (CDC) risk adjustment models for pay-for-performance SSI did not adjust for patient comor

147 s not currently used to design or prioritize pay-for-performance strategies or metrics.

148 e providers are reimbursed by implementing a pay for performance system that rewards providers for hi

149 ity remained similar after 6 years under the pay-for-performance system (11.82% for Premier hospitals

150 in rates for specific patient subgroups, and pay for performance therapeutic thresholds.

151 improvement for 2 of 6 targeted therapies at pay-for-performance vs control hospitals (odds ratio [OR

152 To determine if pay for performance was associated with either improved

153 formance and other hospital characteristics, pay for performance was associated with improvements ran

154 Use of pay for performance was statistically associated with ge

155 physicians and hospitals will be receiving 'pay-for-performance', whereby our income will depend on